

Henry Hazlitt Interviews

DR. LUDWIG ERHARD
on Germany's Economic Recovery

Who Owns the Weather?

Paul Hollister, Jr.

Roadhouse to Freedom

Norbert Muhlen



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THE Freeman

*A Fortnightly
For
Individualists*

Executive Director
Managing Editor

KURT LASSEN
FLORENCE NORTON

Contents

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Editorials

The Fortnight	329
What Treaty-Made Law Can Do	331
The Second-Hand Deal?	332
Issues at Berlin	333
Failure of a Mission	334
Short and Long of Butter	334

Articles

Where Germany Stands Today	
Interview with DR. LUDWIG ERHARD	335
Laymen's Revolt in the Churches	EDMUND A. OPITZ 338
Roadhouse to Freedom	NORBERT MUHLEN 340
Lesson for the Left	HUBERT MARTIN 342
Our Mediterranean Bastion	HENRY C. WOLFE 343
Who Owns the Weather?	PAUL HOLLISTER, JR. 345
Letter from Italy	R. G. WALDECK 347
An Answer to Tito	BOGDAN RADITSA 349

Books and the Arts

Man, the Absurd	JAMES BURNHAM 351
Germany's Benighted Knights	ASHER BYRNES 353
Mr. Rhine's Shadowy Cat	MAX EASTMAN 354
Stainless Stanton?	LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR. 354
Survival in Hell	LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ 355
Veblen Once-Over	GEORGE J. STIGLER 356
Briefer Mention	356
The U.N. on Broadway	NICOLAS MONJO 357
No Greater Love	358

From Our Readers

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Our Contributors

The success of his direction of West Germany's economy has placed DR. LUDWIG ERHARD among the recognized leaders of Europe, indeed of the free world. In personal meeting, there is nothing in his modest genial manner to suggest that he is aware of his undisputed importance. Robust, energetic, hard-working, there is at the same time an easy informality about him. An eloquent speaker, he seems on the platform more teacher (which he was for a number of years) than orator, explaining complex subjects with absorbing clarity backed up by gestures that suggest self-confident force.

There has been extensive controversy in recent months about Communism in the Churches. Another more encompassing movement has been much less publicized—that of equating Christian idealism and socialist ideas. EDMUND A. OPITZ has described how one such group, going under the name of Council for Social Action, was organized and has developed.


A day or so after his return in January from Europe, NORBERT MUHLEN, whose articles from Germany have appeared in recent issues of the FREEMAN, stopped in for a visit. During a conversation about some of the more solemn aspects of what he had seen and heard, we asked: "But weren't there some bright spots?" "Why, yes," he said after a moment, "the Russian Freedom House." And what could that be, we wondered, thinking of an American institution of that name. "For men who have fled from Russia and have nowhere to turn," he said, "it is a sort of roadhouse to freedom." That gave us the title for the moving story he wrote and sent us within the week.

Is America justified in establishing bases in Spain? HENRY C. WOLFE, who has just spent some months in the Mediterranean area, answers in the affirmative and explains why.

PAUL HOLLISTER, JR., artist as well as writer, began to wonder as a result of more than the usual intrusions of the weather on outdoor painting if perhaps something might not be done about the situation. His investigation led him not only into the arguments about what can be done, but the even more controversial discussion of who has the right to do it.

From the COUNTESS WALDECK in Rome, we received as we were going to press a startling revelation of a political fact behind the Italian cabinet crisis that has been curiously suppressed.

For the further enlightenment of Marshal Tito as well as our readers we asked BOGDAN RADITSA to supplement his claim in our January 11 issue of a secret Yugoslav-Soviet agreement, Mr. Raditsa's answer is made up entirely of information published in the Yugoslav press over the past year.



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FROM OUR READERS

From Cover to Cover

Just finished digesting the January 11 issue of the FREEMAN and, as usual, found it as accurately and devastatingly critical as in the past. From Mr. Pettengill's letter ("Why the Dollar Shortage?"), which should be read from the rostrum of every high school auditorium of the land, to the back cover I relished the contents.

Belle Haven, Va.

L. BARNETT

Lost Favor

Re: Your editorial, "The G.O.P. Poll," in the issue of January 11. The President and the G.O.P. have lost favor for continuing the same Truman, Acheson, F.D.R. policies, both here at home and abroad. We voted against all socialistic schemes. Now they are to be broadened and forced on the people, who like to plan their own security and be free. . .

De Ridder, La.

MRS. L. M. BROOK

The Titoist Dream

I must praise you for having published the remarkable article of Mr. Raditsa ("Tito's Secret Alliance with Moscow," January 11). Poisoned by Titoism, many people think the Communist world and the free world can coexist. What a dream!

Baltimore, Md.

JOHN KEE

Gloriously?

. . . In his book review ("Biography of a Butcher," December 14), Mr. Stuhlmann writes of Himmler: "Yet what made him the coldblooded murderer who died, ingloriously, in 1945, by swallowing cyanide?" Of course, everything is relative. But does Mr. Stuhlmann really infer that the other Nazi leaders tried before a tribunal of a rather dubious composition, one of whose presidents is slated to appear before the McCarthy Committee, and hanged by a hangman who is reported to have been a bloody amateur (to say the least) died gloriously or more gloriously?

Again the funny . . . idea that a man who commits suicide is a crook because the community does not give its blessing.

New York City

HUGO C. GOLLMER

A Reply

I quite agree with Mr. Gollmer when he says that in the contemplation of historical events and personalities "everything is relative." Thus, my remark was quite obviously related to

the particular circumstances of Himmler's death. For I could not help noticing the perhaps ironical relation between the frightened figure of the late Reichsfuehrer, who had vainly tried to escape his fate in the guise of an ordinary soldier, and who found himself in British custody, wrapped in a blanket, trapped by his own fear, and the "Nordic ideals" of heroism and glory the same man had proclaimed while sending millions of people to the gas chamber.

My remark did not, as Mr. Gollmer infers, relate to my opinion of the manner in which other Nazi leaders found their well-deserved end.

New York City GUNTHER STUHLMANN

Mr. Herblock's Cartoons

Morris H. Rubin, on your Letters page of January 25, writes that cartoonist Herblock "is clearly established as the creator of the expression ["McCarthyism"]—and few more effective foes of the tyrannies of Communism and Fascism are abroad in our land."

I remembered reading references to Mr. Herblock in the FREEMAN's predecessor, *Plain Talk*, looked up the article ("The Washington Post" by O. J. Dekom, March 1948), and found:

The *Washington Post* has led a crusade against the loyalty program. Typical of its attitude on this score was a cartoon by Herblock showing "1,600,000 Government employees" being forced to walk barefoot over a pile of glowing coals and spiked boards, while two savage witch doctors explained, "if you're innocent you won't holler."

The *Post* was responsible for most of the difficulties experienced by the State Department in its feeble efforts to get rid of its own pro-Soviet employees. It was largely the newspaper's constant hammering that forced the Department to beat a retreat in the case of seven security risks, in spite of FBI evidence to the contrary. Herblock ridiculed the State Department in a cartoon showing a typical Washington cocktail party where a browbeaten fellow, wearing a gag, was told, "You're with the State Department, I presume." . . . For this cartoon, the *Post* received a public letter of gratitude from the Communist-infested UPWA.

Doubtless Mr Herblock is, as Mr. Rubin says, a "foe of the tyrannies of Communism." But it seems to me that by ridiculing in such cartoons the loyalty program (incidentally, of the Truman Administration), he did his bit more than six years ago toward fostering the fashionable sneering attitude on "witch hunts" in government that contributed to the loss of our vital defense secrets to the Kremlin, and the loss of China to the free world.

Chicago, Ill. ANNE R. HOLTON

THE *Freeman*

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1954

The Fortnight

The Eisenhower Administration, during the past two weeks, presented its major legislative and financial blueprints to the American people. Unfortunately, in appeasing the New Dealish wing of the Republican Party and the Democrats in Congress, the White House failed to provide the economic leadership, courage, and independence of thought which its earlier supporters had a right to demand.

The new budget, when you come right down to it, failed its essential test: it did not bring income and outgo into balance. President Eisenhower tried to encourage the thrifty-minded when he asserted that "the trend clearly is toward a balanced budget." But former President Herbert Hoover, citing Benjamin Franklin, made a more poignant comment when he said that "governmental debt and borrowing" were "the road of sorrow and in general the destroyers of liberty."

What the Eisenhower messages failed to consider was the fact that expensive welfare-state operations do not mix with balancing the budget, any more than do oil and water. We welcome the President's tax proposals, designed to "encourage the initiative and investment which stimulate production and productivity"; but, as is stated elsewhere in this issue, we are disturbed to find in the Administration's program no renunciation of its Roosevelt-Truman predecessors.

The anti-Communist prisoners are free! That is the first and central point. We may perhaps believe that they should have been freed long ago, that they should not have been submitted to the farce of the neutral custody and the indignity of the interrogation. We may regret that General Thimayya turned them back to the U. N. under a cloudy, equivocal formula. Still, history is seldom cut to a clear and courteous pattern. The central fact remains: they are free. Our pledge and our honor have been upheld. We may be certain that no iron or bamboo curtain will keep this news from spreading throughout the dark realm of the Soviet empire. For the masses of the peoples now

subject to the tyranny of the Kremlin, the freeing of the Korean prisoners will like a flash of light display the road to their own future freedom. The tyrants themselves, the rulers of the empire, will also ponder long over the news of the freeing of the prisoners. In the end, this news may prove a far stronger deterrent to their plans of aggression than all possible A- and H-bombs. Struck with the certainty of freedom, their armies would dissolve faster than under the impact of split atoms. If we are really willing to commit ourselves to it, we shall find that there is a mighty power as well as honor and glory in the ideal of freedom.

As the prisoners walked south to freedom, the Communists poured the rhetorical vials of their foul and bitter wrath over the heads of the Indian custodial authority. So endeth each episode of appeasement or neutralism. The Indians thought that they had discovered a smart trick whereby to get out of their awkward assignment but not themselves take any responsibility for freeing the prisoners. (Nehru, the international moralist!) They got just what they deserved, and exactly what they could have expected if they were willing to learn from the experience of thirty-five years: a kick in the face from the totalitarians, and the quiet contempt of the lovers of freedom.

It has been generally understood that Hawaii would be admitted as the forty-ninth state during this session of Congress, but that the admission of Alaska would be held up. Recently a bill has been introduced to couple the two together. It seems possible that this is a parliamentary move designed not so much to speed Alaska as to delay both. Such delay may be well advised. There are those who say that Harry Bridges, the West Coast Communist leader, not only controls organized Hawaiian labor but is the most powerful figure in Hawaiian politics. We do not feel that either Congress or the public is sufficiently informed concerning this alarming possibility. Delay on admission could be profitably used to give a thorough and public airing to the whole matter. It may be that a general Hawaiian housecleaning is in order before the islands are granted the privileges of statehood, among which the election of congressmen, senators, and Presidents is numbered.

Detroit has just illustrated two opposite views on the nation's economic future. Walter P. Reuther of the C.I.O. and United Automobile Workers sent what the newspapers call a "plea" to the White House, in which he claimed that "clearly, a recession has set in," and called for a get-together on some New Deal-type pump priming. A few days later, General Motors President Harlow H. Curtice announced that his company would put \$2,000,000,000 into expanded plants during the next two years. Frankly, when G.M. is willing to put that much cash on the barrelhead of tomorrow's economic stability, Mr. Reuther's plea sounds shrill, artificial, and feeble.

Retired hard coal miners in northeastern Pennsylvania are learning a hard lesson in welfare financing. Some 13,000 of them will, from now on, receive only \$50 instead of \$100 per month; death benefits have been reduced from \$1,000 to \$500. The welfare fund now owes the United Mine Workers \$4,000,000, and cannot keep up its payments. As it is financed out of current income—50 cents per each ton of coal produced—the anthracite welfare fund is subject to fluctuations in hard coal output. Our government's ambitious Social Security system, lacking a continuous and solid cash basis, is little more than a gigantic replica of the shaky anthracite union fund. Thus, what is happening in northeast Pennsylvania is a warning to all welfare planners.

Messrs. Norman Armour, Robert Woods Bliss, Joseph C. Grew, William Phillips, and G. Howland Shaw, all five of whom are retired diplomats of integrity and distinction, have seen fit to issue a joint statement in which they condemn criticism of the Foreign Service. To come thus to the defense of their former colleagues, with whom they have many ties of career and sentiment, is naturally within their right. Moreover, it is in order to remind the public that there are no grounds for questioning the loyalty of the majority of the members of the career Foreign Service. However, we would find this joint statement more convincing in its content if there were any record that these five men, or any of them, had been equally sharp in condemning publicly those individual Foreign Service officers who betrayed their trust, or equally acute in criticizing the official *Foreign Service Journal* for its all-out support of every derelict from Alger Hiss to John Stewart Service.

Another pair of innocent, victimized "liberals" has blown up on their supporters. Harvard Professor Wendell H. Furry and Harvard Research Assistant Leon J. Kamin earlier took self-righteous refuge in the Fifth Amendment when asked about their possible Communist connections. Harvard President Nathan M. Pusey saw nothing in this to disqualify them from service on the Harvard

faculty. Suddenly, on January 15, they abandoned the Fifth Amendment, and admitted to the permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that they had indeed been Communists, and for considerable periods—including the period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Professor Furry's Communism had covered the years 1943-45, when he had been on secret radar research at M.I.T. He refused to name his associates on that project, although he obviously has no way of knowing whether they may not have been, and still are, active in espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Mr. Kamin made a similar refusal. These two men are now in formal contempt of the Senate, as well as in plain defiance of the public security and interest. Dr. Pusey's somewhat ambiguous remarks on January 19 failed to dispute this point.

The passing of Sir Ernest Benn leaves a vacancy that will be more keenly felt because there were so few like him. During his seventy-eight years he saw nothing but the constant growth of state power all over the world; yet this only increased the vigor of his battle against it. He was a founder and president of the Society of Individualists, and he remained an unrepentant individualist to the end. His last book, *The State the Enemy*, published in London only a year ago, was an admirable restatement and summary of his views, full of new illustrations of the deplorable results of the growth of socialism and statism. His persistent and often lonely fight of course brought down upon him the ridicule of the statists; but he was well able to take care of himself in the battle of wits. We append one example: "Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it wrongly, and applying the wrong remedy."

The pigeon that made the two-thousand-mile flight from Murmansk, in northern Russia, to the Gulf of Genoa was no Picasso dove of peace, but a political refugee from behind the Iron Curtain, since it refused to go home and was finally adopted as a mascot by the crew of an Italian fishing boat. The pigeon showed good judgment, political and weatherwise, in its change of habitat. If it could talk about slave labor conditions in the Murmansk area, it would be the most useful kind of mascot for Italian anti-Communists.

A committee of Indian saints has proposed that the Big Four Foreign Ministers hold their negotiating sessions in the nude, preferably under the chairmanship of Nehru, also nude. This seems to us the most constructive idea that has come out of India in some while. It would cut oratory down to a minimum: the usual platitudes would be just too ridiculous if issuing from a naked speaker. And it would be impossible for anyone to conceal any cards up his sleeve.

What Treaty-Made Law Can Do

A question of supreme law touching the lives, liberty, and property of every one of us has become so involved in purposeful and sinister confusion that a lay person who tries to follow the argument may have the lost feeling that he comes out where he went in.

The nominal subject is a proposed amendment to the Constitution called the Bricker Amendment. It has been approved by the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, by more than sixty Senators, by the American Bar Association, and by more than eighty civic and patriotic organizations.

Commonly in the news from Washington and in most newspaper editorials this proposed amendment is referred to as a measure to limit the treaty-making power of the President. Unconsciously or not, that is propaganda; it is no such thing. It is a measure to limit the application of treaty-made law to the domestic concerns of the United States. The power of the President to make treaties with other countries in the field of foreign affairs would remain as it is. Only when a treaty began to affect domestic law would the limitation apply.

