

the
FREEMAN

DECEMBER 11, 1950 25 CENTS

THE SECOND PEARL HARBOR

Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson

CONTOUR OF AN ELECTION

George E. Sokolsky

APPEASEMENT ECONOMICS

Garet Garrett

ANTI-SEMITISM IN UTOPIA

Eugene Lyons

THE PRO-SLAVERY PROPAGANDISTS

George S. Schuyler

THE CASE AGAINST ACHESON

An Editorial

Editors: John Chamberlain • Henry Hazlitt • Suzanne La Follette

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DECEMBER 11, 1950

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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

MAJOR MALCOLM WHEELER-NICHOLSON is the author of several books on military affairs, in one of which, "America Can Win" (1941), he predicted the attack on Pearl Harbor. . . . GARET GARRETT, who has recently resigned his six-year editorship of *American Affairs*, is a former financial writer for the *New York Sun*, the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Post*, and former chief editorial writer for the *Saturday Evening Post*. . . . GEORGE S. SCHUYLER has been with the *Pittsburgh Press* since 1924, and since 1942 has been associate editor. He writes for that paper one of the most brilliant columns in the country. . . . EUGENE LYONS was UP correspondent in Russia from 1928 to 1934, an experience which resulted in complete disillusionment and the best-seller "Assignment in Utopia." From 1939 to 1944 he was editor of the *American Mercury*. At present he is a roving editor of the *Reader's Digest*. . . . ROBERT M. YODER attracted national attention before World War II with the old Eugene Field column, "Sharps and Flats," in the *Chicago Daily News*. After the war he joined the staff of the *Saturday Evening Post*, from which he recently retired in order to free lance. . . . BEN RAY REDMAN is the well-known editor, writer and motion picture executive. . . . ROBERT PHELPS is a free-lance writer; also the editor of a collection of Aphra Behn's novels published last summer by the Grove Press. . . . RALPH DE SOLA is a naturalist. He is also an inveterate listener to good music. . . . WEARE HOLBROOK has retired after twenty-five years with the Herald Tribune Syndicate and is now a free-lance writer.

Forthcoming:

In our issue of December 25 we shall publish another of Morrie Ryskind's mordant satires, giving his reasons why Mickey Cohen should be elected President. Joseph Zack, one-time Comintern agent for Latin America, will discuss the Communist-Puerto Rican nationalist connection in the light of the recent abortive insurrection.

In an early issue Major Wheeler-Nicholson will follow "The Second Pearl Harbor" with a discussion of what he believes a sound military policy should be.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1950

THE FORTNIGHT

It is imperative that, before examining even the worst blunders of the past, or determining who was responsible for them, we try to chart clearly our course in foreign policy from this point on.

The worst thing we could do would be to commit fresh and greater errors by a refusal to admit past ones. We should now leave it to the military to decide, on purely military grounds, whether to try to hold on to Korea against apparently overwhelming odds, or to make a strategic withdrawal. A withdrawal from Korea would of course be a heavy blow to American prestige; but it would be far preferable to a major military disaster.

A strategic withdrawal would mean merely that we were willing to lose a battle in order to win a war — that we were willing to retreat from a point where we were weak in order to strike more effectively at a point where we were strong. Where that new point ought to be should again be determined with the advice of the military and on military grounds. The military consensus from the beginning has been that Korea was strategically untenable if either Red China or Soviet Russia chose to throw its hordes against us there, but that Formosa was an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” that could not only be held indefinitely by our air and sea power but used as a constant bombing threat against Red China. We would have the additional advantage of enlisting the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and helping him to activate his guerrilla supporters on the Chinese mainland. And we could announce that we would keep up these hostilities against the Chinese Communists until they withdrew from the Korean peninsula and permitted the peaceful restoration of a free and independent Korea.

In addition we might permit the training of Japanese to form a part of the United Nations forces to be landed in Korea at the appropriate time. Japan might become one of the nations that would guarantee the autonomy of Korea, possibly as an independent part of a Japanese Commonwealth (with much the same relation to Japan that Australia has, for example, to Britain). As Russian control of the Korean peninsula is a far greater strategic threat to Japan than it is to us, we would enlist the

fullest Japanese cooperation as well as its manpower in such an enterprise. The Koreans themselves would surely prefer such a relationship to enslavement to the Kremlin. Thus instead of needlessly sacrificing the lives of Americans boys, as now, and only being accused by Communist propaganda, in return, of “aggression” in Asia, we could make our own the slogan: “A Free Asia for the Asiatics” — but not for the Communist dictators.

The merest outline of such a program, however, or any other but the present bankrupt policy, runs into formidable questions at the very beginning. Can we seriously trust the very group who led us into the present ominous danger to lead us out of it? Would the country be united behind such a group? Has this group even the competence to carry out a sensible and well-considered foreign policy? Has it not demonstrated, on the contrary, that it is the prisoner of its own record — that it has a vested interest in its own past mistakes, and that it is determined to defend those mistakes by compounding them, at whatever cost to the country?

The very minimum need, if we are now to follow a balanced foreign policy, is the immediate resignation of Secretary Acheson. By his past record — outlined at length elsewhere in this issue of the *Freeman* — he has forfeited the confidence and trust of the country. But this is not the worst of it. Even in this critical hour he has been using his position, working through his subordinates in the State Department and through a newspaper group, to try to throw the entire blame for the present disaster on General MacArthur. The remarkable article by James Reston in the *New York Times* of November 30, full of anonymous and unsubstantiated gossip against General MacArthur (the kind of accusation that Mr. Reston is fond of describing as “McCarthyism” when somebody else practices it) was an outstanding example of these tactics. Fortunately Arthur Krock gave the General an opportunity to reply to some of these charges.

But there was one allegation in Mr. Reston’s article not included in Mr. Krock’s message of inquiry. To give General MacArthur an opportunity to reply to this charge the editors of *The Freeman* sent him the following message: “James Reston in *New York Times* November 30 wrote specifically MacArthur ‘is understood to have op-

posed, when it was first mentioned to him, President Truman's reassurance to the Chinese Communists on the safety of their electric power sources along the Korean-Red China border.' Is this true?" The *Freeman* received the following answer: "Statement is completely false. MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Tokyo."

The editors of the *Freeman* confined their inquiry to this allegation because it was the only one against General MacArthur in the Reston dispatch which, if true, would have seriously reflected on his judgment. Though this assurance by President Truman to the Chinese Communists proved in fact to be completely futile, he was of course right in making it if only for the sake of the record.

Most of the charges, however, answered themselves. What General MacArthur chiefly stands accused of is trying to protect the lives of his troops. Thus he actually asked for permission to bomb the concentration points in the "privileged sanctuary" in Manchuria of the Chinese Communists who are killing American soldiers in Korea! When Communist planes came over to locate or bomb our troops, General MacArthur actually wanted to permit our flyers to chase them back even beyond their own sacred one-way border! He even objected to setting up a so-called "buffer zone" in Korea which the United Nations troops would keep out of to "reassure" the Chinese Communists who attacked us.

These accusations throw a brilliant light on what is still the attitude of the Acheson group. It is worse than appeasement; it is an incredible caricature of appeasement. When MacArthur pushed the North Korean Communists back, at a heavy cost in American casualties, to the Thirty-Eighth Parallel, there was an outcry that we should not cross it, but instead allow the invaders to reform there to attack us again, at their leisure. This time the appeasers cry that we must not only refuse to push the Chinese Red invaders beyond their own borders. We are not even to push them back to their borders! We must give them a "buffer zone" — to be cut out of the country they invaded! If the Achesonites want a buffer zone, why don't they suggest that it be set up inside Manchuria, from which the real threat of war comes?

Even if Secretary Acheson were to resign, many of those who remained in top positions would still have a vested interest in maintaining and compounding the blunders of the past. Secretary of Defense Marshall was responsible for the policy of trying to force Chiang Kai-shek to take the Chinese Communists into his government. The whole effort of the State Department since then has been to try to justify that mistake.

And then there is above all President Truman himself. It was he who made the snap decision to throw our troops into war in Korea — by-passing, by the fiction that this was a "police action" of the "United Nations," the exclusive constitutional power of Congress to declare war. Mr. Truman's domestic and foreign policies received a severe jolt at the polls on November 7. There can not

be the slightest doubt that if the elections were held today there would be Republican majorities in both Houses. True, there is still no historic precedent for the resignation of an American chief executive who has lost the confidence of the country. But someone should call Mr. Truman's attention to the fact that the Constitution explicitly permits him to resign.

On the day that the lame-duck session of the Eighty-first Congress opened, President Truman called for action on five measures of "greatest urgency." Not only did some of these measures lack urgency — such as statehood for Hawaii and Alaska — but most of them were proposals to do precisely the wrong thing. "Must" Measure One was for supplemental appropriations for the present fiscal year, principally for defense and atomic energy, expected to total some \$17,000,000,000. Even if we grant that every specific dollar of these proposed supplemental expenditures is necessary, Senator Byrd has conservatively estimated that at least \$10,000,000,000 could be cut from our non-military budget to offset it. Mr. Truman proposes to do nothing about this at all.

Measure Number Two is to raise \$4,000,000,000 through an excess-profits tax. Almost everything is wrong with this. (1) It would be incomparably better for the national economy to cut this \$4,000,000,000 from unnecessary federal expenditures. (2) As a way of "taking the profits out of war" the so-called excess-profits tax is at best a hit-or-miss measure. (3) It leads directly to extravagance and wastefulness in corporate management, so that the government loses more by it in added expenditures than it gains in revenues. (4) It adds grossly excessive burdens on production precisely when it is most necessary to increase production. (5) It relieves consumption of taxation precisely when it is most desirable to discourage wasteful consumption. In short, it is inflationary both by omission and commission.