And why is treaty-made law so dangerous? Because Article VI of the Constitution of the United States says: "All treaties. . . shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the Constitution or the law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."

For nearly 175 years those words have stood there in the Constitution without giving us any trouble. Why now do they bring about what may be called a constitutional crisis?

The trouble is that the world has changed. When those words were written the problem was how to unite the states for any foreign policy at all. But at that time, what was foreign policy? It was something that began at the water's edge. A treaty was confined strictly to foreign policy; it was to regulate something that otherwise could not be regulated, and it had nothing whatever to do with internal or domestic laws. A treaty touched only such things as boundaries or fishing rights or the flights of migratory birds.

Now it is very different. Now we are involved in a vast network of social, political, and military treaties, and a series of executive agreements rising to 10,000 in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty alone. In view of this situation and the new doctrine of the State Department that "there is no longer any real difference between domestic and foreign affairs," it follows that treaties can automatically make law for citizens of the United States with no action of Congress or state legislatures.

That is treaty-made law.

Treaty-made law has already been in collision

with state laws, and state law has fallen. You may read all the literature put forth by the forces opposing the Bricker Amendment without once coming across the startling truth that as the laws now stand the Charter of the United Nations is the supreme law of the land because the Charter of the United Nations was adopted and ratified as a treaty; or the fact that in the recent steel seizure case if five Justices instead of three had voted with Chief Justice Vinson, President Truman would have been upheld in an unconstitutional act by the United Nations Charter and there would have been nothing anybody could do about it.

In a recent press conference President Eisenhower announced his unalterable opposition to the Bricker Amendment on the ground that it would take the country back to pre-Constitution days, when, under the Articles of Confederation, no one could speak with authority for the American government; everyone had to think of the separate states and what they might do. In his conduct of foreign policy he was not going to undertake the impossible task of speaking, not for the American government as an entity, but for forty-eight state governments.

It is incredible that Mr. Eisenhower could have arrived at that absurdity by himself alone. He must have got it from the legalistic minds of the forces opposing the Bricker Amendment, who invented it, and probably from the mind of John W. Davis, a constitutional lawyer who ran for President on the Democratic ticket in 1924. Mr. Davis says the Bricker Amendment "is a shocking attempt to set us back into the very situation of national impotence which was one of the main causes of the downfall of the Articles of Confederation." Well, a layman, in all common sense, may say that this argument, besides being absurd, is dishonest. Why? Because it conceals the question.

The question is not whether a state may, in Mr. Eisenhower's words, have "the right to repudiate a treaty." The question is whether a treaty may nullify a state constitution which Congress has no constitutional power to touch.

The President is reported to be friendly to the Knowland substitute for the Bricker Amendment. This will require your full attention. This plan is intended to kill that part of the Bricker Amendment that strikes at the very secret of exalted executive power. The two amendments are deceptively similar. If you put them side by side and read them to find wherein they differ, you will have to watch your step, for the difference is skillfully contrived. It is the omission of four words in Section 3, an omission that leaves the door wide open to executive agreements in place of treaties,

and exempts them from the provision as to treaties that they shall not take effect as internal law without legislation by Congress—executive agreements such as Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. Meantime a new substitute plan is being drafted making further compromises in the same direction.

Is that what the opponents of the Bricker Amendment want? It behooves them to say specifically what they think they could do under the Knowland substitute that they might not be able to do under the Bricker Amendment.

As a lay person you may find comfort in throwing all the legalistic arguments in the waste basket and looking only at the character of the opposition to the Bricker Amendment. Its spearhead now is a New York organization calling itself a "Committee for Defense of the Constitution." This feat of semantics is reminiscent of the slogans that got the country into World War Two, especially, "Defend America by Aiding the Allies." The entire cult of internationalists, of interventionists, of one worlders, all who think national sovereignty is a fetish that ought to be burned on the altar of mankind's welfare, are solidly arrayed against the Bricker Amendment. This includes the romantic liberals who have been silently thinking for years that the short cut to reform in the United States is by means of treaty-made law.

There is one question to ask them. Are they happy with where the State Department's conduct of foreign policy has landed us, under existing doctrine? If they say yes, there is nothing more to argue about. All that you can do then is to choose your world.

The Second-Hand Deal?

During the past several weeks, the President has amplified his State of the Union message with a series of special messages dealing with major fields of national interest and policy. He has made his recommendations to Congress with respect to agriculture, labor, social security, health, taxes, and the budget. We should thus be by now in a position to size up his program as a whole, and to discover the principles upon which it is based.

As it turns out, it is still not possible to arrive at a clear estimate or a measured judgment. We cannot be sure just where the President stands, because he insists on speaking in terms of a free enterprise system while recommending a program that has as its premise the theory that the federal government is responsible for the welfare and well-being of the individual.

The President has often told us that his "philosophy" is middle-of-the-road. He seeks to avoid "extremes" and to adjust or compromise differences. The marks of this philosophy and this effort are plain on the recommendations that he has made to

Congress. Except in the technical military field (which we discussed in our last issue), there is no sharp break with the past, and no straight-line course set for the future. There is a little something for nearly every group in the population, but no one gets a heaping portion. There are reflections of a dozen economic and political theories, but no commitment to any.

The Taft-Hartley Act is going to be changed somewhat, but not enough to get too excited about one way or the other. The government will be made more efficient and economical, but we really won't worry about balancing the budget. Agricultural subsidies are a bad idea, but we will not risk upsetting some farmers by eliminating them. We will subsidize medicine without (we hope) socializing it. And so on.

With this kind of approach, it is natural that among the specific proposals each citizen can find some of which he approves and a number that he dislikes, or toward which he is indifferent.

But the matter of philosophy, policy, *direction* is of a different kind. If your two possible destinations are respectively North and South, then you can't "compromise" by going East. By turning East you just get nowhere. So it is with the great issue that is perhaps fundamental for our time: the issue of "big government," of the relation of the individual human being to the state. Let us grant that you can't just turn the clock back, and that practical concessions on specific problems are sometimes necessary. But you cannot compromise your direction of motion. You must be moving toward or away from bigger government, toward increasing freedom for individual human beings or toward increasing subordination of individuals to the state.

With respect to this basic issue, the President's program, as expressed in these messages, is most unsatisfactory, and not a little disturbing. It is true that he has swung the government's pendulum somewhat away from the grosser excesses of Fair Dealism, that he recognizes business as part of the community, and that economic success is no longer treated as an inherent moral crime. But he has altogether failed to rededicate this country unequivocally to the ideals and practices of individual freedom. The messages on social security and health not merely place "economic security," "confidence," and "medical care" within the province of government, but assert unqualifiedly that "the human problems of individuals are a proper and important concern of our government."

This is the philosophic premise that underlies all forms of statism and collectivism, from the Roosevelt-Truman creeping varieties to the fully developed socialisms and communisms in which they all must in time eventuate. We cannot believe that in electing Dwight Eisenhower the citizens of this country were asking to be served a second-hand version of the Old Deal.

Issues at Berlin

There is no reason for regarding the conference at Berlin as an occasion for rejoicing. It is a disagreeable necessity, not a promising opportunity. The conference must be considered a defensive holding operation, not a means of expanding the frontier of the free world.

An international conference very rarely succeeds in reaching any positive results unless it meets against a background of substantial agreement among the participants, worked out in preliminary negotiations. There was certainly no such preliminary agreement as a prelude to Berlin. The protracted exchange of notes between Moscow and the Western capitals which led up to the Berlin meeting revealed only open disagreement openly arrived at.

A second cause for concern about the outlook for the Berlin Conference is that the Soviet government is under no pressure from its own side to moderate its demands, to withdraw from its extreme positions. It has no allies, only satellite puppets. The United States, on the other hand, is the leader of a coalition which, especially in its French sector, is extremely shaky.

No newspaper in Warsaw or Prague or Bucharest will address to Mr. Molotov the admonitions to be patient and flexible which the *Times* of London and the *Manchester Guardian* (not to mention the Bevanite *New Statesman* or the neutralist *Le Monde*) are likely to offer to Mr. Dulles. And this is only one of many forms of restraining pressure which operate on the American side of the conference table and are nonexistent on the Soviet side.

If the Secretary of State is not to succumb to the siren voices of appeasement, he should lash himself firmly to the mast of principle. There is a basic proposition on the German issue which the United States delegation must uphold to the bitter end, regardless of pressure from any direction. It is that Germany can be reunited only on the basis of free elections throughout the country. That such elections could not be held in the Soviet zone without a complete dismantling of the present apparatus of governmental terror and oppression is a Soviet concern, not ours. There can be no yielding on this point, no acceptance of any scheme, however artfully camouflaged, that could lead to a merger, futile at best and probably very dangerous, of a totalitarian Soviet zone with a West Germany living under free institutions. On this point, incidentally, there is full agreement between Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the Social Democratic opposition.

Should the very unexpected happen and the Soviet Union consent to German reunion in freedom, other issues would arise. One would be the proper east-

ern frontier of Germany. Another would be the location of governmental power in Germany during the interval between the holding of the election and the organization of a new all-German government.

However, these issues are not likely to arise in practical form. The Red Army is a powerful force in the present Soviet political set-up. That the Red Army leadership would be willing to withdraw from the Soviet zone of Germany, especially from the Baltic coast, is improbable, to say the least. The chief task of our delegation at Berlin, unless there is an unforeseeable and sensational softening in Soviet policy, will be to keep the record clear, to present our case so clearly, temperately, and forcefully that no non-Communist Frenchman will feel, after the Berlin Conference, that a deal with the Kremlin is possible.

There is an obvious parallel between the tactics of stalling obstruction which Moscow pursued before the Berlin Conference and which Peiping has followed in preliminary talks about a Far Eastern political conference. The objective is the same: to extort concessions by playing on Western impatience for a peaceful settlement.

However, there is a case for a varied American reaction to these same tactics. The Berlin Conference is a hurdle that has to be taken before French action on E.D.C. can be expected. It is most unfortunate that this conference is being held before the European army is an accomplished fact. But if the Berlin meeting was unavoidable—perhaps it was, in view of the psychological atmosphere in western Europe—it was preferable to hold it as soon as possible, even at the price of a minor concession about the place of meeting. If the conference breaks off, as it well may, it should be on some clear, fundamental issue, not on a relatively unimportant dispute about procedure.

In the case of the Far Eastern conference, on the other hand, there would seem to be no good reason for paying any price, even a small one, to expedite matters. It would certainly be most unwise to back down on our insistence that India, which has again played its expected role as a pro-Communist "neutral" in its attitude on the anti-Communist prisoners, has no place in a conference on Korea. Nor should we admit the preposterous Communist claim that the Soviet Union should be admitted as a neutral.

There is nothing to be expected from a Far Eastern conference. The partition of Korea is an accomplished fact which no amount of talk is likely to change. The most sensible course to follow in the Far East is to serve a curt final notice on Peiping that if Red China and North Korea want to attend a conference for winding up the Korean war on the terms we have suggested with U.N. approval, they can do so. But we see no useful

purpose to be served in listening to Communist quibbling, bickering, and propaganda tirades. And it is, or should be, a matter of pretty complete indifference to us whether the Far Eastern conference is held next month, next year, or at all.

Failure of a Mission

Shortly after the start of the new year, stories about a "new look" in America's China policy began to appear. One of the strongest of these was in the *New York Herald Tribune*, under the signature of Roscoe Drummond, a seasoned journalist not addicted to sensationalism. Mr. Drummond began his article with the alarming suggestion that "there are a number of highly placed, strongly anti-Communist officials of the State Department who think that the time may not be far distant when the United States may find it desirable to recognize Communist China and approve her membership in the United Nations."

He went on to explain this point of view with arguments common to British discussion of the Chinese issue. Recognition would not imply moral approval. There is an increasing prospect that Mao Tse-tung will assert independence of the Kremlin. The Red Chinese regime should not be "driven into the arms of Russia"—on the rather dubious assumption that it has ever been anywhere else. And so on.

The incident that seems to have touched off this and similar stories was an interview with Arthur Dean, American representative in the suspended talks with the Chinese and North Korean Reds at Panmunjom and former law partner of Secretary of State Dulles.

Fortunately, the reaction of the State Department to this line of talk has been one of genuine displeasure and repudiation. It is intimated on the highest authority that no change is contemplated in America's policy of not recognizing the regime in Peiping and of opposing its admission to the United Nations. There is clear recognition that the disadvantages of appeasing this regime would far outweigh the alleged advantages. Such an action on our part would be tantamount to throwing up the sponge for the weak and dispersed anti-Communist forces in East Asia. There would be a rush to get on what seemed to be the winning side, to climb on Mao Tse-tung's bandwagon.

An important consideration is the attitude of the large and commercially and financially important Chinese overseas communities in Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. These communities have hitherto remained loyal to the Free China government in Formosa. Should the United States pull the rug from under that government, the overseas Chinese communities might well

become fifth columns for Red Chinese expansion into this economically and strategically important part of Asia.

This whole incident should be a stimulus for additional signatures to the petition against the admission of Red China into the United Nations, sponsored by the Committee for One Million, with headquarters at 36 West 44 Street, New York. As for Mr. Dean, it would seem that his usefulness as an American amateur diplomat in the Far East is ended. If we must have someone to talk with the Chinese and North Korean Reds it should be someone who will not talk out of turn, who will not give out statements calculated to dishearten our friends and encourage our enemies in Asia.

Short and Long of Butter

Moscow has been shopping in the United States for capitalist butter, which sells in the Soviet Union at about \$3.25 per pound. The Russians are short some 150,000,000 pounds of butter, for which they are bidding avidly in the world market.

We've got a long memory, which goes back to last October, when Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan told the hungry and thirsty Soviet proletariat just how well off it was, compared to the decrepit Western nations. Mikoyan let it be known that even champagne had "become accessible to the working people of our country, which is an indication of our general prosperity."

But even the Soviet man does not live on champagne alone, and he likes some butter on his bread. That something is seriously wrong with Soviet farm production was even admitted in the charges against Secret Police Chief Lavrenti Beria, who was executed in December. But we never expected the Muscovites to come all the way to Mankato, Minnesota—where they tried to buy American surplus butter—to make up what was lacking in their dairy production.

Soviet cows and kolkhozes cannot be commandeered into higher output, any more than our own domestic economy can survive continuous control and quota systems. The Commodity Credit Corporation, which has asked that its borrowing authority be increased to \$8,500,000,000 this year, will have spent some \$6,000,000,000 in farm price supports by June 30. While the C.C.C. clamors to have its budget increased, those two bureaucratic giants, the Departments of State and Agriculture, are at odds over the proposed use of \$1,000,000,000 worth of farm "surplus" as so-called aid to foreign nations.

The more self-reliant countries abroad are afraid of what they call American "dumping." The Communist nations, with their Marxist economies on the rocks, are only too ready for a slick deal or a U.S. government-subsidized handout.

The FREEMAN Interviews

DR. LUDWIG ERHARD

Minister of Economics,
Federal Republic of Germany

Where Germany Stands Today

The much-publicized recovery of Germany in the past five years has been conceded by friend and foe to be a victory for the principle of a free economy. The overwhelming success of Dr. Konrad Adenauer in the September election is generally regarded as a tribute to this principle and to the man who put it into effect—his Economics Minister, Dr. Ludwig Erhard. Dr. Erhard is an affable Bavarian who combines scholarship with an exceptional gift for the practical application of his knowledge. It was he who in 1948, confronted with the repressed inflation of National Socialism, instituted a sweeping monetary reform and re-established free prices and competition. (See "Economic 'Miracle' in Germany," by Wilhelm Roepke, the FREEMAN, August 24, 1953.) With Germany again a participating member in the community of nations, Dr. Erhard has pressed for the extension of the principle of a free market to her relations with the other countries of Europe and to the United States. During Dr. Erhard's recent visit to America, Henry Hazlitt in a personal interview submitted to him a series of questions on some of the whys and wherefores of his country's economic situation both domestic and international. These questions with Dr. Erhard's acute answers provide a detailed and accurate statement of where Germany stands today both in the matter of internal economy and in regard to the critical subjects of exchange control, the European Payments Union, the International Monetary Fund, the Coal and Steel Union, and a prospective West European tariff union.

Question: To what do you chiefly attribute the economic recovery of Germany in recent years?

Answer: The economic recovery of the Federal Republic can be attributed primarily to the industry and creative capabilities of employees and employers. But these two factors could unfold only in a free economy. The necessary prerequisites for this were the currency reform and the steady abolition of controls, price regulations, and other government-directed measures. Besides, the Marshall Plan aid has also helped considerably to facilitate the recovery of our economy.

Question: What respective importance do you

attach to the 1948 monetary reform and to the dismantling of price controls in bringing about this recovery? Or do you think of these as merely two indispensable parts of the same reform?

Answer: Before the currency reform, the German economy was in the grip of a ceiling-price inflation. That is, while there existed a substantial money surplus, prices were regulated by law and no longer expressed true value relations. All goods were subject to a total economic regimentation. The currency reform in 1948 provided a necessary cut in the money surplus and hence made it possible to adjust the relation between the amount of goods available and the money value. Even more important, however, was the natural correction of the general price level, which followed that first adjustment. This re-establishment of a healthy, market-economy price structure was accomplished by the extensive lifting of price controls at the time of the currency reform. Thus, currency reform and the freeing of prices constitute but two aspects of the same process which made possible the recovery of the German economy.

Few Price Controls Remain

Question: Could you cite some of the economic controls that were dropped in addition to controls on wholesale and retail prices?

Answer: It would be easier to answer that question if you had asked whether there are still any goods and services in the Federal Republic subject to price regulation. Because of social considerations or of the fact that in some branches of our economy the special structure of the market has made impossible an immediate competitive adjustment of prices, some goods still remain under state price control. For instance, the prices for household utilities, electricity, and gas; certain rents; traffic rates; and some farm products.

But even in these fields we shall try to get rid of state intervention. In the trades and industry sector, which are my department, there are now practically no price controls.

Question: Do you believe there is more to be done in removing the economic controls in Germany that still remain?

Answer: An economy must always be integral.

Therefore, it will be necessary to adopt the principles of competitive economy also in the field of housing, for instance, in the capital market, etc. Some steps in this direction have already been taken in the capital market.

Question: What is your attitude toward present exchange control?

Answer: As you know, I have for some time been advocating the removal of exchange control, since free international competition is impossible under such control. Until this goal is reached, we in Germany will do everything possible to ease the controls as far as this can be done one-sidedly. In this connection I want to point to our introduction on January 1, 1954, of a measure designed to free a specified amount of blocked mark accounts, to the gradual re-establishment of the transfer of dividends of foreign capital investments in Germany, and to the pending introduction of an initial liberalizing free-list for imports from the dollar area.

Exchange control is and remains unsatisfactory. It is impossible to build honest and free competition on the basis of unrealistic and arbitrarily fixed rates of exchange. Progress in the free world can only be made, and peace can only be secured, when the free world is united harmoniously by freely convertible currencies.

International Action Sought

Question: Do you believe that Germany can abandon exchange control acting alone, or would this, in your opinion, have to be accompanied, in order to assure its success, by abandonment of exchange control in Great Britain and in other countries?

Answer: It would be much easier to abandon exchange control if several countries should undertake the step together. This would reduce the danger of discrimination by countries with soft currencies. At present nobody in Germany considers abolishing exchange control in the Federal Republic alone, but we will do everything possible to promote this idea in Europe.

Question: What are the chief economic and political obstacles in Germany to abandonment of exchange control?

Answer: A particular difficulty in abandoning exchange control, which also includes capital exchange, is the fact that the problem of *Sperrmark* (of blocked mark accounts)—that is, the funding or repayment of short-term capital obligations to foreign countries—has not been completely solved. But I hope that before the end of this year we shall find final solutions to this problem too. Another obstacle, in view of our exposed border situation, is the often discussed danger of the flight of capital through the action of holders of foreign exchange in Germany. In my opinion this danger should not be overestimated. The solution of the *Sperrmark* problem should, incidentally, give us important

clues as to the actual extent of this danger. A strengthening of the freely convertible currency reserves by creating a common currency stabilization fund, seems to be another important prerequisite for the abolishing of exchange control. Nevertheless you must have no doubt that Germany belongs to those European countries which are prepared to take immediate and determined steps toward free convertibility.

European Payments Union

Question: Do you favor Germany's remaining in the European Payments Union? Is the continuance of the European Payments Union compatible with the abandonment of exchange control in Europe?

Answer: The European Payments Union was created as a transitory system to accomplish full convertibility. I believe the time has now come to take the decisive step. The E.P.U. would serve its purpose best if it should become the driving force in this development. At the forthcoming conference about extending the E.P.U. until June 30, 1955, Germany will work to that end.

An abandonment of exchange control in the member states would automatically remove the basis of the E.P.U. system.

Question: Do you favor the continuance of the International Monetary Fund? Do you think Germany should be a member? Would there be any further need for the International Monetary Fund after a general abandonment of exchange control and a resumption of full currency convertibility?

Answer: The German Federal Republic became a member of the International Monetary Fund in 1952 because she approved the objects of that organization. These objects include, among others, the creation of a multilateral system of payments between the member states, and the abandonment of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the development of world trade. I consider the continuation of this organization desirable, because it can give welcome aid both in the transition to full convertibility and in the long-term safeguarding of convertibility. A general abandonment of exchange control will not make the International Monetary Fund superfluous. On the contrary, only when that is achieved will it realize its full significance and capacity for growth. Germany will continue to support actively the International Monetary Fund.

Question: What are the prospects of the continuance of investment control in Germany?

Answer: In the Federal Republic there is no general investment control in the sense of legislation for or against investments. Only in the fields of utilities and building is it required to register investments, so that contemplated investment schemes may be objected to or even prohibited.

So far as production and investment controls are based on Allied legislation, they are enforced

Dr. Erhard's Philosophy

By HENRY HAZLITT

It is fair to say that during the past five years West Germany has taken greater steps away from government controls and toward a free market economy than any other country in the world. During this same time it has made a greater and more dramatic economic recovery than any other nation. It is reasonable to conclude that the first has been the cause of the second.

It is particularly significant that this nation which acted so vigorously in the removal of controls was the same nation that had adopted them in their most extreme and thoroughgoing form (with the sole exception of Russia) under the regime of Hitler and Schacht. And it is particularly ironic that it was long delayed in or prevented from dismantling these controls by the democratic Allied occupation authorities. But after the new policies were adopted, they received overwhelming endorsement by the German people at the polls.

The man most responsible for West Germany's return toward a free market policy, and for its dramatic consequences, has been Dr. Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economics. In this special FREEMAN interview Dr. Erhard explains his economic philosophy and gives his own version of the steps that were chiefly responsible for the German recovery,

and of the steps that he believes must still be taken if this recovery is to be maintained and consolidated.

Dr. Erhard, it will be seen, places equal importance on the currency reform of 1948 and on the dropping of price controls at that time, considering them to be "but two aspects of the same process." He believes that more remains to be done internally, because an economy must be integral, and "the principles of competitive economy" must be further extended in the fields of housing and in the capital market.

In the foreign field, Dr. Erhard believes that free international competition is impossible under exchange control; but he also contends that it would be difficult for Germany acting alone to abolish exchange control, because of the dangers of discrimination by countries with soft currencies. "At present nobody in Germany considers abolishing exchange control in the Federal Republic alone, but we will do everything possible to promote this idea in Europe."

Dr. Erhard contends that a West European tariff union, including Germany, is desirable, but that such a tariff union should not be the beginning but rather the end-product of European integration.

by the Military Security Office (MSB) in Coblenz. These controls will be abolished as soon as the German Treaty has been concluded. It is too early yet to say to what extent controls may possibly remain in such fields, for instance, as atomic research and defense production (within the framework of the E.D.C.).

Aside from these limitations, the German economy is not subject to any kind of investment control that would be inconsistent with a free market economy.

Question: What is the long-term outlook for the European Coal and Steel Union? Do you favor the extension of its principles to other commodities?

Answer: The European Steel and Coal Union is a first step on the road to the economic integration of Europe. Its future development depends upon how far it may be possible to supplement and expand it by horizontal integration. The simple addition of attempts at integration in other fields,

following the example of the Steel and Coal Union does not seem to me the right way to attain the goal of an economically united and healthy Europe. This goal is generally acknowledged to be necessary, but the integration has to take place in a functional way.

Question: Do you think a West European tariff and customs union, with Germany as a member, is necessary or desirable?

Answer: A West European tariff union, including Germany, is definitely desirable. But this must not lead to a replacement of tariffs by other measures of import regulation in various countries. The eventual abolition of tariffs has to be accompanied by a re-establishment of currency convertibility, an abolition of quantitative import restrictions and of other measures which impede true international competition. For practical reasons, however, such a tariff union should not be the beginning but rather the end-product of European integration.

Laymen's Revolt in the Churches

By EDMUND A. OPITZ

Without their knowledge or approval millions of church members are contributing to denominational social action groups dedicated to hastening the advent of the welfare state and a planned economy.

Every religion has something to say about human conduct in society. Without social ethics religion is moribund. "Religion," Ludwig von Mises has written, "must provide [the believer] an answer when he asks why there are rich and poor, violence and justice, war and peace, or it will force him to look for an answer elsewhere." Thoughtful laymen are not critical because social questions are being asked by churchmen, but they are concerned—and some are in active revolt—about the one-sided nature of the answers that are too frequently being made to questions about the relation of religion to society. Their concern is over the fact that the pronouncement of many church councils on social theory, the writings of prominent theologians, and the "social action" groups of various denominations have exhibited a pronounced and consistent bias in favor of Socialism or "a new social order."

In 1948 a resolution was passed by the World Council of Churches meeting in Amsterdam that shocked laymen into an awareness of the distance between their own thinking and that of some of their official spokesmen. The resolution declared that the world church condemned alike the ideologies of Communism and laissez-faire capitalism. Its import was to place a stamp of Christian approval on something closely approximating British Socialism, as a sort of middle-of-the-road position for Christians between capitalism and Communism.

Long before the appearance of the Amsterdam resolution the way had been paved for it by movements within the various churches. In 1930, for example, the Fellowship of Socialist Christians (now called Christian Action) was organized primarily around Reinhold Niebuhr. Within a few years the professional strata in the church had been captured or infiltrated by this largely non-Communist left. In 1935 John C. Bennett, who took part in framing the Amsterdam resolution, wrote: "The leadership and many strategic centers, such as theological seminaries and church boards and periodicals, in most of the denominations are committed to the position that Christianity demands drastic changes in the structure of social life." The "drastic changes" Dr. Bennett had in mind would result, he said, in "an economic order based upon the social ownership of the large sources of wealth and power."

No true Christian would repudiate Dr. Bennett's concern with the problems of our social life and his earnest desire to remove injustices. However, is it necessary to accept the Socialist diagnosis and remedy as the only way to combat the social ills of which we are daily and personally aware?

Socialist Thinking Gains

In the last fifty years the Socialist ideology, under a variety of names and with varying emphasis, has made great headway in academic as well as in religious circles. In all fairness it is not surprising that these intellectuals and religious leaders gave Socialist answers to social questions. Over the period of an entire generation those competent to carry on the tradition of historic liberalism were shut off from an audience by the trend of the times. This state of affairs was due in part to the leaders of a triumphant business civilization, who subsidized Socialists in order to exhibit the breadth of their own minds. Thinkers who might have furthered men's understanding of a truly free society received little encouragement. Later, as the New Deal got under way, the business community began to have qualms about what might happen to it, but with few exceptions did little to oppose the trend toward centralized government.

By 1950 the Socialist avalanche had, intellectually at least, reached a resting point. Since then its inadequacies have been pointed out in a number of books and periodicals and by organizations devoted to creating a wider understanding of the libertarian philosophy. This reasonable change in the climate of intellectual opinion removed whatever excuse might have existed for the continuance of the dubious denominational "social action" groups. At least so it seems to resolute laymen, who protest, and are taking action, against the partisan activities carried on by their denominational social action agencies.

A group of such laymen was organized in May 1950 in the Congregational denomination under the leadership of men well informed in social theory, and also articulate libertarians. By March 1952 the research efforts of this committee and other laymen throughout the country had aroused the denomination to the point where the Executive Committee of the General Council of the Congrega-

tional Churches appointed a nine-man Board of Review to look into the activities of its Council for Social Action, organized in 1934. Their report, submitted last October (and widely commented upon in the press), generally concurred in the laymen's view.

The Congregational Council for Social Action was the first of such groups in the churches. Other denominations soon followed with similar councils, all working in cooperation with the social action agency of the National Council of Churches. All are dedicated to hastening the advent of the welfare state and a planned economy by presenting these social objectives as Christian imperatives.

The Goal: to Abolish Capitalism

The temper of the General Council—the national body of the Congregational Church—may be judged by a resolution it passed at the June 1934 meeting which created the social action agency. This resolution condemned “our present competitive profit-seeking economy” which “depends for its existence upon exploitation of one group by another.” It further resolved that:

We set ourselves to work toward: The abolition of the system responsible for these destructive elements in our common life, by eliminating the system's incentives and habits, the legal forms which sustain it, and the moral ideals which justify it; the inauguration of a genuinely cooperative social economy democratically planned.

The thousand-odd delegates at the meeting were told by Hubert Herring, the first head of the Council for Social Action: “It is revolution. The old patterns are torn up. Rugged individualism, the sacred right of capitalism. . . are dead . . . The day of profit is done.”

Support for the Council for Social Action was to come from money contributed by members of the Congregational Church for missions. Thus, the million or more Congregationalists in America are today contributing approximately \$100,000 a year to the work of an agency that is oriented toward Socialism.

Among other things the Council for Social Action did with this money was to maintain a full-time lobbyist in Washington. He was not there to speak for the Council—it is too small a group to carry much weight. But Congressmen are interested in what a million and a quarter churchgoers think. Thus, he passed himself off as the spokesman for this much larger and more significant body, many of whom had never heard of him. In their name he pressured for the kind of legislation endorsed only by the Council for Social Action and in many cases violently opposed by the very people he claimed to represent.

The “social action” crowd is, of course, entitled to their particular beliefs about what is best for

the rest of mankind. But they have no ground on which to expect or demand support out of denominational benevolence to advocate socialist ideas not shared by the majority of the members of the denomination. Other socially concerned groups, such as the Congregational-Christian Pacifist Fellowship, neither receive nor seek support from denominational benevolence; it should be the same with the Council for Social Action.

The reluctance of the “social action” group to accept an equal position with others who are also trying to improve society according to Christian ideals is explained by two facts. First, they believe, as they themselves point out, that they are called upon to “witness to the convictions of an advanced minority. . . without being chained to majority or consensus”; that they are above the “narrow class interests which unhappily characterize large segments of their denominations”; they have “a broader perspective than the average layman can hope to have.” Their contempt for the churches that support them is evinced by a phrase they have taken over from a European critic: to them American Protestant churches are “bourgeois ghettos.”

Influencing Centers of Power

Second, they think in terms of infiltrating and capturing centers of power. The non-denominational movement, “Christian Action,” was founded to “formulate strategies for concerted effort in influencing power centers” in church and community. “All of us are in a position,” its executive secretary has stated, “and all of us can get ourselves into a better position, to advance our common convictions through the religious institutions to which we have direct access.”

Just what are these “common convictions”? The fountainhead of many of them has been Reinhold Niebuhr, so we may properly turn to his latest book, *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (reviewed in this issue of the FREEMAN, p. 351), for an answer. In it he wants us to avoid “the error of the absolute sanctification of government.” On the other hand, he says, we must “recognize the difference between legitimate and illegitimate, between ordinate and inordinate subordination of man to man. Without some form of such subordination the institutions of civilization could not exist.”