"Must" Measure Three is heavy financial aid to relieve "drought-stricken" Yugoslavia from famine. This is dubious politically and preposterous economically. We are rewarding Tito for ordering the shooting down of American flyers. In the name of "fighting communism" we are building up the power of a self-declared Communist and sanctioning and subsidizing a Communist despotism — all in the doubtful hope that when the chips are down this Communist will be found fighting on the capitalist side and will not make a last-minute deal with Stalin. We are supporting the Tito propaganda that it is primarily the "drought" that has caused the famine in Yugoslavia and not the Communist economic policies that produce shortages and famine everywhere they are imposed. We don't dare to criticize or ask a change in a single Communist policy that discourages the raising of food in Yugoslavia. Instead we submissively prepare to make good the shortages that these Communist policies have caused.

"Must" Measure Four is extension of rent controls from December 31 to March 31. Virtually every year since World War II, Mr. Truman has asked for rent control for "just one year more" — though everyone with the slightest knowledge of the situation knew that this plea was

bound to be repeated at the end of the year on the same grounds as at the beginning. The present proposed three-months extension is frankly a stop-gap measure in order to pave the way for a much longer extension. The case for rent control — particularly the kind we have had and the kind that is now proposed — is economically untenable. By keeping rents below the free market level, it systematically brings a housing “shortage”, both by encouraging wasteful occupancy of existing space and by discouraging the building of more rental housing to the extent that would otherwise have occurred. It deprives landlords of both the funds and the incentive to make repairs and improvements.

“We must consider the relation of rent control,” says Mr. Truman, “to the price and wage aspects of our stabilization program.” If we ever did that seriously, we would

see that wages and virtually all other prices have been allowed to rise in free markets (wages and food prices have even been artificially boosted), while rents alone have been discriminately held down. This is clear from the government’s own figures. Thus, while rents had been permitted to go up less than 25 per cent above the 1935–39 level by last September, all cost-of-living items together had gone up 74 per cent, food alone had gone up more than 108 per cent, and weekly wages in manufacturing had gone up 170 per cent.

The Syngman Rhee government has been declared by the UN to be the constitutional government of Korea. But Mr. Acheson has suggested that it nevertheless set up an interim government to replace President Rhee, whose term does not expire until 1952. Perhaps the UN could be persuaded to do as much for us.

THE CASE AGAINST ACHESON

The diplomatic fiction that the war in Korea was a small local affair has been demolished by open Chinese aggression which threatens disaster to General MacArthur’s forces. And Secretary of State Dean Acheson has at last discovered a fact which has been common knowledge outside the never-never land of American diplomacy: that the aggressor behind the Chinese Communists is Soviet Russia.

So now it can be told: We defeated the puppet of a puppet in Korea; we are now fighting the puppet; and in both cases the real enemy has been the puppeteer, who of course is Stalin.

“Pardon my firmness,” the Secretary of State was saying in effect on November 29, in a broadcast speech which sounded as if it had been written in a second-hand cliché factory. He spoke at a moment when American boys were dying, when the American Army was facing annihilation, and when General MacArthur urgently needed authorization to aid his imperiled forces by bombing installations and troop concentrations behind the Manchurian border. The General could wait; American “diplomats” at Lake Success would continue to argue with the Chinese Communists over who slapped whom, while Mr. Acheson warned the fathers and mothers of the dying that Communist China’s “brazen” act “holds grave danger for the peace of the world.” One might think the secretary regarded the full-scale war in Korea as just another local skirmish.

Mr. Acheson’s speech of November 29, made at a time when swift action to support MacArthur was desperately urgent, was completely silent on this urgency. It sounded like a filibustering speech calculated to divert the attention of the American people and the world from the military paralysis due to UN inaction.

Has there been any basic change in American Far Eastern policy, all Mr. Acheson’s bold clichés notwithstanding? Or are there still, between his statements of defiance, hints of further appeasement?

As long ago as the autumn of 1944 the man who now admits that Soviet Russia is out to conquer the world

had become the head of the pro-Russian group in the State Department. Former Assistant Secretary Adolf A. Berle testified to this fact before the Committee on Un-American Activities on August 30, 1948, as follows:

As I think many people know, in the fall of 1944 there was a difference of opinion in the State Department. I felt that the Russians were not going to be sympathetic and cooperative. Victory was then assured, though not complete, and the intelligence reports which were in my charge, among other things indicated a very aggressive policy not at all in line with the kind of cooperation everyone was hoping for; and I was pressing for a pretty clean-cut showdown then when our position was strongest. . . . The opposite group in the State Department was largely . . . Mr. Acheson’s group of course, with Mr. Hiss as his principal aid in the matter. I got trimmed in that fight and, as a result, went to Brazil; and that ended my diplomatic career.

The “opposite group” went on to “get” many another good and patriotic American in the Department, while Mr. Acheson’s “principal aid,” Alger Hiss, went on from one important post to another until he became the organizer of the San Francisco Conference to set up the United Nations, and one of President Roosevelt’s chief advisers at the fatal Yalta Conference.

They “got” Under Secretary Joseph Grew, who resigned in the summer of 1945 and was immediately succeeded by Dean Acheson. When Patrick Hurley returned from China in November to demand dismissal of the pro-Communist State Department men in China who were turning over his secret messages to Moscow, it was the Ambassador’s resignation that was accepted. The pro-Communists stayed. And Dean Acheson sat down with General George Marshall to write the instructions to bring about a Kuomintang-Communist coalition government in China — instructions which Marshall vainly followed for a year.

By October 7 of 1945 the *Daily Worker*, whose Washington correspondent on June 7 had called Acheson “one of the most forward-looking men in the State Department,” chortled in its joy:

With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened.

And the *Daily Worker's* uptown echo, *PM*, declared that "What the Government seeks now is to develop a diplomacy based on better appreciation of what the Soviet wants."

That was what the government developed, and that is what the government has continued in the Far East down to the present debacle.

When Acheson, after two years at his private law practice, returned to the Department as Secretary in January, 1949, he was sold to the American people as representing "continuity" in foreign policy. Precisely because this was true, those who realized that our foreign policy pointed to disaster were dismayed by the appointment. There was also objection from those who felt that it would be unbecoming, to say the least, for a man whose law firm was registered with the Department as representing several foreign governments to be dealing with those governments as Secretary of State. But the main objections were based on Acheson's previous record in the Department.

Since that time Acheson's completion of the China sellout, his publication of the infamous Government White Paper whitewashing the Department's Red China record, his public denunciations of Chiang Kai-shek, his appointment of Philip Jessup and Dean Rusk as makers of Far East policy, his proposals — after having virtually turned Asia over to communism — that we pour money and arms into any borderland Korea where Stalin might choose to have his puppets attack, his public and official declaration that he would not turn his back on the convicted perjurer Alger Hiss — all these actions had aroused great public uneasiness even before the Korean adventure, and had prompted two Democratic legislatures (Texas and Mississippi), and various other organizations and individuals to call for the Secretary's dismissal.

Some of the charges brought against him are here briefly summarized from Congressional speeches and the public prints.

1. He has been the chief architect of the policy which has brought us, in five years, from the unconditional victories of 1945, and sole possession of the atom bomb, to the verge of national ruin.

2. Under his guidance, we acquiesced in the conquest of one third of the world by Communist imperialism.

3. He and his clique encouraged a weak Communist rebellion in China, armed and directed by Russia, to take over the heartland, or key to all Asia; today, in consequence, Americans are dying for a toehold in Korea, a peninsula attached to the China Mr. Acheson's Department helped to push into Russia's arms.

4. On July 31, 1946, Mr. Acheson wrote to Alfred Kohlberg of New York a letter, which was published, in which he said: "... Gen. Marshall . . . is exerting every effort to fulfill the American Government's desires by bringing the two major Chinese political factions peacefully together to form a united and representative government."

5. After the legitimate government of China had been

forced to flee to Formosa, Secretary Acheson recommended abandonment of that island. His Department, on December 23, 1949, sent out secret instructions to all diplomatic and consular personnel to promote the view that Formosa was doomed and expendable.

6. Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on June 19, 1947, Mr. Acheson said there was no danger of a Communist defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. In his letter to the President of July 30, 1949, prefacing the White Book, he says that "no amount of aid could have saved Chiang." These statements are typical of the quality of Acheson's statesmanship.

7. On August 24, 1949, in answer to Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, Mr. Acheson denied that Vice President Wallace had made a written report to President Roosevelt on his return from China in 1944. Since then, Mr. Wallace has released portions of two such reports.

8. In issuing the White Paper on China, on August 5, 1949, Acheson declared that all important documents were included. Twelve cables called for by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley when testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1945, were omitted and are still secret.

9. He has approved the Chinese Communist demands for hostages to guarantee Americans' leaving Red China.

10. He paid Communist China to get Consul General Angus Ward out, and then only after a newspaper campaign had aroused public opinion.

11. Under questioning by a Senate Committee before his confirmation as Under Secretary of State in 1945, Acheson stated that Russia should have a share in the administration of Japan.

12. He sponsored the Hiss brothers unreservedly to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, to whom Whittaker Chambers had mentioned them as Soviet agents. In 1946, he used his influence with the FBI to save Alger Hiss; he publicly and officially refused to turn his back on Alger Hiss after twenty jurors had found him guilty of perjury about espionage.

13. He acted as counsel for Lauchlin Currie, former Administrative Assistant to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, when Currie appeared before a Congressional Committee, charged by both Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley with having aided their espionage network.