The cause of Socialism, Christian or otherwise, has enlisted some noble and generous spirits precisely because they saw in it a social ideal which would end the subordination of man to man. Now that this route has proved to be but the “road to serfdom,” more and more laymen in all denominations can be expected to join in the revolt against those groups in their midst that persist in traveling it. Of these the social action agencies are first and foremost.

Roadhouse to Freedom

By NORBERT MUHLEN

*Where Soviet escapees find a resting-place
in their flight from tyranny, work to do,
a chance to learn what it is like to be free.*

"My name is Beria. Here are my Soviet identity papers. Could you get me a job—any decent job?" The housefather in barracks at Kaiserslautern gave a startled glance at the man who had just entered his office. It was September 1953 and Lavrenti Beria was rumored to be hiding somewhere in Europe. But the earnest young Russian who had spoken could not be more than twenty years old.

The housefather had barely recovered from his surprise when a new visitor came to him with a similar request—his name was Malenkov. Fyodor Beria and Vasily Malenkov, both lately of the Red Army, were two of more than two hundred Soviet defectors who have come to Kaiserslautern in West Germany in search of freedom.

Two years ago Kaiserslautern was a sedate, if not dull provincial town when workmen arrived and began chopping down the beautiful woods which surrounded it. In their place there emerged dreary barracks and airfields, factories and housing projects, constructed by the U.S. armed forces. Today Kaiserslautern's native population of 65,000 are next-door neighbors to over 50,000 Americans and their families. There is also a French garrison, and Turkish, Dutch, Norwegian, Portuguese officers drive on its narrow, cobblestoned streets. This international influx began when Kaiserslautern was selected as the production and supply center of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Walking through the town, you may find that NATO is a reality rather than merely a headlined fantasy.

Close to American juke-boxes, French night-club orchestras, and brassy German jazz bands echoing in Kaiserslautern's night, a chorus of men's voices can often be heard singing "The Volga Boatmen" and other Russian songs. It comes from the horse-shoe-shaped, one-story barracks of Russian Freedom House, which nestles along a wooded ridge on the outskirts of the town. Following the voices, I walked through the front yard of the barracks—where a row of geraniums was the only guard. The door was wide open. Inside half a dozen men in working clothes were singing to the accompaniment of Russian records; a few men played chess; others read, or listened, or drank glasses of tea from an old samovar which dominated the long, bare table.

But a little while ago, all these relaxed workers had worn the uniform of the Soviet Army. Former

soldiers and officers who had escaped, it did not seem surprising that they should be in Kaiserslautern where the free nations are setting up an arsenal against the Kremlin threat. These men form a token contingent of what Eugene Lyons has called "our secret allies"—the peoples of Russia. Talking with them I gathered that they had had no special interest in politics and public affairs before they escaped through the Iron Curtain; if there ever was a cross-section of typical young Russians, it was here. What distinguishes them from the great majority of their countrymen is merely the good luck that assigned them to occupation duty in East Germany or Austria, where they found a chance to flee westward.

Kaiserslautern's Freedom House was founded by the American Friends of Russian Freedom, a group of patriotic Americans who learned in the 1940s of the unhappy fate of Russians in the West, and felt duty-bound to "do something about it." Since 1950 the organization has set up a reception center in Munich for new Russian escapees, helped others with advice and small sums of money, sent some to schools where they could learn a trade, and provided a helpful link between them and the Western world.

One Woman's Crusade

The European director of the American Friends is Sheba Strunsky Goodman, a New York woman with an exceptionally rich store of experience in helping the enemies of totalitarianism. In the years before the war and thereafter, she had played a leading role in rescuing victims of the Nazis; unfashionable and even dangerous as it was at the time, she had taken great pains to exclude from help, and from admission to the United States, the Communists who tried to pose as harmless "anti-Fascists." Since the late 1940s she has concentrated her interest on totalitarianism's most mistreated victims, the anti-Communist Soviet defectors. From her talks with them she soon found that it was of primary importance to find normal jobs and homes for them, to help them help themselves in the West. Only if the opportunities of the free world of which its spokesmen liked to boast were opened to them would the echoes of past failings toward Russian escapees be silenced.

Mrs. Goodman learned of the vast demand for

labor which the new military projects in the Kaiserslautern area had brought about; she went to Kaiserslautern and crusaded for her idea that Russians, if and when they were cleared as bonafide anti-Communists by stringent security investigations, should be helped to get jobs. She finally received such a promise. Barracks where these Russians could live until they found homes of their own was the next step.

When Freedom House was opened in the fall of 1953, its thirty-four tenants hardly knew who among them had been a colonel, who a private in the Red Army. They knew each other as auto mechanics, drivers, salesmen, stokers, plumbers, welders, machinists, and electricians—the jobs the American group had found for them. They are doing exceptionally good work, their foremen assured me, and are quite popular among their American and German fellow-workers.

Why They Crossed Over

Why these men wanted to escape and how they feel about their government indicates how little their rulers have succeeded in producing blindly obedient, blindly enthusiastic “Soviet men.” Usually it was on the spur of the moment, on special provocation, that they fled; their minds had been prepared for this decision in years of frustration and fear. Most often they experienced the shock of recognition on their first homecoming after the war. They had been told that “everything would be better after victory;” they discovered that there was less food, less comfort, more fear of the commissars. Some were afraid of being punished for crimes they had not committed—like the Ukrainian boy who had been deported by the Nazis as a forced laborer, or the lieutenant who had joined General Vlassov’s army rather than starve in a prisoner-of-war camp. Others were sons of former kulaks, nephews of men who had disappeared in Siberia as “counter-revolutionaries,” Mohammedans filled with bitterness about the discrimination against their group in the army, young Communists tempted by the proximity of the Western world and its promises. They were politely surprised at my question as to why they had escaped. Didn’t almost everyone in Russia have good reasons why he would rather live elsewhere?

But their odyssey, and often their tragedy, had only begun when they finally reached the West. Instead of the better life for which they had left their land and their families, they found new dangers and distress. Soviet defectors in the post-war years were likely to be “repatriated” by the Western democracies whose asylum they sought, turned back to the dictatorship they had fled. To avoid this enforced repatriation which usually was followed by a death sentence, many defectors went underground as soon as they reached the West. Some succeeded in “passing” as Germans

or as Displaced Persons of non-Russian origin, and started a new life. Others were less successful in the alien, hostile West where they could not find a job, and were distrusted, if not feared. Some slid onto the road of lawlessness, surviving by black-market deals and more serious transgressions, until they were marked as outlaws.

Forced repatriation ended after 1948, but the escapees were held in Western internment camps and arrest cells for a long time. When they were finally released, it was, as they bitterly remember, “as if an orange had been squeezed dry, and then thrown on a dump-heap.” If they did not choose to remain behind barbed wire, they found themselves penniless and friendless in a strange country.

The Soviet propagandists made the most of this sorry situation. That deserters would be repatriated by the Americans was repeatedly broadcast even after it was no longer true; this not only kept many Soviet soldiers from escaping, but also made them distrust the West. To prove that the Americans still extradited escapees, the Kremlin’s propagandists hit upon a clever trick; soldiers who had tried to escape and had been caught by Soviet guards before they reached the West were paraded before the troops as “repatriated deserters” before they were shot. This happened as late as 1953, and had its effect on the Russian soldiers. In addition, the Soviet press carried rather devastating pictures and reports—many of them unfortunately authentic—on the unhappy life of deserters in the West.

Lessons in Democracy

Freedom House marks a wide step forward from these failures of the West. It does more to prove that there are realities behind the promises and proclamations of the West than many of the propaganda broadcasts beamed behind the Iron Curtain.

Many Soviet escapees have not found it easy to adapt themselves to the ways of the West. “Whenever I spoke the truth in Russia,” a twenty-five-year old former corporal who now works as an auto mechanic told me, “I got hurt; only when I lied did everything go well.” Like many of his comrades, he learned only in Kaiserslautern that lying is not a normal or commendable practice. What the former Soviet soldiers also learned in Kaiserslautern—where for the first time they could speak freely without having to look over their shoulders for informers—was the real reason why they had escaped, a reason many did not fully understand at the time of their escape. They have learned that life is not worth living in a totalitarian order. They want to return to their homeland—but only when it will be free. Or rather, they hasten to explain, while it is freeing itself.

An army whose men would rather be on the other side is of little use to its masters. “The principal

condition for victory," say the Field Regulations of the Red Army, is "to win the working and peasant masses of the enemy army over to the side of the proletarian revolution." To a notable degree, Kaiserslautern's roadhouse to freedom contributes to the "principal condition" of Western victory in a war which will not even start if the Soviet masters know they cannot count on their army. The jobs, and the home, and the benefits of freedom which young Russians find in their unpretentious new barracks may well turn out to be as powerful as, though less destructive and less expensive than, any weapon in our hands.

Lesson for the Left

By HUBERT MARTIN

The corrupting influence of the closed shop upon union practice has just been demonstrated by an incident in a British publishing house. What makes the incident particularly worthy of note is the fact that the firm in which it occurred is being run by a man who may justly claim to have done more than anyone outside the government to put socialism over in Britain—Mr. Victor Gollancz, the publisher of the Left Book Club. Mr. Gollancz felt strongly enough about the case to put it before the British public through the *London Times*.

An employee of the firm for twenty years had been in charge of the trade counter until July 1948, when he was promoted to be a salesman "on the road." On being promoted he gave up his membership in the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers, because traveling salesmen do not come under the jurisdiction of that union and because he had every reason to believe that he would be on the road permanently.

Almost five years later, in the spring of 1953, the salesman contracted Menière's disease, an affection of the ear which upsets the physical balance. Continued traveling would have endangered not only his own life, but the lives of others. As the disease is likely to last for a long time, the firm thought the employee should be returned to his old job.

But now the union stepped in and refused to accept him as a member. When Mr. Gollancz tried to intercede he was informed by its Branch Secretary that the union "does not consider it fair that they should be asked to assist him now that his health is failing and he is unable to follow his usual employment." It was suggested to Mr. Gollancz that the union regarded it as necessary to "punish" the man because he did not do what he might have done when he was promoted—retain his membership "either as an out-of-trade member or by paying full contributions." In other words, the union, having achieved the closed shop, is no

longer content to tax the members whose interests it might claim to defend, but from this vantage point attempts to tax outsiders.

Union Bosses and Workers Disagree

The punishment hit not only the unfortunate man (who, as Mr. Gollancz asserted, had no hope of getting any job in a union house and little possibility of being employed at all), but also the firm which was losing his twenty-five years' experience and his loyal devotion. This did not seem to weigh with the union bosses, who apparently do not care much about the success of business enterprises, not even when British socialism owes them as much as it does to Mr. Gollancz' firm. The workers' representatives within the firm, however, took a different line and made a strong plea that the employee be given back his union card. But they were no more successful than Mr. Gollancz had been.

The airing of the incident in the *Times* in the changed atmosphere of an England under a conservative administration bent upon the abolition of controls in economic life had a fortunate effect. The union leaders readmitted the man to the union and protested to the *Times* that they had been misunderstood. However, the only discrepancy between their story and that told by Mr. Gollancz is that they denied that the word "punish" had actually been used by any union official; they suggested that it might have been employed by some workers' representative within the firm when he tried to guess why the union leaders were barring the reinstatement of the employee. They had no words hard enough for Mr. Gollancz, who, they said, "took advantage of what was an unfortunate expression of opinion. . . to give the general impression that the union, i.e., the general secretary or one of the branch officers, had used the word." They declared that their London branch usually adopted "a most generous attitude on those matters" and they seemed to expect public praise because "the branch placed the man's welfare before the resentment at the attitude of Mr. Gollancz and readmitted him to membership." What they did not explain was why the man was not readmitted before Mr. Gollancz offered them the opportunity to take umbrage.

Mr. Gollancz was aware all the time, of course, that it was in his power to give the job back to the man in defiance of the union. But he said he was afraid that in that case "all the union members would doubtless 'walk out,' and we should be unable to replace them by other union members; accordingly, we should become a non-union house—a course that would be repugnant to us."

Apparently not even a clear demonstration of unpleasant facts on the left could lead the publisher of the Left Book Club to draw unorthodox conclusions.

Our Mediterranean Bastion

By HENRY C. WOLFE

Spain and Turkey constitute modern Pillars of Hercules essential in our planning to prevent an all-out war or, if that conflict comes, to launch a winning offensive.

A strong demand for the immediate admission of Red China to the United Nations was voiced by British Socialist Clement Attlee in Yugoslavia last August. Asked whether he also favored admission of Spain to the U.N., Mr. Attlee answered No. He did not believe that Spain would "subscribe to the conditions of the United Nations Charter." Red China would, he thought. As for Yugoslavia, Britain's former Prime Minister noticed "a general atmosphere of freedom" there. It was Spain where, to him, everything was wrong.

In the face of bitter opposition from the British Labor Party and powerful groups in other nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, including the United States, our government has reached an agreement for the establishment of American naval and air bases in Spanish territory. For such an agreement with Mediterranean Spain, regardless of its socio-political set-up, has become a necessity for our side.

In our strategic planning today the Mediterranean Sea assumes increasing and crucial importance. In this area we can be strongest vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It is here that we can exert our maximum power and influence to try to prevent, if possible, an all-out war; it is from here that we can, if that conflict comes, stage our most powerful offensive to win it.

In ancient mythology the Pillars of Hercules stood on opposite sides of the Strait of Gibraltar. The modern Pillars of Hercules stand at the opposite ends of the Mediterranean: one is Spain at the western end, the other is Turkey at the eastern end. It is on these pillars that the contemporary Hercules (Uncle Sam) is basing his naval and air power. Without the support of Spain, we might, in the event of war, find ourselves cut off at Suez and Gibraltar from our Turkish pillar. Soviet submarines, coming round from the Baltic, might block the Strait of Gibraltar unless we have bases in Spanish territory nearby. In fact, without Spain our entire military-naval-air build-up inside the Mediterranean would risk being isolated from the United States home base. Hence the Pentagon's long, determined effort to reach an agreement with the Spanish government.

Other factors in Europe and North Africa have a bearing on the importance of Spain as an ally. One is the uncertainty of NATO's land strength in western Europe. Another is the appalling weak-

ness of NATO's northern flank in the Baltic region. Still another is the political instability of French North Africa, where nationalist and pro-Soviet movements endanger our air bases. Italy, on which so much of our naval-air strategy has been blueprinted, is increasingly beset by the internal Communist problem. Albania, a small but strategically located satellite, poses a Russian submarine threat right inside the Mediterranean region. To complicate matters, the NATO Mediterranean naval command dilemma, with Britain going it alone, has never been resolved.

Last Line of Resistance

Prior to the Washington-Madrid agreement, officials in the northern NATO countries expressed to me their fears that if the United States became allied with Spain, we would think of the Pyrenees as our main line of defense. This certainly is not American policy today. Nor do the Spaniards favor it. They would much rather have a West European buffer between their country and Soviet military power. But the lack of German contingents in the West's defense, the bickering among the various nations of NATO, the anti-Americanism and appeasement in some NATO circles, and the large Communist parties in France and Italy make it essential for American planners to have a last line of resistance to fall back on in Europe. That last line is the Pyrenees. Furthermore, if the NATO experiment should fail, Spain could play a key role in an American "peripheral defense" of Europe.

But while it is only elementary common sense to be prepared for the worst, it should be stressed that our rapprochement with Spain is not conceived as a last-ditch measure. It is, rather, an advance move in a dynamic policy that appears to have a good chance of success. Far from being defeatist, the agreement implements our policy of building so impressive a striking force on the Soviet left flank as to deter Kremlin aggression anywhere in Europe. We are strong in the Mediterranean today, and now that we have the prospect of Spanish bases, we should grow much stronger.