14. On April 18, 1947, without investigation, he cleared John Carter Vincent, chief of the vitally important Far Eastern Division of the State Department, of charges of pro-communism filed by a U. S. Senator. In his letter he professed complete ignorance of official published Communist programs for worldwide conquest, especially in the Far East.

15. Acheson headed the American delegation in the formation of UNRRA, where he insisted on the veto to please Russia, and according to former Polish Ambassador Jan Ciechanowski, steadily supported all Soviet demands. Thus he rendered the United States impotent to control or investigate UNRRA, although this country supplied the overwhelming bulk of its funds.

16. As head of the State Department unit arranging for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Acheson secured the appointment of Alger Hiss as Director of the Division of International Security in charge of American prepara-

tions for the UN, as adviser to Secretary Stettinius and President Roosevelt at Yalta, and as first Secretary General of the UN.

17. On July 20, 1946 (*Congressional Record*, p. 9714) Mr. Acheson stated that there were no Communists in the State Department, and that only one had been fired for that reason. The first statement proved to be untrue.

18. In spite of documented charges of softness toward communism against Ambassador Philip Jessup, Mr. Acheson has made him top American foreign policy adviser both in Europe and Asia.

19. Speaking in welcome to the "Red Dean" of Canterbury at Madison Square Garden, Nov. 14, 1945, Under Secretary of State Acheson said:

... never in the past has there been any place on the globe where the vital interests of the American and Russian peoples have clashed or even been antagonistic — and there is no objective reason to suppose that there should ... be such a place. ... We understand and agree with them that to have friendly governments along her borders is essential both for the security of the Soviet Union and for the peace of the world.

20. Acheson recognized Tito's Communist government of Yugoslavia on December 22, 1945, without demanding the free elections provided for at Yalta.

21. Against the advice of Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane in 1946, Mr. Acheson approved a "loan" of \$90,000,000 to Communist Poland, then represented by Donald Hiss of the Acheson law firm.

22. The Lilienthal Atomic Energy Committee was appointed in October 1946, on Acheson's recommendation, without the knowledge of his superior, Secretary of State Byrnes, or of Bernard Baruch, who headed our Atomic Commission to the UN.

23. Acheson fronted for the Acheson-Lilienthal atomic energy report, which proposed turning over atomic secrets to Russia on promise of peaceful uses, but without inspection.

24. On May 1, 1946, Acting Secretary of State Acheson announced that invitations to attend the Bikini A-Bomb tests on July 1 had been extended to the Soviet Government.

25. On December 16, 1945, Under Secretary Acheson received Juan Negrin, head of the Communist group of Spanish Loyalists. He refused to receive Fernando de los Rios, head of the anti-Communist group. Four days later he received Milton Wolff, commander of the subversive Abraham Lincoln Brigade and Congressman Vito Marcantonio, and promised them, according to the *Daily Worker*, to intervene with Franco on behalf of two condemned Communists.

26. Everybody except Mr. Acheson has known all along that the Communist forces in China and North Korea were armed and directed by Russia; that American prisoners are executed by order of Russia, exactly as Polish prisoners were executed in the Katyn Forest. Yet Mr. Acheson permitted Chinese Communist delegates to accuse this country of aggression in Formosa while American soldiers were still waiting for permission to fight the enemy with all means at MacArthur's command.

It must be said that President Truman, in approving and defending the policy and behavior of the ruling State Department clique, has made himself ultimately responsible for them, for the policy, and for the debacle to which it has led. It is also true that his responsibility is

shared by a majority in Congress, and by a large majority of the newspapers. Those who have not protested against the errors which have resulted in the enslavement of one-third of the world and the terrorization of the rest of it, must share in the responsibility for those errors.

"BIPARTISANSHIP" EXAMINED

Tom Connally of Texas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is a simple soul; and sometimes he gives away the show.

On November 27 he issued a prepared statement in which he dutifully declared: "I have always been a strong advocate of the principle that our foreign policy should be developed in a bipartisan manner." But he shouted on the same day, in a spontaneous burst of anger and candor: "All this talk about 'bipartisanship' and 'You've got to consult the Republicans' — to hell with all that! If a man is an American he ought to stand for an American foreign policy in the interests of the people of the United States!"

Here we have clearly revealed all the inconsistency and hypocrisy in the Administration demand that the Republicans be "bipartisan" in foreign policy. What most Administration supporters mean by this is simply that the Republicans should be rubber-stamps — that they should endorse and applaud every step in foreign policy that Messrs. Truman and Acheson choose to take. Any Republican criticism whatever, even if made from the highest motives and solidly documented, they dismiss as "partisan", "isolationist", and a betrayal of America.

On the other hand, however, as Senator Connally's statements make clear, though the Republicans are to be denounced for any criticism of the Truman-Acheson foreign policy, they are not to be rewarded for the most faithful endorsement of this policy. On the contrary, if the policy turns out to be mistaken, they are to be held responsible for the mistakes. Says the Senator: "The Republicans talk about 're-examination'. Well, if they do they will find their tracks all around them. The Marshall Plan, military aid to Europe — all these things they supported along with us."

But whenever the Acheson-Truman policy turns out to be successful, the Democrats are to grab partisan credit for it. The *New York Times*, in reporting the remarks of Senator Connally quoted above, declared: "His conviction is, and has been, that foreign policy, like any other policy, is primarily the function and responsibility of the party in power, and that . . . the majority in the end must primarily be praised or blamed."

So there you have Senator Connally's official interpretation of what is meant by bipartisanship. In sum: to hell with consulting the Republicans; it is wicked and un-American for the Republicans to oppose the Truman-Acheson policy; their duty is to endorse it; if anything turns out to be wrong the Republicans can not benefit from this because they participated in the errors, but if anything turns out to be right, the praise and partisan credit must go to the Democrats.

Let's examine this notion a little more closely. (We can't say "re-examine" — for the sad truth is that like most of the ideas on which we are operating today, "foreign" or "domestic", it was never seriously examined in the first place.)

The concept of a "bipartisan" foreign policy stems from the facile slogan that "politics stops at the water's edge." If this means that the Republicans ought not to oppose the Administration's foreign policy merely for narrow or selfish partisan reasons, it is true beyond dispute. The same principle applies just as strongly, however, to domestic policies. The water's edge has nothing to do with it.

It is true, of course, that any responsible critic of our foreign policy should always keep in mind what the effect of his criticism may be in foreign countries that we wish as potential allies or fear as potential enemies. His criticisms should be so worded that they can not easily be misinterpreted abroad. In particular, such criticisms should never be made in a way to mislead the Kremlin into supposing that the Republicans are softer in their opposition to Communist aggression than the Democrats, or into supposing that it can use our party differences to drive a wedge to weaken or divide us.

This is almost the only germ of truth in the mountain of error and hypocrisy about "bipartisanship."

If the Administration were itself sincere in wishing to pursue a "bipartisan" foreign policy, it would follow a radically different course than it has in the past. It would stop presenting decisions to the Republicans as *faits accomplis*, to be blindly rubber-stamped. It would submit its proposals in advance, in private, to the recognized Republican leaders in Congress. (Combined with this should be a more responsible way of selecting party leaders than the blind principle of seniority: see the editorial, "A Vital Reform," in our issue of November 27.) Further, if the Administration does not wish the Republicans in Congress to exploit their criticisms of its foreign policy for partisan purposes, it should itself refrain from exploiting its foreign policy for partisan purposes. The President should not, for example, make melodramatic political visits to generals at the peak of a campaign and at a moment when "victory" seems to be neatly in hand, nor should he bitterly attack the Republicans generally as "isolationists" three days before election.

Another error about "bipartisanship" arises from a confusion of goals with methods. Naive supporters of the Administration, like Senator Connally, see the problem in simple terms: The Administration is sincerely seeking for peace; it is seeking "world leadership" for America; it is sincerely seeking to resist Communist aggression. Therefore, all opposition to its policies must be partisanship, blind "isolationism" and downright un-American. The fact that the methods the Administration is following have failed and will fail to achieve these goals has not even occurred to these supporters. They are like a chess player who resents criticism of even his most flagrant errors because his intention, at least, was to win.

Our foreign policy should be bipartisan only in the sense that both parties should honestly try to reach an agreement concerning foreign policy, and should try to put aside differences on minor points. But just as the Administration should not be deterred from taking a good course simply because Republicans dislike it, so the Republicans should not be deterred from even the most vigorous criticism if they are convinced that the policy we are pursuing is dangerous for this country and for the world.

The primary objective is not that our foreign policy should be "bipartisan" but that it should be sound. If the Administration follows an unsound foreign policy, the opposition party is not merely justified in opposing it; it is its sacred duty to oppose it.

The duty of an opposition party, in fact, can be stated very simply. It should support any policy of the Administration — "foreign" or "domestic" — if it is right, and oppose it if it is wrong. If the policy is part right and part wrong, it should support what is right about it and oppose what is wrong about it.

No opposition party is fulfilling its duty to the voters by either an automatic attitude of "not-me" or an automatic attitude of "me-too." The most confused theory of all is that it is the function of the opposition party to say "not-me" in domestic policy but "me-too" in foreign policy.

JAMES KEVIN McGUINNESS

One of the most courageous and selfless opponents of Stalin's largely successful attempts to capture Hollywood was James K. McGuinness, one of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's top executives. Oliver Carlson has called him the "spark plug" of the Motion Picture Alliance, that intrepid band of producers, writers and actors who have had the courage to put the fight against Russification of their industry ahead of their personal careers.

When Jim McGuinness dared to testify against the Hollywood ten before the Committee on Un-American Activities, it cost him his contract with MGM. But he was neither intimidated nor embittered. Although he was anxious — what American is not? — about the danger into which the country has been led, those privileged to spend with him the last evening of his life found his wonderful wit as keen and hilarious as ever. Yet the ordeal had been too severe, after all, and those who fought beside him are left suddenly bereaved and bewildered. It is hard to believe that a heart so staunch could fail.

DEATH OF A FIGHTER

(For James Kevin McGuinness)

The sound of mortality is quiet
in the night's small hours;
it rustles, and the pulse is gone.

Gone the surging life
that battered at the world,
the pounding heart, heroic
in the unequal struggle.

The mortal candle gutters
in the monster breath of evil,
the gallant heart subsides.

Weep openly; the love of man
is but a fragile wall. Pray
gently; the requiem is ours.

RALPH DE TOLEDANO

WANTED: MILITARY ARGUMENT

In this issue of the *Freeman* we feature (see page 170) an article by Major Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson on the appalling military predicament of the United States. We are sure our readers will agree that it is a chilling, spine-tingling and—in the main—utterly realistic article. Major Wheeler-Nicholson has been called the “Billy Mitchell of the American infantry,” which is better commendation than any we might supply on our own. Billy Mitchell, as readers will remember, bucked all the prevalent thinking about air power in the twenties and was broken by his superiors for his habit of speaking his mind. Yet Billy Mitchell was right and his superiors wrong.

There is only one thing in Major Wheeler-Nicholson's article that seems to us a matter for argument, and that is the author's theory that Soviet Russia may launch an invasion of the North American continent by seizing Alaska with a view toward using it as a staging base for activities further south. Alaska, as any reader of Robert Service's sordough rhymes and Jack London's stories is aware, is a “weather factory,” a “weather breeder.” In the winter the traffic, including air traffic, is impeded by ice and snow and sub-zero temperatures that make the operation of machines depending on oil, gasoline and sparkplugs a most chancy matter. In the summer there are the Bering fogs. And in other seasons there are rains and boggy tundra. With fog, rain, ice, snow, mosquitoes and staggering mountains to contend with, any occupying power would be hard put to it to supply a large holding force in Alaska.

We do not say that Major Wheeler-Nicholson is wrong in his effort to focus our attention on Alaska; maybe the Russians have some new wrinkles bearing on the problem of military supply in Arctic climates. After all, the Russians are cold-weather animals; they have lived in Siberia for a long time, and their experiences in Kamchatka, a notorious “weather breeder” territory, may have disclosed to them things that are beyond the ken of temperate-zone people. Whether Major Wheeler-Nicholson is right or wrong, however, we consider it our duty to present his argument in toto. As a matter of quite conscious policy we hope to print many other challenging articles on military policy and strategy for one compelling reason: the American people are entitled to hear *every* point of view bearing on the predicament into which official military thinkers in alliance with official State Department policy makers have plunged us all.

As we see it, the Administration is terribly afraid of an open debate on military policy. Washington does all it can to cultivate a “their's not to reason why” attitude on military matters among the people. Why? Because pursuit of the truth about military affairs among conflicting points of view might lead to a “re-examination” of the military policies which our State Department insists upon as necessary to a political policy which in itself has failed to check Russia's swift expansion since 1945.

Take this matter of sending ten American divisions to Europe, for example. Assuming that the Europeans themselves can supply some sixty divisions in time to halt Russia, the idea of putting American soldiers into Germany in force may be a good one. But we don't know whether seventy divisions could possibly stop the Russians either now, or in 1953 or 1954. A sincere thinker,

General Bonner Fellers, who cut his military eye teeth by doing important work for General Douglas MacArthur, doubts that even sixty European divisions would put up much of a struggle against a Russian horde. In which case ten American divisions would be isolated and cut to pieces in the event of war on European soil. It is Bonner Fellers's contention that Russia should be opposed, not on the soil of Europe, but from bases in North Africa. African bases would have the protective moat of the Mediterranean in front of them. The ten American divisions which official policy contemplates sending to Europe might, in Bonner Fellers's opinion, be more profitably used to defend North African bases from which Russian factories and cities could be razed from the air.

We do not know whether General Fellers is right or wrong; some would say that he does not reckon with what Russia might be able to do if it possessed the Ruhr. We do know, however, that Fellers can present a logical argument. Yet, to our knowledge, he tried unsuccessfully for years to get his point of view before a wide public. When he finally crashed through, with a notable article in *Collier's*, the smear-boys got busy on him at once, trying to prove by the manipulation of certain sentences lifted out of the context of an off-the-cuff speech, that Bonner Fellers was a Nazi. General Fellers happens to be a fervent believer in the check-and-balance theory of the American Republic; he is as far from being an admirer of the Hitler political system as the South Pole is from the North. Yet his dissent from the official State Department-War Department view of the practicability of fighting Stalin on the European continent was enough to mark him down for character assassination.

During World War II there was much dissatisfaction in certain quarters with the military policies bound up with the political deference which Harry Hopkins and others insisted on showing the Stalin government. Many eminently patriotic Americans thought a Balkan invasion should be substituted for the Italian invasion after Sicily had been conquered. But efforts to talk about the need for a Balkan invasion were hush-hushed. Similarly, talk about alternative strategies for the war in the Far East was discouraged. Long before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, long before Roosevelt and Marshall bribed the Russians to invade Manchuria, generals of the United States Air Force were arguing privately that neither the cooperation of Russia nor an American invasion of the Japanese mainland was needed to bring the Japanese to their knees. Correspondents who had been in the Pacific came home and retailed the Air Force view to their editors. But did the editors print what the correspondents had to say? They did not. They thought it was patriotic to keep mum; their general attitude was, “Let the War Department do what it thinks best.”

But the War Department needs the corrective of general discussion, the give-and-take of argument, just like anybody else. It needs it particularly when it is subject to the pressures of an Administration which consists of politicians who in many instances have their faces to save. So let us hear what the military thinkers have to say, even though they may transgress the political orthodoxy of the moment. Only by such vital stimulation may we hope to develop a soundly informed public opinion in a realm that will soon be life and death to all of us.

THE SECOND PEARL HARBOR

By MALCOLM WHEELER-NICHOLSON

The following article is a chapter from "The Terrible Swift Sword," a forthcoming book by Major Wheeler-Nicholson.

ARE WE in danger from the possibility of a new and more devastating Pearl Harbor? If wars resulted as the inexplicable explosion of a set of unknown factors, we could be easier in our minds on that score.

But as war is the logical culmination of a series of prior moves leading to the climax, it might pay us to re-study the causes leading up to Pearl Harbor. Preceding that climax, we followed a course of appeasement, uncertainty and lack of resolution that led to the loss of potential allies and strategic areas. We followed that by getting more courage, forming a coalition of remaining allies, and arming them and ourselves. Emboldened by this, but not waiting until we were ready to fight, we laid embargoes against the aggressor and announced to him that he could go no farther without fighting.

The attack upon Pearl Harbor followed swiftly — a natural denouement, as this writer pointed out before the event.*

It should be a matter of concern to us that we have reached a similar third phase today in our relations with Soviet Russia. We have maintained an embargo for some time. Our action in Korea has been reinforced with many brave and ringing words from Washington, before we are ready for war, warning Stalin that he can go no farther without a fight.

As like causes tend to produce like results, we can be in for a rough time. For this second assault is likely to make the first one seem like a mere slap on the wrist.

In the first place, it is unlikely that Soviet military planners would repeat the error that led to eventual Japanese defeat — a campaign of limited objective aimed against a segment, rather than at the source of our power, our mainland industry. It is also unlikely that Stalin would limit his attack to an atomic bomb, hit-and-run affair, thereby confining himself to use of the one weapon in which we excel in quality and quantity, and neglecting the powerful means and weapons in which he excels and in which we are deficient. Military common sense, instead, would impel him to throw everything he has at us, land, sea and air. Analysis of the components of his military power lends credence to that belief.

In concentrating our worries on his greater numerical strength, we neglect to study the composition and the placement of that strength, both equally vital in appraisal of power and intent. His army is composed in traditional Oriental military fashion, of a "horde" and an "elite corps." The horde is made up of his infantry divisions, plus a heavy proportion of artillery divisions, these latter having a dual role, that of laying "encouraging

salvos" at the heels of its own attacking infantry, as well as that of firing at the enemy. The horde makes up the bulk of the some 500 Soviet divisions, active and reserve, totaling some 6,000,000 men.

The elite corps is composed of (a) the Soviet air force, weaker in strategic bombing elements than ours but far stronger in attack aviation, the whole being quantitatively equal to the combined Anglo-American air forces; (b) some 35 armored and mechanized divisions, plus the self-propelled artillery units, and (c) the 20 "air armies" of airborne troops, the total estimated as high as one million men. This elite corps is primarily an offensive force, and is the largest aggregation of fire power and mobility on land in the world today.

In addition to the Soviet Russian forces, above, are the European satellite armies of some one million men, including 10 armored divisions, and the Chinese Communist armies estimated at over three million men, with a potential of some 10 million.

The placement of these forces is on a time-tested formation: that of a triple line, the first of outposts, then a line of supports (these two generally being satellite forces), and behind them a line of local reserves, extending around the entire vast Soviet perimeter, from northern Siberia, behind the entire Iron Curtain, along the Indo-Chinese, Burmese, Indian, Iranian, Turkish, Greek, Austrian, West German and Finnish frontiers in the far north again. Behind these triple ramparts, occupying interior lines, is the Soviet Russian horde as main body and main reserve, and the elite corps, as highly mobile offensive reserve.

The whole formation gives the utmost freedom of action to the Soviet forces, with the greatest economy of force, permitting of the maximum concentration for them on the shorter spokes of the web and ensuring maximum dispersion to their opponents on the exterior lines of the circumference.