The ideal defense of western Europe would provide powerful NATO pincers in the Baltic and Mediterranean regions which could close on the flanks of a Red army pushing across Austria and Germany toward the English Channel and the Bay

of Biscay. But of the nations in the Baltic area, Finland is virtually disarmed and partly occupied by the Russians, Sweden is neutralist, Denmark and Norway, although members of NATO, are extremely weak militarily and will not permit Western bases on their soil. Except for American and British naval-air power, presumably based on the British Isles, Norway and Denmark are tragically defenseless.

The Mediterranean situation, however, is hearteningly different. In Turkey and Greece we have able and loyal allies who are ready to fight and have the vision to perceive that the more closely the NATO members cooperate, the less prospect there is that they will have to fight. It is this spirit, plus material help from the United States, that has carried these two beleaguered nations through the difficult years since World War Two.

Turkey: Pillar of Strength

Turkey, the eastern pillar of our Mediterranean policy, is a progressive nation of about twenty million people which has no Soviet fifth column. The Turkish soldier, who is used to campaigning under hard conditions of climate and terrain, has no superior as a fighter. Although he is paid only ten cents a month during his first year of service, his morale is unsurpassed and he is fanatically devoted to his country. His prowess in Korea merely confirmed the opinion of those who already knew him. And what the Russians, in the course of more than a dozen wars with Turkey, have discovered about their small but redoubtable neighbor.

But the Turks have shown that they know how to do other things than fight for their fatherland. They have demonstrated their eagerness to learn new methods, to operate complicated American arms and equipment, to adapt these armaments to the tactics best suited to Turkish territory. They have learned how to build modern roads and how to get more out of their land and natural resources. Above all, they have demonstrated their astuteness in diplomacy and international relations. Realizing that it is the Kremlin's aim to isolate them, the Turks have countered by furthering friendly ties with their neighbors and entering alliances with as many of them as possible. They endeavor to create closer relations with Iran on their eastern border and to draw nearer politically and militarily to Iran's next-door neighbor, Pakistan.

But it was to the west in the Balkans that Turkey achieved its greatest success. Relations with Greece, a former traditional enemy, are now tightly knit. Turks and Greeks face a common enemy on their northern frontiers, Soviet puppet Bulgaria. As soon as Tito broke with Stalin, the Turks set out to bring about friendly and, if possible, close political and military relations with Yugoslavia. Last February the Balkan Entente—Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia—was formed. All

three countries have frontiers with the Cominform, all are under the threat of invasion from the East. Each partner, the Turks argue, needs the others.

The Balkan Entente nations, whose sphere extends from Austria southeastward to Iran, can immediately put sixty-odd divisions of good fighting men in the field. Turkish diplomacy has been striving to give the Entente greater defensive depth by bringing Italy into the alignment. The crisis over Trieste, however, has disrupted the efforts to make Italy and Yugoslavia associates in a defensive coalition. The feud between Rome and Belgrade has, moreover, jeopardized the West's defensive barrier in northern Yugoslavia and increased the danger that, in case of war, the Soviet army could push through the Ljubljana Gap—the historic invasion route through the mountains from Slovenia to the plains of Italy. Despite the fact that the Gap is vital to both Italians and Yugoslavs, its defense is at present endangered by the imbroglio over Trieste and the uncertainties of Yugoslavia's relations with both the East and the West.

As things now stand, Italy poses some danger to the Balkan Entente and NATO by reason of its large Communist Party. The Italian Communists and their Socialist allies under Pietro Nenni's leadership drew 35.3 per cent of the vote in last June's elections. What is most sinister in the Italian situation, however, is the fact that the Communists are on the offensive, aggressively confident of taking over the country. The dispirited anti-Communists, on the other hand, have neither unity, dynamic leadership, nor a program.

On the positive side, the NATO position in the Mediterranean shows great offensive and defensive potential. Allied Land Forces, Southeastern Europe, have established their headquarters at Izmir, on the Aegean coast of Turkey, a location that is protected from the Red Army by the rugged land mass of Anatolia. Directed by an American general, the joint staff is manned by Turkish and Greek officers. A forward air echelon has been stationed at Salonika under the direction of Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe. The United States has recently been granted the right to build air bases on Greek territory.

Behind the Turkish-Greek NATO land force, and available for support of a Yugoslav military effort, is the United States Sixth Fleet commanded by Vice Admiral John H. Cassady. Working under American command are the naval units of Turkey and Greece. The Sixth Fleet, according to Admiral Cassady, is "continually on the move, exercising at sea, visiting scores of ports, and constantly prepared to fulfill its role as a coordinated and powerful striking force if the need for such should ever be thrust upon us." In addition to the carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, auxiliaries, and men of the Sixth Fleet, our offensive resources in the Mediterranean include

our bomber bases in French North Africa, Tripoli, and Turkey. By 1955, it is estimated, we should have respectable air striking power from the projected bases in Spain.

Our Mediterranean position adds up to this: in the event of war, NATO can mount a formidable land offensive against the Soviet build-up in the Balkans, launch possible naval strikes across the Black Sea at the coast of South Russia, and direct air offensives at the heart of U.S.S.R. industrial power in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Our fighters can escort bombers to the vital Baku oil fields and to southern Russian cities like Odessa and Kharkov. The masters of the Kremlin know this. It may possibly have deterred them from new adventures, for example, against West Berlin. It certainly accounts for their constant efforts to bully Greece into refusing the United States air fields on Greek territory, for their threatening

notes to Turkey, for their economic and propaganda pressure against Yugoslavia, for their aggressive moves inside Italy, for their unremitting campaign to sow discord among the NATO allies.

Formidable as it is, NATO's land-naval-air force in the eastern Mediterranean is incomplete without a western Mediterranean base. This we are now starting to build in Spain.

Many in the Western world did not recognize the value of Spain's commitment to Mediterranean defense. Moscow did. From the beginning, the Kremlin and its fellow-travelers in the West have tried to use the United Nations to prevent a rapprochement between Spain and the Western powers. Nevertheless, the cold, hard logic of the situation has triumphed over the Kremlin's maneuvering. Spain has become one of the new pillars of Hercules. Correspondingly and increasingly, our strength looms as a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

Who Owns the Weather?

By PAUL HOLLISTER, JR.

That is the thorny question raised by the modern alchemy of man-made rain and snow.

On a windy day in March 1951, members of several Senate subcommittees got together in Washington, D. C., to talk about the weather. To be sure, they were not trying to pass the time. They were, seriously and earnestly, concerned about their subject. And to all intents and purposes, it was a grave matter. For if they confirmed what they set out to prove, namely, whether or not man can control the weather, they would be faced with a whole series of lofty problems unprecedented in government history. But why, one might ask, did our legislators want to take on such a problematic subject in the first place?

"Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it," Mark Twain is supposed to have said. He didn't say it; his friend Charles Dudley Warner did, and even in those days he was wrong. For way back in 1841 a Pennsylvania meteorologist named Espey proposed the firing of forty acres of timber every week at intervals of twenty miles all up and down the Pacific coast to produce rain for the nation. This was one better than what the Indians had been doing for centuries, uttering threats and shooting arrows into black clouds. Espey's program had a touch of science about it.

In 1876 a Frenchman, Baudouin, claimed to have made rain by flying into a cloud a kite grounded by an electric wire. J. B. Atwater got a patent in 1887 for breaking up a tornado with a cleverly

rigged box of explosives. And in 1891 L. Gatham, an ordnance worker experimenting in the cooling of large guns, got the notion of chilling clouds with carbonic gas to make them rain. But, until a few years ago, all such efforts to take a hand in the workings of nature were more or less transitory and inconsequential.

Meanwhile, however, rain making has become a multi-million-dollar business, one of the fastest-growing and most mysterious operations in the United States. Mysterious because nobody knows with absolute certainty if man can make rain. Fast-growing because so many people whose livelihood depends upon the weather hope he can. As Jim Wilson of the National Weather Improvement Association put it: "Maybe rain making will not work anywhere but in a freezer. But we'll give it a five-year try. If it succeeds, it will be the biggest thing that ever happened to Western agriculture." World-famous Nobel Prize physicist Dr. Irving Langmuir went further: "A few pounds of silver iodide [the most practical rain-making agent to date] would be enough to nucleate all the air in the United States at one time and perhaps have a profound effect upon the climate."

The real battle for control of the weather began inconspicuously enough one hot July afternoon in 1946. Dr. Vincent J. Schaefer, associate of Dr. Langmuir, and Dr. Bernard Vonnegut at the General Electric Research Laboratories, were making

experimental clouds in a deep freeze unit. But, for some reason, the unit refused to stay at -10 degrees Fahrenheit. Then, as the legend now has it, Dr. Schaefer put some dry ice (temperature -109 degrees Fahrenheit) inside and, presto, the chamber was filled with falling crystals.

On November 13 of that year, flying over the Berkshire hills, Dr. Schaefer dropped six pounds of dry ice into a cloud and apparently converted four miles of it into snow. This was big news.

Research in Cloudland

Out of Schaefer's cloud-seeding flights that November grew Project Cirrus, a five-year cooperative research investigation sponsored by the Army Signal Corps and the Office of Naval Research in consultation with General Electric, aimed at finding out how clouds work. It developed valuable new techniques for analyzing weather data. While Project Cirrus was official, overnight from coast to coast countless unofficial rain makers jumped on the bandwagon, eager to try out the new alchemy. The battle for the sky was on.

Some idea of the gigantic proportions of unleashed rain may be seen in the following figures: If a rain maker were able to cover Missouri with just one inch of rain, it would amount to five billion tons of water over that state. He would have let loose energy in the form of heat and condensation equal to 140,000 Hiroshima-type atom bombs, or roughly 140 hydrogen bombs.

As might be expected, there were some pretty sharp competition and some pretty tall claims.

Up in Oregon, for instance, cloud seeders claimed sensational results in knocking off hail thunderheads. But down in Arizona attempts to end the drought only made it worse. And, as might have been expected, complaints started to come in that rain makers were raining out ball games, blocking roads with snow, causing both floods and droughts, and equally that they were doing nothing.

The experience of Dr. Irving Krick, the country's leading commercial rain maker, illustrates just about every conceivable attitude toward man-made weather. As a graduate student at California Institute of Technology in 1933 Krick got nationwide attention when he predicted a big storm off the Jersey coast hours before it wrecked the dirigible Akron with a loss of seventy-three lives. It was Krick who gave Eisenhower the weather green light for the Normandy invasion on D-Day.

In 1950 the Water Resources Development Corporation, which Krick heads, went into the weather business in a big way with a contract for the increase of rainfall over 100,000 acres of land, the wheat ranch of the Horrigan brothers in south-central Washington, out of reach of Pacific coast clouds. There Krick's outfit increased a wheat yield of seven and a half bushels per acre to twenty bushels.

How large his weather operations are may be seen from W.R.D.C.'s record in 1951, when farmers and ranchers from fifteen western states got together to pay \$3,000,000 for rain making over 325,000,000 acres. Less than a penny an acre. An increase in rainfall of only 2 per cent covers the cost of making the rain. "Deserts will remain deserts," Krick says, but he thinks that increased rain can boost the West's livestock by 30 per cent to 40 per cent, and crops as much as 50 per cent.

In the fall of 1951 the Bonneville Power Administration hired Krick to get more snowpack behind power dams faced with a power shortage. Municipalities called upon him to fill reservoirs, logging companies to put out forest fires, fruit-growers to prevent hailstorms. Things went spectacularly for Krick until he made rain over the short-grass range lands of southeastern Colorado, and farmers in Arkansas lost a million-dollar melon and onion crop to hail and blamed the loss on Krick. When he increased snowpack for farmers in the valley below Colorado's fashionable Estes Park high in the Rockies, he was blamed for delaying the short resort season, and also of snowing under valuable mining industries. Nevertheless, Krick has accumulated a staggering record of success and convinced a tremendous number of people with interests at stake that man can make weather.

More Proof Needed

Yet many people, including other scientists, feel that early experimentation has not provided sufficient proof for the thesis that man can make his own weather. They maintain that until we have pink rain, there is no way of knowing whether a cloud, if left to its own devices, would not have emptied itself anyway. Incidentally, also dissenting is the U.S. Weather Bureau, which for reasons of its own, including lack of experimentation outside the laboratory, does not want to see its weather disturbed.

This, approximately, was the confused state of affairs when our legislators decided that the question needed plenty of study, and got together to do so. They were prompted, no doubt, not only by scientific considerations but also by the fact that millions of dollars in lawsuits in various states seemed to indicate that many people were taking this weather making business seriously. A Wenatchee Indian in Yakima, Washington, for instance, had sued a rain maker for a damaged hay crop. And a group of Montana ranchers had filed a "legal notice to all the world" that they considered the cloudy moisture above their land their own property and would not let anybody else fool around with it. Thus, for the first time in history, the question arose: "Who owns the weather?" over a certain piece of land.

In a long Senate investigation, which resulted in hundreds of pages of pro and con testimony

by scientists of different views, the argument revolved around the question: Can we really control the weather, accurately, beneficially, and over the whole country? But as nobody produced a definite answer, the Senate group decided to create a "weather eye," an agency to study the whole thing some more. In a bill which has recently become law, they established a nine-member Advisory Committee on Weather Control. This body is equipped with wide powers—including subpoena of information—to evaluate all public and private weather experiments to see just what sort of legislation, if any, would be needed to serve the public interest. Four Committee members are to be the Secretaries of Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior; the other five are to be appointed by the President with Senate consent. The committee will make its final report to Congress in June 1956.

When this report is turned in, the question of proper legislation to control man's control of the weather can be dealt with. For who, actually, owns the weather? The federal government? The states? Private corporations who make weather? Or John Q. in the street with his umbrella?

This, indeed, is a thorny question. And a solution that would satisfy all parties concerned seems to be a long way off. Rain-making scientists, including Dr. Wallace Howell, New York City's famous \$100-a-day rain maker, have generally favored federal as opposed to state control. Robert McKinney, chairman of the New Mexico Economic Development Commission, said: "The fact that the Weather Bureau is a federal agency, not a state function, is ample proof that the Congress long ago recognized weather is interstate."

But within particular states, other rain-making groups whose interested parties include State legislatures, commissioners of agriculture, soil conservationists, and local weather bureaus, are working to keep the weather out of federal hands. It has been argued that if weather modification should be found feasible on a local level only, then state legislation would be all that is needed.

Whatever the outcome of this debate, the potential of weather modification could change our whole way of life. It is considered well within the realm of possibility that rainfall from coast to coast can be controlled, devastating hurricanes and tornados broken up, floods prevented, aviation hazards reduced, damaging hailstorms converted to soft rain. Mechanical electronic brains based on the numerical forecasting system are contemplated, which could predict weather long in advance. Dr. Schaefer told the Great Plains Agricultural Council: "I think we know enough that eventually we can do anything we want to with the weather."

By June 1956 we should know exactly where we stand in relation to the weather which besieges us. If we can control it, then it's a cinch we own it, and that ownership must be protected.

Letter from Italy

Unclaimed Victory

By R. G. WALDECK

The government crisis going on as I write these lines is on the surface not particularly extraordinary. It stems from difficulties that occur normally in a democratic regime when no single party is sufficiently strong to command full responsibility. That is the situation in which the Christian Democrats find themselves today, owing to the official outcome of the elections last June. Compelled to find allies on the right or left, they quarrelled among themselves as to where to place that alliance. Should it be left of center, with the Republicans, Liberals, and moderate Socialists? Or right of center, with the monarchists? That is how the scene is generally presented. The only thing wrong about this reasoning is that it is based on an astounding error. For actually the Christian Democrats did win the elections. That's the really big Italian story.

You would expect the Christian Democrats to make the most of this happy dénouement. Why, Mr. De Gasperi might even have become *Time's* "Man of the Year" instead of Germany's Dr. Adenauer, had he conceded his victory. But that's just what he didn't do.