We are faced, then, with the "armored hordes" of Eurasia. They sit secure, in a vast fortress dominating the Eurasian land mass, its garrison skilfully disposed on the three outer barbicans and ramparts, and able to repel any local attack, while the inner keep and citadel holds powerful reserves quickly available to give superiority of force at any seriously threatened point.

Our forces in Korea, for example, have fought against the North Korean army which is only a single segment of that outermost barbican, the line of outposts. Behind it is its support, another single segment of the second line — the Manchurian, Chinese, Communist forces of 300,000–400,000 men. Standing poised within easy striking distance, should the Chinese Communist support be driven in, is a segment of the third line, the local reserve

* "Battleship of the Republic," Macmillan, 1940, page 165. "America Can Win," Macmillan, spring 1941, pp. 6, 30 *et seq.* pp. 41, 48, 52, 54 *et seq.*

— the 650,000 Soviet Russian troops based upon Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Should they be unable to cope with our forces, behind them, poised like great, gray combers, are increasingly stronger waves of the mobile reserve, the main reserve and the vast Soviet armed horde itself.

Our valor of ignorance in landing a small force in Korea in face of that heavily garrisoned fortress resembles the temerity of a puppy attacking a steam roller.

The same defensive strength and its placement would meet us at any point around the vast Soviet periphery. So great is this Soviet defensive strength, and so well placed, that it leaves a substantial surplus, available and adequate, for *offensive* purposes. The garrisons of its outer barbicans alone (the line of satellite European and Chinese Communist forces forming the outposts and supports) can, unaided by Soviet forces in the inner keep, seize western Europe and the remainder of Asia, unaided. It should be evident that the European satellites have been readied for some time, and that the Chinese satellite is getting into position, in Korea, in Indo-China and Tibet, to do that very thing.

The former power deterrents provided by an armed Germany and Japan having been turned into power vacuums, they no longer exist to act as brakes upon Russian expansion. There is no power on the Eurasian continent today capable of checking Soviet Russian aggression, or even requiring dispersion of Soviet force to contain it. This leaves Stalin with both his horde and his elite corps intact, free and unhampered. His infantry horde (the Russian infantry soldier being traditionally better on homeland defense than attack abroad) is strong enough both to provide security for the homeland, and to furnish reserves to back up the satellite armies.

Then what of the Soviet elite corps, that powerful, highly mobile, hard-hitting force, designed for offensive action? Seeing that Stalin does not need it to finish his conquest of Eurasia, against whom is it to be used?

We can not afford to discount the possibility that it is intended for use against us. We have been nominated and elected as Soviet Public Enemy Number One, for the good reason that we are the only power capable of preventing Stalin's attainment of his main objective, Soviet world domination. That fact should impel us to examine our current delusions and to make a possibly more realistic appraisal of the situation.

In doing this we should heed two wise military axioms:

The one is that the opponent must be credited with using the best plan and means available against us; i.e., we must envisage the *worst* that the enemy can do. Proper planning against that would obviously ensure providing against lesser dangers.

The other is that the first principle of war is security. Security, like charity, begins at home. The protection of the homeland, based on the verity that survival is the first law of nature, is the first consideration of any military realist, as witness Stalin's effective measures.

To lend emphasis to this in our case, we should ponder two facts:

The one is that we have never in our history faced the full power of a foreign nation concentrated against us alone. We have only faced fractions of such power, even in the last war, as a little reflection will show. *Today*

we have to figure on meeting the full power of Soviet Russia, unassailed and unassailable by anything on its own continent.

The other is that for the first time in our history, and in addition to the above, we are vulnerable to assault on our own continent, by an overseas power *which does not need control of the seas to invade us with ground forces.*

Before pointing out how that can be done, let us examine what may turn out to be our most dangerous delusions. One is that Stalin will not find means to stop our retaliatory atomic bombing before it starts, since he has at least one terribly effective means we have put into his hands; another is that his smaller stockpile of atomic bombs would deter him from atom-bombing us. Seeing that the advantage is all with the aggressor in atomic warfare, and that in such case he needs only adequacy, not superiority or even equality, we may find this delusion dangerous. A third is that his smaller stocks of oil, steel and aluminum would deter him from waging a long war. This ignores the fact that he has all such stocks he needs within easy grasp in Europe and the Near East. Besides, he evidently doesn't plan a long war, as he is all geared for a short war!

The most dangerous delusion is our somewhat naive belief that Stalin, at the peak of his armament today, would wait politely for the two or three years it would take, at the present rate, for the superior industrial power and inventive ability of the West to render his expensive hardware obsolescent.

With the possibility that Stalin can render our land desolate tomorrow, let us examine at least one plan, or variation thereof, by which he *can* do it. In addition to what may be Stalin's terrible swift sword against us, his elite corps of well over a million men, there are three other factors to which we have paid little heed.

The first is the possibility that all five, instead of only two, of the new Soviet 35,000–36,000-ton battleships, reputedly armed with guided missiles, are in commission or soon will be. (*The Sovietsky Sojus, Sovetskaya Ukraina, Strana Sovetskoy, Sovetskaya Byelorussia and the Tretji International.*) At this writing we have only two battleships out of mothballs, the "Mighty Mo" and the "New Jersey."

The second is the improved northern Arctic route from Archangel to the Bering Sea, available for Soviet shipping some four months in the year.

The third factor is the surprising skill shown by the Soviets in mine laying. At Wonson, in Korea, both the quantity of mines and the technique of their placement aroused the respect of our naval personnel in those waters.

The fourth factor is Soviet progress in guided missiles, which far surpasses ours. Not only the Soviet Baltic shores are reported to be lined with guided-missile batteries, but the coasts of Siberia, opposite Alaska. The mysterious explosion reported by the United Press last May 18 at Fort Richardson, Alaska, and unexplained fires in that vicinity, may possibly have been trial ranging shots with Soviet guided missiles. Reliable sources in Scandinavia, with whom I discussed the matter of the strange passage of missiles over Sweden, are convinced that Soviet Russia's guided-missile program is far advanced. It may prove to be the secret surprise weapon with which the Soviets hope to counter our atomic bomb.

But the sum of the above factors, plus Soviet Russia's 20 air armies, one of which is said to be especially trained in Arctic work, can give us a clue, perhaps, to how Stalin would assault us.

To start with, it must be assumed that he would strive to cause the utmost dispersion of our forces while maintaining utmost concentration of his own. In this, his European and Asiatic satellites are already doing their share. The Korean complication was quickly succeeded by renewed activity in Indo-China, backed by Communist Chinese aid. This aid will become an increasingly important factor in Asia, threatening Hong Kong, aiding Ho Chi Minh's forces in Indo-China, consolidating its seizure of Tibet in order to threaten India, rousing the large Chinese population of Malaya, infiltrating Burma and backing the Burmese Communists. All this will be aimed toward attaining the maximum American, British and French dispersion in Asia, as well as preparing for the eventual seizure of the rest of Asia by Chinese Communist forces.

The flare-up of Communist activity will extend to Iran, where slowly mounting Communist action will probably result in uprisings by the tribesmen on the Soviet borders and their joining with the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party, in efforts to overthrow the government. This will undoubtedly bring American reinforcement to keep the oil of the Middle East from Stalin's grasp. Turkey will be threatened by Soviet troop movements on her borders; her neighboring Balkan satellite nations will increase pressure upon Yugoslavia. Greek guerrillas already have been alerted and seem ready to resume warfare. Trouble will increase in Austria and East Germany. The headlines will be filled with alarms and excursions, mounting steadily from now on.

Not until threatening mobilizations of the Czechoslovakian and satellite Polish armies become acute will we probably dispatch more American troops to Germany. The eve of the real showdown will undoubtedly be when Moscow makes demands on Finland which can not be met, and sends in Soviet troops to occupy barracks and facilities. (These are already laid out, incidentally.) This would be followed or accompanied by closing of the Baltic Sea with mine fields.

The real point of attack being Alaska, the first overt move is likely to be a diversionary attack, possibly of some 300 Soviet Tu-70's accompanied by jet fighters with extra wing tanks, aimed at the eastern United States via Iceland-Newfoundland.

Report of this may come from our radar defenses if they are set by then; otherwise Canadian sources would give warning. The result would be panic in our big cities. Probably more people would be killed and injured attempting to flee to the country than in a battle. Washington would be thrown into such a panic that civilian officials would probably insist on concentration of all our airpower in the East — which would be all right with Stalin. The main Soviet armada of bombers and fighters would be defeated, being expendable suicide groups, but attention would probably have been concentrated upon them to the exclusion of watching two other bomber groups, one coming down from the north of Canada and the other inland from the Atlantic Ocean. These would carry the Soviet atomic bombs and could

knock out New York, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Detroit and Washington itself, snarling up military control by obliterating the Pentagon and all within it. (Opinions would vary as to whether Stalin might be doing himself a disservice by blowing up official Washington.)

With this bad news would come reports that the Soviet satellite troops had overrun Europe and the rest of Asia, overwhelming and forcing the surrender of such American forces as were present. Probably Malik, in the UN, would issue the Soviet warning of the execution of captured American soldier hostages, to follow any retaliatory atomic bombing on our part.

The next bad news would come from Alaska. This might be reports of the blasting out of all military and airfield installations by a mysterious barrage of guided missiles; but in any case, two of the Soviet airborne divisions could seize Alaska with little difficulty, converting our three military airfields into bombing bases and intermediate staging bases for the immense armadas of airborne troops sent toward the US. The first seizure these made would undoubtedly be the Hanford, Washington, atomic installation.

Naval intelligence about this time would report the sudden appearance in the Bering Sea of an immense Soviet flotilla of transports escorted by battleships. Efforts of our hastily assembled naval forces to break up this concentration in those narrow waters would be countered by immense Soviet mine fields, guided missiles from the Russian battleships and from shore, and by attack from Soviet air and submarine forces based on Petropavlovsk. Against all this our naval forces would probably be unable to prevent the landing of the armored and mechanized divisions on our shores. These could make swift progress down the Alaskan Highway and over the network of good roads in British Columbia.

Their goal could be the Pacific Coast area, which would undoubtedly be blocked off from the eastern states, with the Rocky Mountains as rampart. Behind this, Soviet forces could operate airplane and other factories with American slave labor, operate bombing strikes at the rest of the country, block our Navy from its Pacific Coast bases and move toward making the Pacific Ocean into a Soviet lake.

In addition to the possibility of there being, at best, only four or five Army and four National Guard divisions trained and ready in the Continental United States, the country would be dependent (a) upon its airpower, which could not bomb Soviet troops for fear of killing Americans, and (b) upon National Guard forces not yet inducted into federal service — some 370,000 men, needing six to seven months' training to meet first-line troops.

There would probably not be an adequate plan for defense of the homeland in any case, just as there was not any adequate plan for the defense of Pearl Harbor. Our military intelligence will not fall down, but Washington will probably fail to evaluate its reports, as happened before Pearl Harbor, before Russia's unnecessary entry into the war against Japan, before the Communist uprising in Bogota, and before the attack by the North Koreans.

That it can happen here should be evident to anyone who reads the newspapers. That it can be prevented from happening here by using ordinary military horse sense,

in placing the power we actually have in the right places, should also be obvious to any intelligent professional military man. That it will happen here is far more likely unless heed is paid to our military rather than State advisers.

If it can happen here, *when* would it be most likely to happen? That also should be evident from the foregoing. One factor is our own and our allies' rate of armament. At the present rate this would not reach the point of being dangerous to Stalin until the latter part of 1951. Military logic would normally impel him to strike before then.

Another factor is Stalin's proved common sense and military solicitude for the security of his homeland. That will not be achieved until his vulnerable 2000-mile-long Asiatic border with China is made secure by the consolidation of the now turbulent and rebellious anti-Communist forces backed by hope of aid from Formosa. Once our State Department has thoroughly sabotaged that hope, China will be made secure enough to permit Stalin to launch his attack on us. At the present rate of progress made by the State Department, that should be within the next six months.

The third factor is the defenselessness of Alaska, which can not hope for reinforcement until late in 1951, due to lack of sufficient housing. It would be sound military logic for Stalin to strike before then.

The fourth factor is the four months' comparative freedom from ice of the Soviet northern passage through the Arctic to Bering Sea. An offensive would normally start as soon as ice conditions permitted. The sum of these factors would make our time of greatest peril come in the late spring or first summer month of 1951.

We can not afford to risk its coming. We can not

afford to risk defeat. We can not afford to risk being thrust into a long and dreary World War III, which we do not want and in which we could win nothing except our usual privilege of paying for all the damages to all concerned. If the small Korean war has already cost us 10 billion dollars for operations and two billion for damages, the astronomical sums involved in a global war can be better imagined than described. It would bankrupt us. Our present alternative to war, an unimaginative policy of maintaining heavy armaments for ourselves and our allies for countless years of an uneasy armistice, would also bankrupt us, without averting an eventual war.

It is time we took the initiative, stopped wringing our hands, and started to fashion the world nearer to our own hearts' desire than to Joe Stalin's. To accomplish this needs a global military plan based upon military common sense. Such a plan should use the force we have in the swiftest and most economical way to achieve our ends without war.

It can be done. We have the power. The principles upon which a plan to use that power intelligently must be based are unfortunately the absolute negation of all thinking done by official civilian Washington to date. If that thinking does not change, our only hope is in an informed and intelligent public opinion and an aroused Congress. For it is unthinkable that the great strength of this Republic should continue to be so mishandled that it spends itself into bankruptcy to ensure the senseless slaughter of its sons.

That folly can and must be prevented by skilled and intelligent military use of the power we actually possess today, a power capable of being forged quickly into our own terrible swift sword.

CONTOUR OF AN ELECTION

By GEORGE E. SOKOLSKY

WHEN MORE than 40,000,000 people vote in secret, in a multi-party election, in a nation of 150,000,000, democracy is in action. The word "democracy," in the American sense, has come to mean government by choice through representatives elected at fixed intervals.

The political party in the United States is altogether a different institution from anything that exists elsewhere. In the first place, it is not a membership party. No one is a member of the Republican or Democratic Party. Comparatively few persons belong to local district clubs, which are usually poorly attended and exist principally for the political professionals to provide the machinery of nomination and election. On the county committees and state committees of both parties are men and women who rarely, if ever, visit such clubs or play any part in them.

The control of a party's leadership is usually in a primary election, controlled by the state, at which very few persons vote in most states, although in the Solid South the primary is often the determining election. In some, like California and Wisconsin, it is not necessary to be a member of a party to vote in its primaries. In others, like

New York State, it is only necessary to assert at a registration prior to an election that one enrolls for a particular party. It is permissible everywhere to switch such declarations each year, and no statement of principle is involved.

The broad program of a party is fixed once every four years at a convention, but no one is required to adhere to this program, called a Platform — not even a candidate for public office. The position of a political party, when in office, is established by the President of the United States; when the party is out of office, the position is always in a state of flux, the general trend being established by the leaders in Congress, principally in the Senate. Thus, in the Eightieth and Eighty-First Congresses, the positions of the two parties were established by Harry Truman, President, and Robert A. Taft, "Mr. Republican."

Neither had the support of a united party. Mr. Truman was beset by two extremist groups, the Dixiecrats and the ADA.

The Dixiecrats are conservatives in the Southern States, whose economic and social programs run along the same lines as the more conservative Republicans who

follow Senator Taft. They are politically Democrats only because they live in and represent states which were in the Confederacy during the Civil War and which suffered from Republican carpetbagging during the Reconstruction. Whereas it is impractical for them to be Republicans politically, they can vote with Republicans on economic and social questions.

The ADA is an amalgam of Social-Democrats, trade unionists and opportunistic reformers. They say they are left of center, but theirs is a floating center which generally floats leftward but in the past year has avoided contact with the Communists. Because of its trade-union affiliations, the ADA has been able to pull the President leftward, often so far to the left that he lost contact with his own party in Congress.

Mr. Truman in 1948 determined to ignore the Dixiecrats and other Southerners on the assumption that they had to vote for him. He accepted the ADA and CIO program because he assumed that they could swing enough votes to guarantee his election. His political judgment proved to be sound, and he won an election which seemed to have been lost. But the price he paid was a loss of independent leadership; in fact, his subsequent conduct gave the impression that he was a hostage to the ADA.

The Republicans were as divided. They have a right, center, and slightly left wing in the Congress. They also have some very important governors, such as Thomas E. Dewey of New York, who take independent positions. Then there is Harold Stassen, President of the University of Pennsylvania, who is a Presidential candidate with a large following, and there is always Herbert Hoover, who grows in stature constantly not as a political leader but as a national sage. Finally, General Dwight Eisenhower developed an important Republican following which demanded that the Republicans recognize him as their inevitable candidate.

The political leadership of Robert A. Taft is of a most unusual character. He makes no attempt to reconcile the elements of his party. He functions within the margins of the Senate, building a coalition of individual Republican and Democratic senators upon particular measures. By this method he established the Republican-Southern Democratic coalition which in the 1950 election gained control of the Congress, particularly the Senate.

This discussion, thus far, has been focused on domestic questions; in the matter of foreign policy, the divergencies within each party are even sharper. But these differences of attitude are unrelated to such confusing terms as "isolationism" or "internationalism."

In the realm of foreign policy, two questions develop cleavages within each party. These are:

1. The extent of American responsibility for the maintenance of the Western world;
2. The correction of the error of irresponsible and unmeasured appeasement of Soviet Russia.

The first question has been answered by voters in the 1950 election wherever it has been tested. The re-election of Senators Taft, Millikin and Capehart; the defeat of Senators Lucas, Tydings and both Thomases, are samples of public opinion, so widely scattered as to be indicative of the will of the American people for a reappraisal of the Marshall Plan, of European Military Aid, of the

Charter of the United Nations and the oblique implementation of policy by Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

No one in 1950 can hope for a withdrawal from such obligations as we blithely assumed between 1943 (Teheran) and 1950, but surely the American people do not know of all our commitments; nor do they know precisely what is being done about them. The era of secret diplomacy has proved to be a political liability. Furthermore, this election has indicated beyond doubt that 150,000,000 Americans can not and do not want to carry the entire Western load. Henceforth, other countries will have to pull their weight. The British, who have piled up a dollar reserve close to \$3,000,000,000, will be expected to assume their proper responsibilities.

The second question is called by Communists, the ADA and such, "McCarthyism." This sloganized "bad word" means, in effect, a review of the infiltration of Communists into government and of their services, as American officials, to Soviet Russia.

On this question the citizens in the 1950 election left nothing to doubt. The defeats of Senator Millard Tydings and Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas were clearly and unmistakably due to McCarthyism. Tydings, in particular, was defeated only for that reason.

In Connecticut, the Republicans dodged McCarthyism in spite of sage advice to the contrary. Result: Senator Brien McMahon, who in his campaign dissociated himself from his senatorial history and associations, was elected over a Republican candidate who avoided the issue of McCarthyism. Also, in that state, Senator William Benton's vote was subject to a recount, having been so narrow. In a campaign where the central issue of McCarthyism was avoided, Benton's vote was narrow because of his associations with the State Department.

The distinguished Elbert Thomas of Utah was defeated because of the established record of aid and comfort to infiltrating Communists.