For three months it has been whispered in Rome's parliamentary, diplomatic, and legal circles that a recount of the contested votes gives the pro-Western center bloc a comfortable majority. But the Italian press never mentioned this bit of news which is apt to change the political complexion not only of Italy but of western Europe. The few foreign journalists who stumbled upon the story didn't write it up, because they found no one to hang it on: Italian politicians, while privately acknowledging it to be true, warned them that they would issue a denial if quoted on it. Finally the A.P. carried the story, on December 23. However, so far there has not been a peep out of any Italian official, not even a denial.

I can think of many instances when a politician tried to hide his defeat, but of none when a politician tried to hide his victory. Here are the facts behind this political oddity: Before the elections a so-called "majority law" was pushed through Parliament by the parties of the center. This law, as an Italian friend of mine put it cheerfully, "combines the beauties of democracy with the best features of totalitarianism." It provides that any coalition winning 50.01 per cent of the vote is to receive a "bonus," entitling it to 65 per cent of the seats to the Chamber of Deputies—that is, to 380 out of 590 seats. This ingenious device, intended to assure the winning coalition of a strong working majority,

could profit only the center parties; neither the right nor the left could expect to get sufficient votes. However, when the votes were counted in June, it seemed that the center bloc had not achieved a simple majority either; it was supposedly short 110,075 votes.

Meanwhile, an all-party parliamentary committee began to investigate some 1,300,000 votes which had been contested by the poll-watchers in June. That's the last that has been officially heard of this committee. But here is what was privately heard about it: After eliminating some 600,000 of these contested votes which were blank, spoiled, or otherwise invalid, there remained about 700,000 to be recounted. Of these 400,000 were counted, and, lo and behold, they were three to one in favor of the center parties. This was as early as last October. Since then, according to latest reports, the whole batch has been counted, and the center parties obtained 80 per cent of the 700,000 votes.

If this is true—and I didn't find one Italian politician who didn't privately admit that it is—the center bloc has won the majority plus the bonus, and is entitled to seventy-three more seats than it has at present. Forty-two of these would go to the Christian Democrats, seventeen to the Saragat Socialists, seven to the Republicans, and ten to the Liberals, while some forty-eight Communists, twenty-one Nenni Socialists, eleven monarchists, and five neo-Fascists who now sit in the Chamber have no right to their seats.

New Election Inevitable

To be sure, no one expects the losers to announce that they have lost. Neither the Communist and pro-Communist left nor the monarchist and fascist right is likely to give the show away. But why don't the center parties announce their victory and set about driving the usurpers out of the Chamber? I put this question to several politicians of the center parties, but they all just sighed and said that such a flat-footed solution would bring on a revolution and one had to go about it much more subtly. The fact is that even the subtlest admission of victory would bring on a new general election, which seems undesirable to all concerned. No party feels that it can afford an election, least of all, it would seem, the Christian Democrats, who are said to owe \$2,500,000 on the expenses of the last one.

Another reason why the center parties hide their victory under a bushel is the fear that the Communists might provoke strikes and riots in retaliation for the unseating of their deputies. And still another is that the drastic revision of the Chamber majority would jeopardize the validity of all legislation transacted by Parliament since the elections. Already the best Italian legal minds are fascinated by the problems posed by the admission of a victory for the center. They generally agree that the present Chamber has been constituted

illegally, and that all laws passed by it must be tested anew.

It goes without saying that none of these reasons, however important, justifies the government of a democratic country in withholding the outcome of a general election from the people who did the electing. For better or worse, the truth should be put before the public. Some Christian Democratic politicians, among them ex-Premier de Gasperi, so it is said, are willing to publish the facts; but others are fearful of repercussions.

According to latest reports the government, in order to gain time, has ordered "a recount of the recount." While the recounting is being done—very, very slowly to be sure (the wags speak of three to four votes a day!)—the government will try to get the majority law repealed. Once they have done away with the law which gives them such an exuberant majority, and which was expressly designed for this purpose, they might even dare to admit that they won the elections.

Meantime it would seem that the left-of-center alliance might obtain. Amintore Fanfani, the leader of the left wing of the Christian Democrats, has been given the task of forming a government. A writer and professor of economics, Fanfani has been a minister in nearly every cabinet since 1947 and is one of the ablest men in Italian public life. He believes that with the help of the Republicans, Liberals, and Social Democrats (38 votes) he can push through social reforms, efficient taxation measures, housing and employment plans with a view to stemming the rising tide of Communism. However, his optimism is not widely shared. The general consensus is that no cabinet, whether headed by Fanfani or anyone else, can survive for more than three or four months and that after its fall general elections will be inevitable. The outcome of these general elections, in which the Left has everything to win and nothing to lose, one dares not contemplate.

Eastward, Ho!

A machine that automatically translates from the Russian language into English was recently demonstrated in New York. The International Business Machines Corporation claims the credit for it, but this, of course, is nonsense. The machine is a Russian invention. At any international conference you can see Soviet machines that not only translate from one language to another, but also deliver speeches.

We Americans worry constantly about what other countries think of us. Isn't it high time for other countries to begin worrying about what we think of them?

ARGUS

An Answer to Tito

By BOGDAN RADITSA

Marshal Tito issued through the Associated Press on January 9 a personal denial of the information in my article, "Tito's Secret Alliance with Moscow," published in the *FREEMAN* of January 11. He described the article as "slandorous writing" which aimed "to demolish the reputation of Yugoslavia in the international field." In reply I have assembled data on a rapid sequence of events no one would have dared to predict a year ago. These facts are digested from official statements that appeared in the Yugoslav press in 1953. They indicate that Tito's denial of a secret agreement with the Kremlin will soon prove as much a fabrication as his classic denial of August 1944, when he "assured" Winston Churchill that "as he had stated publicly he had no desire to introduce the Communist system into Yugoslavia" (Churchill: *Triumph and Tragedy*, page 89).

May 1. Dragoye Djuric, Yugoslav chargé d'affaires, after expressing the condolences of his government on the death of Stalin, was officially invited to assist in the Moscow May Day parade. Thus relations between Belgrade and Moscow were re-established for the first time in five years.

May 31. Yugoslavia signed an agreement with Rumania, a satellite of the U.S.S.R., on the inland navigation of the Danube.

End of May: On the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the Yugoslav Air Force, Tito stated: "Better relations with Moscow are desirable."

June 4. Yugoslav-Soviet basketball game held in Moscow. The Yugoslav national team was welcomed enthusiastically and given freedom of movement.

June 6. Molotov proposed to Djuric that Yugoslav-Soviet diplomatic relations be re-established by the exchange of ambassadors.

June 8. Yugoslav official delegation took active part in the meeting of the Soviet-dominated Danubian Commission in Bucharest, Rumania.

June 14. Tito, speaking at Pazin, Istra, reiterated the need to normalize relations with Russia in the interest of Yugoslavia, and to avoid the heavy burden of armaments.

June 15. Yugoslavia officially granted permission, requested by the Soviet government, to move from Vienna via the Danube to the Black Sea, twenty-six war-type navy units of the Soviet river fleet. These units passed through Yugoslav territory.

The Yugoslav government approved the appointment of the new Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade, Vassily Valkov.

June 29. The Rumanian government accepted an earlier Yugoslav proposal to establish a Yugoslav-Rumanian commission to work toward curbing border incidents.

July 7. The Bulgarian government accepted a similar proposal.

July 8. Tito gave an interview to U.P. correspondent Helen Fisher, in which he stated that "Yugoslavia will welcome better relations with Russia," for he believed "that the leaders of the Soviet Union must make great changes."

July 13. The Soviet government approved the appointment of Mr. Vidic as Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow.

August 1. Enver Hoxha, chief of state of satellite Albania, speaking to the National Assembly, declared that Albania was ready to resume normal commercial relations with all countries which would respect Albanian territorial integrity. The Yugoslav and Albanian governments have since then resumed such relations.

August 7. Albania accepted the Yugoslav proposal to establish a joint commission to investigate border incidents. The Hungarian government gave Yugoslav diplomats permission to circulate freely in the country.

August 26. The chancery of the Yugoslav Government Decorations Office introduced two new decorations, the "Yugoslav star" and the "war banner." Both had been designed by a Soviet artist, Grigore Samoilov, on the Soviet pattern.

August 28. A Yugoslav-Hungarian agreement on the curbing of border incidents was signed.

August 31. Yugoslavia approved the appointment of a Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade.

September 1. The Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade visited deputy foreign secretaries Bebler, Crnobrnja, and Micunovic to discuss the problem of tension between Yugoslavia and Italy in connection with the Trieste crisis.

September 2. The same deputy foreign secretaries received the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, and France. Soviet Ambassador Valkov was immediately informed of the action of the Western representatives.

September 10. Tito's government approved the appointment of an ambassador from Bulgaria.

September 11. Yugoslavia and Rumania signed a new agreement concerning border incidents.

September 14. The Yugoslav government asked approval for appointment of ambassadors to Hungary and Bulgaria.

September 16. V. Chervenkov, Premier of satellite Bulgaria, speaking of the enemies of the "people's republic," for the first time in five years omitted Tito's Yugoslavia from the list.

September 23. Yugoslav Vice Premier Kardelj gave the following statement to the Paris weekly *Express*: "We foresaw a long time ago that the Soviet regime, based on bureaucratic dictatorship

and employing inhuman methods, would be obliged to transform itself internally under pressure of forces developing within the country. It is this transformation of the regime we are witnessing today. I believe that the forces of progress in the sense of a socialist democracy are going to become stronger and stronger in the U.S.S.R."

October 3. Alexander Gundurov of the Soviet Peace Committee, chairman of the All Slav Congress in Moscow, in a broadcast on Radio Moscow, praised the courage of the Yugoslav Partisans and stated that they were "striving to support the World Peace Council decisions." This was the first such praise from the Soviet Union since the Stalin-Tito break in 1948.

October 6. The Yugoslav chargé d'affaires in Prague was granted permission by the Czechoslovak government to visit the Yugoslavs who had been arrested and put into concentration camps after the Great Break of 1948.

October 9. The Yugoslav government sent back the Bulgarian pilot, Stiljan Georgiev, who had landed in Yugoslavia on a flight to freedom. Soon after, Yugoslavia sent back all Bulgarian refugees who had come to Yugoslavia after the Break.

October 11. Tito's speech in Skopje on the occasion of the anniversary of Macedonia's liberation was transmitted by Radio Belgrade. It was during the Trieste crisis: "If something happens, comrades, I say openly, we are going to reject all the obligations taken upon ourselves in recent years. Thus we are going to gain something. . . I think you understand very well what I have in mind. . . We are not alone. We have friends everywhere. . ." [Clearly Tito was alluding to the Soviet Union and its satellites.]

October 12. Soviet Ambassador Valkov had a long talk with Deputy Foreign Secretary Bebler. A few hours later the Soviet government issued a protest against the attitude of the United States and Britain on the Trieste issue. Later the same day Valkov again conferred with Bebler, and the next day he visited Kardelj, the Vice Premier. Two days later anti-Western demonstrations broke out in Belgrade.

October 14. The Hungarian government approved the nomination of the Yugoslav Ambassador.

October 22. The Yugoslav press announced that all students who had been denied enrollment at the universities because of their pro-Cominform and pro-Soviet ties could now resume their studies.

October 26. Yugoslavia sent a delegation to the Railroad Congress in Warsaw, while refusing to send delegates to a similar congress in Brussels.

November 4. A Yugoslav-Rumanian commission signed an agreement establishing the Djerdap River Traffic Administration "to arrive at a definitive solution of the Danube navigation traffic."

November 6. Tito sent to K. Y. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the following telegram, the first such message since

1948: "Please accept my congratulations and best wishes for the prosperity of the Soviet people on the occasion of the national holiday of the U.S.S.R."

The official Yugoslav Communist organ *Borba* glorified the anniversary of the October Revolution as a great day for the international Socialist aspirations of all working peoples in the world.

November 7. The Bulgarian government approved the appointment of an ambassador from Yugoslavia.

December 8. The new Bulgarian ambassador was received in Belgrade.


The official Soviet news agency, *Tass*, re-established an office in Belgrade, sending Soviet newsman Ivan Kozin as representative, while the Yugoslav news agency *Tanjug* sent a correspondent to Moscow.

Early December. The commission for the control of navigation on the Danube met in Galatz, Rumania. Since 1948 the commission had been dominated by the U.S.S.R. and her satellites, and Yugoslavs had frequently claimed that its work was directed against Yugoslavia's interests. Tito's press, which had attacked the commission for promoting only Soviet interests, stated in December 1953 that complete unanimity had been reached on the Danubian question. *Borba* of December 16 wrote that proposals of the Soviet delegate completely accorded with Yugoslav views. Dragoye Djuric, former Yugoslav chargé d'affaires in Moscow, was elected secretary of the commission, a post previously held by the Russian member.

December 26. In Tito's official mouthpiece *Borba*, Vladimir Dedijer wrote that normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Russia has been "the basic aim which we have pursued. . . since 1948." In a balance sheet of what had been accomplished so far, he stated that the number of border incidents had decreased; tank divisions were no longer concentrated on Yugoslavia's borders; formal diplomatic relations had been resumed with the governments of the U.S.S.R., Hungary, and Bulgaria; Albania had requested that such relations be resumed, and on the Danubian commission "the majority now accepts some of the justified and democratic proposals offered by the Yugoslav delegation."

Significant of Tito's rapprochement with Moscow has been the changing attitude of the government-controlled Yugoslav press toward the United States and the West. Soon after Stalin's death the character of the political writing changed. While mild criticism of the Soviet Union could still be found, criticism of U.S. foreign and internal policy grew in volume and vehemence.

The internal struggle in the Yugoslav Communist Party that has come out into the open in recent weeks points to a bid by the party and the army for popular support of their pro-Soviet aims. Tito accused the deposed Milovan Djilas of seeking to bring about Western democracy in Yugoslavia.



Man, the Absurd

By JAMES BURNHAM

When we read a book by Reinhold Niebuhr, we may agree or disagree with what he has written, but we will not dismiss him. His ideas are ore from a deep vein, and his mind has tunneled far in order to bring them to the surface. His conclusions are always refreshing, because they are never platitudes or mere easy responses to the fashionable pressures of the moment. Even at their simplest—and they are often disturbingly simple—we feel that they have been honestly arrived at, which is more than can be said about many of those with whom he has been usually associated on specific political questions.

In the title of the current collection of his recent essays, the word “realism” is used in its common sense rather than its technical (epistemological) meaning. (*Christian Realism and Political Problems*, by Reinhold Niebuhr. 203 pp., Charles Scribner's Sons, \$3.00.)

In political and moral theory “realism” denotes the disposition to take all factors in a social and political situation, which offer resistance to established norms, into account, particularly the factors of self-interest and power. In the words of a notorious “realist,” Machiavelli, the purpose of the realist is “to follow the truth of the matter rather than the imagination of it.”

The unifying thesis of these essays is that, with respect to political and social problems, Christianity is more “realist” than either the allegedly empirical sciences of psychology and sociology or the grandiose modern ideologies such as Marxism and its paler cousin that we call “liberalism.” Both the sciences and the ideologies make three fundamental and related errors. Denying that there is any specific “human nature,” they treat man as merely part of the natural order of matter or history. It follows that man is perfectable, since his defects can be explained by psychological or social causes which can be “cured” through suitable psychological techniques or social reforms and revolutions. From these two premises we arrive at the doctrine that mankind's history is a continual progress onward and upward.

Christianity declares, in contrast, that man, though he lives in the natural order, is not part of it. He is a *self* as well as an object, and he is free. Therefore “a radical distinction” must be made “between the natural world and the world of human history.” Human nature, moreover, contains essential elements of weakness and corruption, which are, indeed, inseparably linked with free-

dom. “The same radical freedom which makes man creative also makes him potentially destructive and dangerous. . . . the dignity of man and the misery of man therefore have the same root.” Though limited improvements in man's temporal condition are not impossible, the idea of an indefinite general “progress” is a hopeless and dangerous illusion.