In this election, the voter voted selectively. He ignored party labels as unrealistic. He chose individuals on their records. Senator Herbert Lehman was re-elected, among other reasons, because his Republican opponent petered out during the campaign. Yet, it is to be noted that Lehman did not do very well. Dewey's plurality was 564,844; Lehman's 261,029. It is to be noted that the citizenry knew that Joe Hanley, Lehman's opponent, was in the hospital, so sick that he could not go home to vote. He is 74 years old. He had written one of the most stupid letters in American political history, which was made public. In a word, Lehman had no effective opposition; yet this is all he could get.

From a broader standpoint, this 1950 election establishes certain specific characteristics of the American people:

1. When there is a real issue, the people come out to vote. Therefore, when the people are apathetic, it is certain that the issues between the contenders do not exist, or have been confounded by "me-too-ism" and double-talk.
2. When candidates for public office stand for nothing constructive, the people respond by voting along straight party lines or in response to pressure groups. Candidates emerge as personalities only when they respond effectively to the challenge of the times.
3. No political or pressure-group leader can vote the

American people. The election of Taft in Ohio, Dewey in New York, Nixon in California, Impellitteri as Mayor of New York City bears witness to the inability of labor leaders to vote their members or even to influence them. The ballot remains secret and an inviolable trust — when it seems to the voter that that is important.

4. Probably \$12,000,000 was spent by the CIO, PAC, ADA, AFL and all sorts of committees to defeat Taft with the objective of enforcing the will of labor leaders on both parties. In 1944, Taft's plurality was 17,999; in 1950, it was 430,879. The members of the CIO and the AFL thus asserted and established that union membership is not synonymous with the rights and obligations of

citizenship. These same voters chose Frank Lausche, Democratic candidate for governor, and precisely for the same reason that they chose Taft. They voted as American citizens, not as a class-conscious proletariat.

At a time when government by choice is going out of fashion in much of the world, to be replaced by government by party dictatorship; when for representative government is being substituted dictatorship by a narrowly chosen oligarchy consisting of a monolithic party; this 1950 election is an index to the survival in the United States of the concept of the voter as a lone individual who enters the secret polling booth without fear, to select, alter, change and designate the government of his choice.

APPEASEMENT ECONOMICS

By GARET GARRETT

A rise in the standard of living is an effect of technological progress. Bigger and faster tools, better methods and more scientific imagination are brought to bear upon work, so that the output of an hour's labor may be increased. But the effect does not flow directly from the cause by any fixed rule. That is to say, the effect has to be administered.

As the output per hour of human labor rises, there is an increase of wealth. You may amuse yourself by asking: To whom does this increase of wealth belong? But that question has no validity. If you say it belongs to those who produce it you will not be able to say who, in fact, did produce it. Was it labor? Labor did not provide the means that made it possible. Management did that. But if, upon that ground, the capitalist says it is his, and tries to keep it as profit, he will defeat himself, because he is not himself the consumer of his own product. It is only society at large that can consume it.

The fact about this increase of wealth, therefore, is that it must be distributed, which is only to say that it must be sold. The only valid question follows: How shall it be distributed to promote the general prosperity of society?

Hitherto by a rule of thumb the increase of wealth from technological progress has been divided in three ways, namely,

1. With consumers, i.e., with society at large, by a reduction of prices;
2. With labor, as an increase of wages, and,
3. With the proprietors as an increased reward for capital.

Normally, that has been the order — prices first, wages second and dividends last. The importance of putting the emphasis upon prices is obvious. As prices fall everybody's dollar buys more and all alike are benefitted — the consumer, the wage earner and the capitalist. Wages and dividends might both stand still and yet if prices fall they really rise because a wage dollar and a dividend dollar, like the consumer's dollar, will buy more than before, and the general standard of living is bound to rise. As the rate of technological progress advances, the need to distribute the benefits primarily by

the price method becomes more urgent. Prof. Frederick C. Mills states the case perfectly, saying:

The one prime method of transmitting the benefits of industrial progress to consumers at large — prompt price reduction commensurate with declines in real costs — has not as yet been adopted as generally or applied as broadly as the necessities of a dynamic industrial system require. Greater advances than those of the last 50 years impend, and a productivity increment of massive proportions is within our grasp, but this increment can be realized to the full only if it is widely shared.

But now comes General Motors with a new way of thinking, which may impose itself upon American industry, not only because it has behind it the prestige of the largest manufacturing corporation in the country but because organized labor for that reason will be able to use it as a powerful bargaining weapon. Briefly, in its recent five-year contract with UAW-CIO, General Motors took the position that labor has prior rights in the increase of wealth that comes from technological progress. The contract provides for what is called an "improvement factor of four cents per hour to be added to wages annually," which is 2.5 per cent, and this is to represent labor's first lien upon such increase of productivity per man-hour as the management hopes to be able to bring about by invention, engineering and a more intensive application of technical science.

The president, Charles E. Wilson, tells how that decision was reached. "Our thinking behind this agreement," he says, "is that . . . if workmen are denied any increase in hourly wages and they can look forward only to a better standard of living through reduction of prices, the process for them is terribly slow."

This means, simply, that organized labor must get its share first, in order that its standard of living may rise faster than that of society as a whole; it means also that if its share, calculated at 2.5 per cent a year, happens to be all of it, so that there is no increase from technological progress left to be distributed among consumers at large, it is just too bad. Union labor represents only about 25 per cent of the working population. Why should the 25 per cent be thus preferred?

It is Mr. Wilson's opinion that this contract is not in-

flationary. But if it should turn out to be inflationary, no matter, so far as organized labor is concerned, for in the same contract there is another provision that confers upon labor complete immunity from the consequences of inflation. If the cost of living rises, according to the government's Consumer Price Index, wages will be increased in a proportionate manner, automatically, — and this, says Mr. Wilson, is on the ground that "it is logical, fair and reasonable to maintain the purchasing power of an hour's work in terms of the goods and services the employee must purchase in his daily living."

Thus, the employees of General Motors and of any other corporation that makes a similar contract with its unions may laugh at inflation because their wages will have constant purchasing power. Let others bear the hardships of inflation.

Referring then to the social security features of the same contract, Mr. Wilson says:

Both the insurance package and the pension plan were worked out in order to assist employees in protecting themselves against the individual hazards of life . . . Many people have held that individual employees should pay for such benefits directly themselves from their wages . . . We often forget how hard it is for the average

workman to save money for a rainy day or for his old age. We have millions of salesmen abroad in our land trying to entice these same workmen and their wives to spend every last dollar they can get their hands on.

That completes the General Motors package. If it becomes standard throughout industry, as it may, the prize will be in these three beautiful pieces:

1. Organized labor will have an arbitrary first claim to any increase of wealth that flows from technological progress;

2. Organized labor alone will be immune from the terrors of inflation, since it will be guaranteed money of constant purchasing power, and

3. If, in the role of consumer, organized labor is victimized by the intensity of industry's mass salesmanship and goes into old age without a dollar under the rug, it need not worry. Industry will have protected it beforehand against that sad sequel.

"It is our hope," says Mr. Wilson, "that this agreement will set a pattern for bargaining based on principles that will insure industrial peace and prosperity and minimize strife and industrial warfare."

Peace in our time — it is wonderful.

THE PRO-SLAVERY PROPAGANDISTS

By GEORGE S. SCHUYLER

AFTER more than a half-century of abolitionism paced by the leading artists and intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and culminating in the emancipation of the slaves in the United States, France, the West Indies and Russia, it is distressingly paradoxical to find the same class as energetically advocating a slavery of far worse type. Progressively for the past half-century or more the artists, writers, scholars, teachers and professionals have boarded the band-wagon of totalitarianism, eloquently advocating a goose-stepping society in which production, distribution, exchange, education and recreation will again be controlled by a tiny minority in the name of the people.

This Utopia has variously been described as Socialism, Communism, Fascism, Nazism and Planned Economy, but it all adds up to the same thing: that is, dictatorial control of the entire economy which means dictatorial control of the people whose labor makes the economy work. In the eighteenth century this was called autocracy; today it is called democracy. And those who profited most from the revolution against feudalism and monarchy to the free enterprise system, are the loudest and most persistent advocates of its abolition.

From the "Red Decade" of the thirties through the Attorney General's lists of subversives and near-subversives to "Red Channels," we find an army of so-called intellectuals, in all fields of endeavor, identified with the drive for the new slavery where the serfs lack even the economic value which the chattel slaves had and which protected them from extermination.

The rise and growth of capitalism not only emancipated the workers from servitude but also liberated the

artists and intellectuals. Previously this class had led a precarious existence at the whim and caprice of the aristocracy, forever on the edge of poverty, abjectly subservient for fear of offending its arrogant patrons. The same socio-economic forces that freed the workers and gave them rights, status, surnames, dignity and class mobility, gave the intellectual class growth, stature and security without political obligation.

The demands of commerce, industry, universal education and rapid urbanization, which accompanied the growth of manufacturing and mass production, provided for the first time in history the opportunities which enabled the artists and intellectuals to grow and prosper. The much-ridiculed hucksters — industrialists, bankers, and merchants — through their enterprise and ingenuity created the needs that supplied ever better living for the artists and professionals, and more freedom and wider recognition than they had hitherto enjoyed. Benefited by an educational system unsurpassed in any previous age, by a communications system which provided newspapers, magazines and books in profusion; and by opportunities in popular entertainment, the intellectuals have been provided with work more interesting and spiritually rewarding than that of the wage laborers. It is a far cry from the starving, ink-stained wretches and back-door musicians of the eighteenth century to the enviable status of the artists and professionals today.