Their inability to discover the corruption of self-interest in reason or in man's rational pursuits; and to measure the spiritual dimension of man's inhumanity and cruelty, gives an air of sentimentality to the learning of our whole liberal culture.

Dr. Niebuhr has never swerved from this basic theoretical standpoint, and from it he again probes the errors of our melioristic social scientists and philosophers. He shows how utterly they have failed to anticipate or comprehend the limitless extremes, the “inordinateness” of the totalitarian revolutions of our time. He traces the evil of Communism to “the relation of absolute power to complete defenselessness,” aggravated by the utopian illusions of the Marxist secular religion.

The logic of Dr. Niebuhr's beliefs might seem to lead most naturally to a conservative position in practical politics. In fact, however, he has been generally associated with the left. In this book, as he recognizes, he moves several steps rightward. “I have always resisted the dangerous illusions of Communism,” he accurately records, “but the notes of criticism on even democratic socialism are new.” Few conservatives have rendered a more severe judgment than the following: “In almost every instance the Communist evil is rooted in miscalculations which are shared by modern liberal culture.” If this is what Dr. Niebuhr believes, it is hard to see how he can remain much longer a contented member of Americans for Democratic Action.

The most novel of these essays throws an interesting indirect light on Dr. Niebuhr's political choices. Writing on “The Foreign Policy of American Conservatism and Liberalism,” he insists that there is no true conservative party in the United States. American conservatism is not conservative at all in the traditional sense; it is a part of the traditional liberal movement and it exhibits the defects of its creed. It has combined the liberal economic doctrine (*laissez faire*) with purely negative features of traditional conservatism (defense of the status quo), and has failed to

adapt either its domestic or its international outlook to the changed circumstances of a new age.

Dr. Niebuhr offers an historical explanation for this paradox. European conservatism has been associated with an aristocracy, and a view of the world and of man that rested on religion and a strong sense of tradition. American "conservatism" has been associated with a dominant business class, and a meager doctrine adapted from physiocratic theory and from Adam Smith. This doctrine, Niebuhr thinks, "corresponds to some characteristic illusions of the businessman, who does not understand the curious compound of forces which go into the making of political power and cohesion."

Niebuhr contends that with this inadequate background and faulty equipment, American conservatism has floundered in the face of the "demonic political movements" of the twentieth century. It has "exhibited a continued confusion in the realm of foreign policy by alternating between isolationist irresponsibility, which refused to assert the full strength of America, and adventurous irresponsibility which failed to measure the limits of power which even a powerful nation must observe." In part this is due to the accident that the Republican Party has been out of office during both the world wars, and has therefore not had the tempering experience of leadership in the supreme crises of our time. This lack will be corrected by the Eisenhower victory, which "has had the salutary effect of bringing the dominant economic group in the nation into a position of political responsibility."

To some extent I feel that Dr. Niebuhr's argument here is an attempt to rationalize a continuing leftism in practical politics which his own basic theories can no longer justify. Even so, his critique can be most valuable for those who wish to aid in developing a new and revived American conservatism.

Albert Camus, the brilliant French author of *The Plague* and *The Stranger*, shares Reinhold Niebuhr's insistence that man cannot be reduced to "a system" or to the natural order. Much of his theoretical journey to this conclusion parallels Niebuhr's, in spite of the distance between their starting points. Camus is an atheist, and, though he has broken with Sartre and his school, his ideas have developed out of the atheist forms of existentialist philosophy. Man is an "outsider" (as I should prefer to translate the title of his first published novel), a surd. Unassimilable and homeless, he confronts a universe that is alien and indifferent.

Camus describes his new book as "An Essay on Man in Revolt." (*The Rebel*, by Albert Camus. With an Introduction by Sir Herbert Read. 273 pp., Alfred A. Knopf, \$4.00.) It is taut, dazzling, marvelously written at its best, very French, and totally unsatisfying.

The entire book is a dialectical lyric on the theme of "rebellion." The act of rebellion he declares to be "one of man's essential dimensions." In modern times it is more than this: "it is our historical reality." He rearranges Descartes. "Rebellion is the common ground on which every man bases his first values. I *rebel*—therefore we *exist*."

The modern age starts in the eighteenth century with the ultimate, the metaphysical rebellion: the rebellion against God.

When the throne of God is overthrown, the rebel realizes that it is now his own responsibility to create the justice, order and unity that he sought in vain within his own condition and, in this way, to justify the fall of God. Then begins the desperate effort to create, at the price of sin if necessary, the dominion of man. This cannot come about without appalling consequences of which we are only, so far, aware of a few.

Camus then traces elaborately the unfolding of the logic of this rebellion. He takes the Marquis de Sade as the first truly modern rebel, with his "demand for total freedom and dehumanization coldly planned by the intelligence. The reduction of man to an object of experiment. . ." He carries the story through its successive manifestations: Ivan Karamazov; Nietzsche; Saint-Just and the regicides (killing God by executing his earthly representative); Hegel and the "deicides"; the nihilists and terrorists; Hitler and "irrational" state terror; Stalin and "rational" state terror.

Camus writes with intense intellectual passion and amazing virtuosity. His rhetoric is strewn with slicing metaphors, subtle syllogisms, packed epigrams, and staggering insights. But when he shifts from history, reflections, and analysis to "conclusions," he seems to turn an incomprehensible somersault.

After tracing the ills of the modern world—which he believes to be by far the most terrible of history's tribulations—to the consequences of the basic act of metaphysical rebellion, he at the end blandly informs us that this is not rebellion's fault. "These consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself or, at least, they only occur to the extent that rebellion forgets its original purpose." After 250 pages of gleaming-hard intellectual dissection, he goes all soft about "toiling masses," "revolutionary trade unions," and the failure of "scientific socialism" to be—of all things—sufficiently scientific. He begins to find excuses for Marx and Lenin, who "never dreamed of such a terrifying apotheosis."

Out of his bootstrap act of rebellion, Camus tries to raise a classic "philosophy of limits, of calculated ignorance and of risk." The philosophy, especially as he illustrates it from his own true field of creative art, is not unattractive. It will never be found by the compass which he provides in this book.

Germany's Benighted Knights

The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945, by John W. Wheeler-Bennett. 829 pp. New York: St. Martin's Press. \$12.00

The purpose of the victors in the First World War was to make the world safe for democracy by eradicating German militarism. The purpose of the victors in the Second World War was the same, only if words meant anything they swore to do the job more thoroughly. After procuring an unconditional surrender in 1945, they intended to prevent Germany from having any armed forces whatever. Some of them even wanted to pastoralize and impoverish the Germans to such a degree that they would have nothing to fight with in the future but pitchforks and pickaxes. But today, barely nine years later, we actually hear an American Secretary of State scolding the French because they will not consent to the rearmament of the Germans within a European Defense Community. If the French remain stubborn, despite American aid and diplomatic as well as military guarantees of security, then it is quite likely the Germans will be told to go ahead by themselves and form a new army of their own. And, perhaps, the whole spectacle may repeat itself.

As an historian, however, Mr. Wheeler-Bennett is not concerned with this question. He believes that no one could tell in 1944 or 1945 how the Soviets would behave as soon as the war was over—or rather that no *responsible* statesmen in England or the United States could be sufficiently sure to act other than they did. Posterity may interpret this matter differently. Meanwhile, the virtue of such a point of view is that it allows Mr. Wheeler-Bennett to tell—in a Churchillian manner—a detailed and concise story of the political role the German military played between 1918 and 1945. And it is by far the best study on this subject.

His book carries a heavy load of documentation. His style is fluid, and he has an eye for character. There is plenty of bite in his comment on the dozens of Wagnerian villains and malicious fools who rose to power along with Adolf Hitler. Yet he does not forget the few German heroes on the fringes of German public life who shine lucidly by contrast. All of them strut through his pages, which are copiously illustrated so that the reader can check the faces against the facts.

The invention of the Prussian General Staff a century and a half ago, Mr. Wheeler-Bennett says, was an event in military science comparable to the development of ironclad ships, tanks, and fighting aircraft. The purpose of its founders and of Clausewitz, who wrote the great manual on war that served as its bible down to 1914,

was to "adapt the Napoleonic military heritage to modern methods and assimilate it with the scientific thoroughness of the German universities." This is an effect that Americans specifically should be able to appreciate. It worked as marvelously in war as our methods do in peace; the Germans, under Prussian leadership, became a warlike people because they were good at it. However, there was an element in this wonderful device which caused it to disintegrate after its greatest triumph, the seizure of all political as well as military authority in Germany halfway through the First World War.

That element was built into it from the beginning. When the General Staff was founded, serfdom still flourished in most of the German states. The idea of a military team of leaders became involved with the attitude of feudal aristocrats toward their overlord. Theirs was to be an essentially mystical relationship, uncontaminated by any morality, whether Christian or pagan. In this spirit the Officer Corps was born. So long as its overlord was the Kaiser, who had certain dynastic as well as constitutional responsibilities, it remained a corps d'élite, a self-perpetuating body of aristocrats who claimed to be the first servants of the monarch of all Germans. When they simply took power in their own hands, as under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, they became a praetorian guard armed with everything but imagination. They were always benighted about politics. They ferried Lenin and Communism through Germany into Russia; they backed the policy of unlimited U-boat warfare; they forced upon the Bolsheviks the ferocious Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

After they lost the First World War one of the brainiest of them, General Hans von Seeckt, managed to convince the military that a state of political neutrality was best for all concerned—but his influence came to an end in 1926. Like Seeckt, most of the military men were monarchists at heart; they could not put up with a democratically elected government. But lacking Seeckt's almost unique insight into the nature of politics in a modern industrial society, they fished about for a more authoritarian form of government, a monarchy, or a dictatorship, whichever they could manipulate behind the scenes, and without any direct responsibility. What they finally got, of course, was Hitler, a man who manipulated them instead. He robbed them, as Mr. Wheeler-Bennett shows, of everything, of their status and dignity in peace, and of their leadership in war.

Once Goebbels suggested to Hitler that Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of Staff, should be sent for in connection with some military problem. "Hitler at once replied that a man with the brain of a movie usher (*ein Kino-*

portier) would not be of much use." On another occasion a general asked Keitel how matters stood between the General Staff and the Fuehrer. "I don't know; he tells me nothing; he only spits at me," was the reply.

With these grotesque remarks ringing in the reader's ears, let him think of the chaos these people brought down upon Germany, and through the paralysis of western Europe and the rule of Soviet Russia as a consequence, upon the rest of the world even unto this day. ASHER BRYNES

Mr. Rhine's Shadowy Cat

New World of the Mind, by Joseph Banks Rhine.
339 pp. New York: William Sloane Associates.
\$3.75

Everybody has wondered how much truth there is in the stories of telepathy, clairvoyance, levitation, and other "psychic phenomena" with which the world has always been brimful. The plan to investigate them experimentally on a large scale, and in the spirit of science, when first announced by Mr. Rhine at Duke University, was welcomed by hard-headed and even very skeptical people. According to Mr. Rhine, the results so far, although far from spectacular, have been on the whole favorable. Psychic phenomena, he thinks, have won a respected place among the data of science. Why, in view of that, he gives them the undignified nickname of "Psi" is a mystery.

At any rate, not only has "Psi" become a respectable object of research, but two of its manifestations, ESP and PK, have been, according to Mr. Rhine, definitely proven to exist. ESP is his nickname for extrasensory perception, and PK for psychokinesis, or the direct action of mind upon external matter. Precognition, or the foreknowledge of future events, has also been demonstrated, he thinks, although happily he has not yet endowed it with the nickname of PRG.

Now the trouble with all this is that a belief in his results rests very largely on a belief in Mr. Rhine. Does he—or did he—approach these problems in the spirit of objective science? That is the big question, and the concluding chapters of this book make it all too clear that he did not. Far from exemplifying the pure thirst for knowledge, he does not even believe in its force. "It is doubtful," he says, "if the spirit of knowledge for knowledge's sake, however much it may inflate the vanity of erudition, has ever initiated and supported a really difficult venture in pioneer science." Accordingly he proceeds, over the protest of some of his associates, to let a very large and shadowy cat out the bag. It was not in order to find out the facts that this "pioneer venture in science" was undertaken, but in order to demonstrate the existence of a "world of spiritual

reality," whatever exactly that may mean. More explicitly, it was in order to support religion, and enable it to succeed at last in its unachieved "mission of saving the world."

What those occupied with religion may think of this offer of help from the laboratory of "parapsychology" is a question. Miracles have a way of not being miraculous any longer when science has shown that they really happen, for it then usually proceeds to show how they happen. Even supposing extrasensory perception occurs, there is nothing in Mr. Rhine's experiments to prove that it has no basis in physics and physiology. What a blow to Mr. Rhine's "world of spiritual reality" if ESP should link up, after all, with short-wave transmission!

In this connection it is noteworthy that Mr. Rhine professes to have reviewed all that is known about the homing and migratory instincts of birds and found no explanation except in extrasensory perception. If his eyes were open in both directions, he could hardly have ignored the startling experiments conducted by Henry L. Yeagley at Pennsylvania State College. In an article on "The Physical Basis of Bird Navigation" in the *Journal of Applied Physics* (Vol. 18, No. 12, Dec. 1947), Yeagley made it seem almost certain that pigeons are guided in their homing flight by an organ, or organs, which make them sensitive to the earth's magnetism and to the so-called Coriolis forces associated with the earth's motion. The neglect of this finding seems significant of Mr. Rhine's approach to his problem. One thing, at least, is certain: No wise man would rely for an unprejudiced investigation upon a person who believes that the *salvation of the world* depends upon his reaching a certain conclusion. MAX EASTMAN

Stainless Stanton?

Stanton: Lincoln's Secretary of War, by Fletcher Pratt. 520 pp. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. \$5.95

Edwin McMasters Stanton has acquired a new panegyrist in Mr. Fletcher Pratt, the well-known military historian. It would be incorrect to say that he has acquired a new biographer.

The business of biography, I take it, is the framing of such an account of a man's life as may enable the reader correctly to estimate his character. Mr. Pratt, however, has followed another course. A large part of his discursive volume has little or nothing to do with Stanton. Long descriptions of military engagements, however interesting in themselves, throw no light whatever upon Stanton's moral qualities. Another sizable portion of the book lavishes praise upon Mr. Pratt's hero. Full marks are given him as a lawyer, an administrator, a family man, and a friend to orphans.

But praise is no substitute for evidence, and the reader seeking to justify Mr. Pratt's encomiums finds little proof in these pages.

The most unsatisfactory parts of the book are those which deal with the dubious aspects of Stanton's career. Here Mr. Pratt's method is essentially simple: he takes the character of his idol for granted, and, on this basis, infers the moral quality of his actions. Since Stanton was, by definition, a virtuous man, even his most atrocious performances were virtuous.

As Buchanan's Attorney General, Stanton was a double-dealer. "He was always on my side," said the President, "and flattered me *ad nauseam*." But day by day he betrayed the confidences of the Cabinet to the Republican opposition. Mr. Pratt does not deny this fact but glories in it. Stanton was a lawyer, and his client was the Union. If a bit of double-dealing would save the Union, then Stanton should be commended.

As Lincoln's Secretary of War, Stanton illustrated the truth of the maxim that those who trample on the helpless are disposed to cringe to the powerful. Mr. Pratt suggests that a man who is rough, overbearing, and outrageous to his inferiors, negligent and contemptuous to his equals, and sniveling to his superiors, is just the sort of man to get things done—the perfect administrator.

As Johnson's Secretary of War, Stanton clung to his office despite the President's efforts to be rid of him. According to Mr. Pratt, he did right. His oath of office was not to Johnson, or Lincoln, or any other man, but to the United States of America. Thus he had to keep the power which enabled him to serve his country by sabotaging the policies of its President.

Yet some of Stanton's actions even Mr. Pratt does not venture to pronounce wise, virtuous, or heroic. These he passes by with indifference. Take the case of General C. P. Stone, arrested without charges, imprisoned without trial, and, six months later, released without explanation. Mr. Pratt justifies Stanton's part in this arbitrary act by stating that suspicion of treason is nearly as bad as treason itself and that, anyway, Stone had made the strongest case against himself by protesting against civilian control of the military. Or take Stanton's suppression of Booth's diary in the trial of Mrs. Surratt and the Lincoln conspirators. "It is hard to see," reflects Mr. Pratt, "what difference the diary could have made." To Mrs. Surratt, however, the difference between life and death might have been more visible.

In summation, one must say that Mr. Pratt's new book has failed of its objective. It has not removed the stain of infamy from Stanton's character. It is doubtful, indeed, whether that stain can ever be removed. For the talents of Lincoln's Secretary of War, though great, were not of the

kind to cover his vices. Executive ability alone is not bribe sufficient to pervert the judgment of posterity.

LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR.

Survival in Hell

Human Behavior in the Concentration Camp, by Elie A. Cohen. Translated from the Dutch by M. H. Braaksma. 295 pp. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. \$5.00

Elie A. Cohen, a Dutch physician, was for three years a prisoner at Auschwitz. This book is largely based on his own experiences; it has been augmented by a study of other literature published on the subject. About one third of the book is devoted to a discussion of the general and medical aspects of German concentration camps: their aims, organization, categories of prisoners, nutrition, mortality, care of the sick, the infamous so-called medical experiments, and the extermination program, which was directed primarily against the Jews of Europe. The major portion of the book consists of two long chapters, one devoted to the psychology of the concentration-camp prisoner, and the other to the psychology of the SS.

These chapters represent the fullest treatment of the subject heretofore available in English. To be sure, the most significant aspects of the psychology of the camp inmate have previously been presented in scientific literature here, the most remarkable of which was Bruno Bettelheim's early study, "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," which appeared as early as 1943 in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. Dr. Cohen's contribution in this area is his broad analysis of the crucial stages in the life of the concentration camp inmate: the initial shock, the experience of acute depersonalization, the stage of adaptation, the role of infantile regression, the role of hunger, identification with the SS and, finally, the stage of resignation, with the concomitant disappearance of both compassion and hate.

In discussing the psychology of the SS, with the high degree of objectivity that pervades the entire book and without personal rancor, Dr. Cohen helps us understand the mentality of people who were responsible for the premeditated murder of at least 7,500,000 persons, 6,000,000 of them Jews. Drawing heavily on Freud's theory, Dr. Cohen concludes perhaps somewhat schematically that most of the SS were recruited from persons with criminal superegos, molded largely by the authoritarian spirit of German family life and German education, whose pent-up aggressions found release in a society which completely reversed the standards of human behavior.

In any discussion of the psychology of camp inmates, one question looms especially large: What

kind of person had the best chances of survival? Was it the one whose drive for self-preservation excluded him from community with his fellow-camp inmates? Or was it also the one who could, despite some inescapable regression, maintain the moral standards of a normal society? Unfortunately, Dr. Cohen has very little to say on this subject. He quotes from another Dutch writer whose observations led him to conclude that a person having certain "religious bonds" (the term is used in its most comprehensive sense to include political idealism and humanism as well as religion) may recover his intellectual and moral balance most quickly after the initial shock of becoming a concentration camp inmate.

Eugen Kogon has gone a little further into this aspect of personal morality in his extraordinary book about the German concentration camps, *The Theory and Practice of Hell*. He wrote:

It was the pure in heart who suffered the least damage—those men of shining integrity who strove to give their all, who never took umbrage no matter what they faced, who steadfastly put evil to one side.

But even his discussion is too fragmentary.

Elie Cohen's book is excellent. Nevertheless, there is still much more, along the lines I have indicated, that we need to know. Millions are today languishing in Communist slave-labor camps where, except for the absence of a wholesale extermination program, the system is little different from that of the Nazi camps. In the tragic world in which we live today, it is indeed urgent that we learn the qualities that will help us survive not only physically, but also morally and spiritually.

LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ

Veblen Once-Over

Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Interpretation, by David Riesman. 221 pp. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00

Thorstein Veblen has come upon evil days. A mere twenty-five years ago he was the fraternity pin worn by all the bright young critics of orthodox economic thought, and by many others as well. New oracles have won away the new generations of inevitable critics of orthodoxy. There is at present no vital or influential work going on in economics which is directly or avowedly much in debt to Veblen. He has had some effect upon the course of economic thought, and especially upon the intellectuals' attitude toward capitalism, but the effect is difficult to disentangle and possibly small in the aggregate.

Riesman's interpretive sketch of Veblen's life and thought does not investigate with any thoroughness the decline of Veblen's influence on economics, or, for that matter, any aspect of Veblen's economic

analysis. Riesman discusses economic theories only at two-arms' length, perhaps because he is not a professional economist. He chooses, instead, to concentrate on sociological aspects of Veblen's thought, and on psychological sources of Veblen's attitudes.

Riesman's approach to Veblen is rather subjective: he emphasizes psychological influences on Veblen's thought, and he gives considerable attention to his own views on Veblen's subject-matter. This approach is possibly even more valuable to the writer than to the reader. In the present case, at least, the approach leads to an extraordinarily discursive treatment. One subject follows another with unassimilable speed, and sometimes with irrelevance: there is no sustained and systematic grappling with ideas and their empirical or intellectual foundations.

Riesman makes many observations that are clever and some that are penetrating, and he has an engagingly showy manner of writing, so one is inclined to forgive him a fair number of far-fetched or overcontrived points. But the book seems a more vivid portrait of its author than of its subject.

GEORGE J. STIGLER

Briefer Mention

Tomorrow, by Philip Wylie. 372 pp. New York: Rinehart and Company. \$3.50

Mr. Wylie is a prolific writer. This is the twenty-fourth book to roll off his literary assembly line. And to all intents and purposes, it is a laudable plea to Americans to take the responsibilities of Civil Defense seriously. Aside from that, however, it is a bad novel and a poor piece of press-agentry. For in minutely describing the terrible impact of atomic warfare, unleashed by a Soviet sneak attack on two more or less prepared American communities, Mr. Wylie parades before us a cast of characters so pat and papier-mâché that they only reinforce the fatal notion that it can't happen here. To make things worse, after Mr. Wylie, without batting an eyelash, has blown to bits some twenty million Americans, wiped the Russian people from the face of the earth, and dwelled at length on the murderous frenzy of hysterical American city mobs, he clinches his trivial end with the reassuring observation that America's bombed cities "provided people with a surge of exhilaration, for the bombing had proved an ultimate blessing by furnishing a brand-new chance to build a world brand-new—and infinitely better."

Diary of a Self-Made Convict, by Alfred Hassler. 182 pp. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. \$3.00

In this slim and deeply moving book, Alfred Hassler, the editor of *Fellowship*, the magazine of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, has made a

quiet and convincing case against the inhumanity and futility he found in the complex and overburdened machinery of our existing penal system. Mr. Hassler was sent to the Federal Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1944, with a three-year sentence as a conscientious objector. He was released on parole a year later. But during his stay he recorded his impressions, calmly, with understanding and Christian compassion. He wanted to know how the regimented world of prison affects a sensitive, perceptive, and educated man. And he found out that it corrupts rather than corrects most people, educated or not. Yet Mr. Hassler does not accuse the men who administer this system, nor does he glorify its victims, criminals, delinquents, or C.O.s alike. He simply shows the inevitably vicious impact of separation, loneliness, bureaucratic constriction, and de-humanization that makes a true rehabilitation of most prisoners an almost hopeless task, in spite of many valiant individual efforts.

The Xit Ranch of Texas, by J. Evetts Haley.
258 pp. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
\$4.00

Of all the tall tales to come out of Texas the story of the Xit Ranch is probably the tallest that is at the same time wholly true. Consisting of 3,000,000 acres, it was given to some men in Chicago in exchange for their building a state capitol in Austin, thus the official reference to it as "Capitol Lands." The organization of this vast domain alone was a monumental enterprise, extending all the way to London, where the original capital investment of \$15,000,000 was obtained. Even more, this is the story of a highly imaginative, and often grim venture. Cattle-raising, as this story aptly illustrates, is not a pastoral occupation but a major industry. Mr. Haley's account is what might be called the "official" biography of the Xit Ranch (since, incidentally, broken up). As such it inevitably loses somewhat in human interest and color what it gains over such presentation in careful documentation and authenticity.

Craters of Fire, by Haroun Tazieff. Translated by Eithne Wilkins. 239 pp. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$3.00

Scaling the world's heights is an exercise that has in the past few years received universal notice and acclaim. There is a form of this activity that has received little attention—that of the volcanologists. These are daredevil scientists who also climb to the top of the world, but with a different aim. They go in search of a molten, fiery inferno bubbling up from far in the earth's depths. It is a perilous undertaking, as Mr. Tazieff's account of his experiences well shows. This involves primarily his exploration of a newly form-

ing volcano, Kituro, in the Belgian Congo. There are additional narratives about Etna, Vesuvius, and Stromboli, as well as vivid stories of some notable volcanic explosions of the past. Though volcano-climbing cannot be said to have for the layman the fascination and grandeur of mountain climbing, its effect on human lives will undoubtedly be greater. For by knowing how volcanoes act, it is possible to predict future eruptions and to avoid such a calamity as occurred in Martinique in 1902 when the entire town of St. Pierre with its 40,000 inhabitants was wiped out.

T H E A T E R

The U. N. on Broadway

Leland Hayward's current production of *The Prescott Proposals* has been called "markedly lightweight," "confused," and "strangely elementary" by various of its critics. We have no desire to quibble with them. But this makebelieve by Messrs. Howard Lindsay and Russel Crouse seems to be slated for a long and successful run, and since it deals, nominally, with an American lady's proposal to achieve world peace through the United Nations, it might be worth while to ponder Mrs. Prescott's approach to politics. For Mrs. Prescott (portrayed at the Broadhurst by Katharine Cornell) combines in her charming personality the harangue of an old-time political novice and the idealistic vagueness of today's amateur liberal.

Roughly, this weary exercise in muddled understanding begins with the plight of Mary Prescott, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., who has the misfortune to have a Czech delegate succumb to a heart attack in her bedroom. The gentleman, Jan Capek, had been her lover in pre-Nazi Prague. But since his defection first to the Nazis and later to the Reds, who subsequently send him to the U.N., she has seen nothing of him.

Hard upon his demise the doorbell rings, and the ministers of France, England, and Pakistan appear. Instantaneously infused with loyal camaraderie, the three pledge themselves to silence and suggest a method for ridding our Ambassador of the discommodious corpse. All would be fine except that now Petrovsky, the Russian, knocks at Mrs. Prescott's door. He, like a true comrade, has been trailing Capek, whom he suspects of being about to shift his allegiance once more. Petrovsky has to be informed of the whole affair, of course, and when he is assured that Capek has not been poisoned, he, too, agrees to keep Mrs. Prescott's secret.

Thus, everything would be well were it not for those political discussions in the committee room, which finally involve even Mrs. Prescott's circum-spect amours with Elliott Clark, an American news

analyst not too amenable toward her propitiation of the Russians. The discussions give Mrs. Prescott a wonderful chance to usher a bevy of sophomoric arguments into the political ring. Beneath an impressive map of the seven continents she sets herself irrevocably against the use of atomic weapons for war, and recommends (without being tediously specific) their curtailment. And she outdoes herself in suggesting that the committee avoid areas of disagreement with the Soviet bloc and take up those issues where accord may be reached harmoniously. This, of course, makes quite a hit with her confrères, because nobody really enjoys wrangling after all.

To be sure, Comrade Petrovsky utters some vile accusations (it seems Mrs. Prescott's news analyst has given the Russians a bad press on the Capek story). But Mrs. Prescott, lively and beautiful, rejects his insinuations with scorn, convincing the audience that she is a grand, hopeful person, forever promising an impending Eden, though equipped to achieve nothing. But who will cavil over lack of accomplishments when there is such fervid devotion to admire?

Yet Comrade Petrovsky is not impressed with Mrs. Prescott's devotion. He intends to expose our Ambassador's escapade with Capek, which would wreck her career and defeat her proposals. But the delegate from the Kremlin has a past, too. And that, Messrs. Lindsay and Crouse point out, becomes his undoing. For when news analyst Clark taunts him with the memory of a girl, a poetess ("Oh, nothing epic," Clark explains, "just lyric. . ."), whom Petrovsky had loved and betrayed in his dark Bolshevik past, the Russian is struck dumb with remorse and Mrs. Prescott and her proposals are triumphantly saved.

"... the ice-age Russian is reminded of a long-since liquidated flame of his own," Walter Kerr wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune*, "and turns suddenly, hap-

pily human. The point of course is a valid one. (Tear off the Communist crust and you will find flesh and blood somewhere beneath.)"

In other words, we are respectfully urged to go beneath the "crust" and appeal to "flesh and blood" in order to cause the men in the Kremlin to "turn human." This, then, seems to be the "valid point" of the play: once a Russian official is confronted with the more or less sordid details of his guilty past, we may expect him to change his heart and his mind rather rapidly. But even the least-informed person—our authors and critics among them—should know by now that in dealing with Soviet diplomats, no undamaged human being would be found even if the "crust" could be removed. There are suffering millions in Russia, but the fragmented emotions of these oppressed people should not be confused or equated with the signal offenses of their oppressors.

The suggestion that an appeal to the heart of a member of the Politburo, or a Soviet diplomat for that matter, can result in a happy consanguinity of East and West is, nevertheless, bound to reassure and please the impulsive and the sentimental. It is comforting to imagine thorny political considerations consumed in a passionate burst of enthusiasm. That obviates the need for caution and the difficulties of thought.

Since many are more comfortable when feeling than when thinking, *The Prescott Proposals* will pass itself off, among their number, as dwelling on the high ground of idealism. But it embodies a phoney optimism at best—an optimism born more of desperation and impatience than of reason or determination.

Mrs. Prescott is an inexhaustible well of this desperate, impatient sort of idealism. When things are at their blackest for her, she withdraws for a while from the committee room. Presumably her powers want summoning, her clichés refurbishing. Her cronies, craving the benefit of her thought, dispatch her secretary in her wake. Our Ambassador returns, maxims flashing. The secret of her strength is made patent at last. "I found her!" cries the secretary. "She was in the Meditation Room."

NICOLAS MONJO

CINEMA

No Greater Love

It is almost impossible to make out just what Roberto Rossellini was attempting to accomplish in his latest film, *The Greatest Love*. If his purpose was to display the beauty of his talented wife, Ingrid Rossellini née Bergman, his grotesque super-realism thwarts it. If he wished to present his "star" star as a great actress, his aim is equally unrealized, for in this tedious travail of a picture she is permitted but one emotion, relentless despair—in which at least this member of the audience soon joined her, though for a somewhat different reason.

If he intended to put over some Communist propaganda on the capitalist-minded American filmgoer, his failure is still more complete. The sub-party line weaving its way through this grim epic is neither adroit nor skillful. This propaganda attack on capitalism in general and the American variety in particular can't hold a candle to the smooth jobs on the subject turned out from time to time by certain capitalistic outfits in Hollywood.

From the standpoint of entertainment, the cinematic return of Bergman to these shores is no cause for rejoicing. In her present sad role of a mother suffering from the death of her son, she is forsaken by her husband, mother, friends (save one Communist buddy), doctors, the police, and finally even the priest of the asylum to which the above have her confined—and that, to our mind, not a minute too soon.

There is, it must be admitted, one saving grace in these gloomy proceedings—the sturdy-legged, laughing, happy Italian children who rollick through several scenes as the offspring of the poor downtrodden creatures victimized by the capitalist rich. As a matter of fact, their parents didn't look so bad either. Poor casting that, Mr. Rossellini.

If the reception given this bit of celluloid in New York by both the public and reviewers is any indication, it should soon be winging its way across America at a prodigious rate of speed. We mention this by way of warning.

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