Nevertheless it is from these impeccably-garbed, well-heeled beneficiaries of the free enterprise system that its most scathing, fanatical and persistently destructive critics and saboteurs come. It would be easy to cull from

the list of fellow-travelers, crypto-Communists and assorted totalitarians a roster of the outstanding artists and intellectuals of the past quarter-century. These people have not only bitten the hand that fed them but have devoured the whole arm.

It is a sad reflection on the morals of this class that so few have the courage to disdain camouflage and come out openly against democratic capitalism in favor of a Mandarin-like government by an elite. Instead they maneuver behind a smoke screen of equalitarian clichés and platitudes, loudly accusing the capitalist system of the savage brutalities and dehumanizing regimentation which the regime they favor has everywhere and inevitably imposed. They are undisturbed by the fact that totalitarian countries today have ten times more people in slavery than were brought from Africa to America in the four centuries of the slave trade. While jibing at the chicaneries and ineptitudes of capitalist politics, they have only praise for those hapless states without any politics at all! Advocating a multiplicity of political factions at home, they fulsomely praise the one-party travesty of democracy abroad. Lividly angry over the vanishing plantation system in Dixie, they are enthusiastic over its spreading and far more ruthless counterpart in East Germany, Siberia and the Ukraine.

They recoil with horror from thought of compulsion or bloodshed to bring about this Utopia, although never reluctant to concede that "you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs." The "eggs" being, of course, all those who remonstrate against the new slavery. The kindest of them dream of scaling the heights to the Promised Land by persuading the masses to accept their shackles without argument or opposition. They want a major social operation by bloodless surgery but, barring that, will settle for the anesthesia of dictatorship with all its messy by-products. They urge a system guaranteeing freedom from sex inequalities, but which has everywhere been free of femininity. Their world, without discussion, difference or dissension, would have the unanimity of the graveyard.

Since the coming of the Roosevelt Disaster these elements who now deplore loyalty oaths, smear campaigns and witch hunts, have exercised a near-dictatorship over American thinking and to a large extent over artistic and intellectual jobs. In government bureaus, editorial offices, in schools and colleges, and even in the WPA hierarchy there was a virtual boycott of non-totalitarians. It was easier for a rhinoceros to rhumba in a telephone booth than it was for a writer or artist to sell a story, script, cartoon, play or book that did not sneer at this civilization and seek to undermine confidence in it. If a manuscript did run this gauntlet, the reviewers sought to destroy it.

The writers of textbooks produced school texts which purposely confused the simple issue of freedom, and histories (?) which jeered at the Founding Fathers. A disdressing number of sociologists jettisoned scholarship in favor of socialism, and the economists kept pace. Those who complained against this campaign of demoralization were adjudged "reactionaries," "100 per cent Ameri-

cans," "capitalist lackeys," "tools of Wall Street," "Uncle Toms" and so forth.

Whether smearing is smearing depends upon whose carcass is smeared. There was no denunciation of this business of smearing until the crypto-Communists, fellow-travelers, spies and subversives began to be exposed. Witch-hunting was fine until there were some *real* witches to hunt.

Why is it that so many of these witches are found in the ranks of artists and intellectuals, among the advocates of the New Slavery? Why is it that the proletariat, languishing amid overstuffed furniture, radios, Chevrolets and electric refrigerators, and allegedly due to gain most by the dictatorship to be imposed in its name, has contributed so few totalitarians, subversives and spies? Why is it that no sharecroppers have betrayed America? Here, indeed, is a subject crying for psychological study!

These totalitarian artists and professionals apparently assume that in the new slave society they will wield the whip instead of feeling it. They think they will have a vested interest in the Planned Economy, sitting at desks and shaping the mass mind, unworried by their present cruel and capricious bosses grinding them down to one new car a year. They believe that "In That Great Gettin' Up Mornin'" they will more easily work where and when they choose, produce what they like and write what the Muse tells them; that there will be no competition, no conflict, no rivalries, no politics, no insecurity.

It is a depressing commentary on Western education that our intellectuals, so-called, believe this to be true in the face of the plethora of evidence to the contrary. One of the unvarying symptoms of totalitarian regimes is the progressive liquidation of their founding fathers. The \$64 question in all such countries is "Where Is The Politburo of Yesteryear?" These are the only nations to which masses of refugees have fought *not* to go back! The concentration camps and mass graves are full of loyal Comrades who risked their skins to promote the Revolution.

Because the artists, intellectuals and professionals occupy such a strategic position in a totalitarian state (where hornswoggling is only less important than machine-gunning in maintaining the "cooperation" of the masses) their job tenure is less secure than elsewhere. Where policy changes with disconcerting speed and frequency, it requires an almost magical agility not to be tripped by The Line. Under a free system being fired calls for finding another job; under totalitarianism it means finding a helicopter — or being humiliated, disgraced, imprisoned or killed. Few of our disciples of totalitarianism have evidenced possession of the intellectual agility required to survive long in a "People's Democracy."

The alternative to free enterprise is slave enterprise, and the prospect of every job being a government job where, moreover, one does not dare to boondoggle, can certainly not be a pleasing one to a mature mind. Our swimming-pool proletarians, leading the drive for a planned economy, are apparently unaware that all totalitarian Fuehrers automatically adopt the W. C. Fields slogan, "Never Give a Sucker an Even Break!"

*Communist dictator Tito seems to feel that the democracies
may have something, now that he needs it.*

ANTI-SEMITISM IN UTOPIA

By EUGENE LYONS

DESPITE frantic efforts of Communist apologists abroad to distort them, despite the semantic dodges used by the Kremlin to make such distortions easier, the facts are clear enough. Anti-Semitism — limited, camouflaged, a bit self-conscious but indubitable in essence — has since the war's end emerged as official state policy in the Soviet Union; and, as always in that country, policy has been tricked out as doctrine.

Formally the attack is directed not against Jews but against "homeless cosmopolitans . . . passportless wanderers . . . people without kith and kin . . . tribeless bastards . . . rabbits." Ingenuity is strained, indeed, in coining these elegant euphemisms for the eternal Jew. But the Soviet citizen is given generous help in identifying the culprit under the doubletalk; even the least perceptive is not left in doubt.

For instance, cartoons on the high crime of cosmopolitanism depict the criminals with the hooked noses of traditional anti-Semitism. In denunciation of individuals, Jews predominate, and where they have Russified their names or used pseudonyms, their natal names are supplied in parentheses. Of fifty cosmopolitans singled out for special abuse during two months when the campaign was at peak, early in 1949, all but one were Jews. The press inveighed against "the homeless cosmopolitan Melnikoff (Mehlman)"; the "cynical impudent activities of B. Yakovlev (Holtzman)"; the "passportless wanderers" among sports writers like "G. Yasny (Finkelstein)." Editorials offered further clues by accusing the reprobates of contact with "businessmen in New York and Tel Aviv." Stalin himself, in assailing the alleged sophistry of certain sinners on a point of dogma, branded them as "Talmudists" — a nuance that was not lost on the country.

Moreover, the poisoned point of the whole campaign was aimed especially at Jewish culture in what remains of the Jewish community under the hammer-and-sickle. The Yiddish publishing house, Emes, was closed down, along with the one surviving Yiddish newspaper. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and all other Jewish social-political organizations were disbanded; their leaders, including the most noted Jewish poets, journalists, actors, historians, scientists, "disappeared." *Literaturnaya Gazeta* lambasted the "anti-patriotic group of homeless cosmopolitans" who fail to unmask "Jewish bourgeois nationalism." The Yiddish paper *Der Stern* ("which we had to suppress") was accused of going so far as "to assume that a Jew living abroad is equal to a Soviet Jew." The editors of the Soviet Encyclopaedia got hell for treating Jews as an international entity: "They drag out the cosmopolitan national palaver about a supposedly 'worldwide' Jewish literature." Meanwhile Yiddish theater, which in the 1930s ranked among the most vital in Russia, has been virtually destroyed.

The facts, I repeat, are no longer in dispute. After all, "cosmopolitanism" — the historic charge of Jewish

international plotting — used to figure also in Tsarist indictments of the race. It is the meaning of the facts that perplexes the outside world.

The Kremlin, of course, has not chosen to pillory some two million of its subjects, to give the right of way to old and new anti-Jewish libels, for the fun of it. Even dictators do not wage war on a segment of their population as a caprice. The argument over *whether* there is state-sponsored anti-Semitism in the Red Utopia has obscured the *why* of it, particularly against the background of two decades of Soviet attempts to contain the malignity.

Moscow is acutely aware of the havoc wrought among its foreign acolytes by this startling development. Certainly it does not underrate the value of its fifth columns, drawing their strength from more or less liberal circles. It knows that the supposed "solution" of the minority problems under the Soviets — symbolized above all by the supposed erasure of anti-Semitism — has been the last refuge of bitter-end apologists for Sovietism.

Yet Stalin has conspicuously refrained from making that clean-cut denial of the unpleasant news for which his foreign admirers anxiously waited. His press has not proclaimed any intention to combat anti-Semitism as in the past, or to punish its purveyors as provided by Soviet law. Clearly the Soviet oligarchs consider the elimination of Jews from areas of influence, and official support of anti-Jewish sentiment in their land, worth the price of "misunderstanding" in the liberal non-Soviet world, deepened hatred for the regime among their Jewish minority, and a new dimension of despair among Communists of all races who still cling desperately to shreds of "idealistic" illusion about their cause.

The most widely touted and accepted of the Soviet myths is to the effect that national and racial equality has been established in the USSR. As recently as September 3 — in the New York *Herald Tribune*, naturally — a book reviewer still stated casually, as if it were a fixed fact in physics, that "racial prejudice . . . has no place in the Soviet Union." It is precisely because the news of a reconditioned anti-Semitism collided with this robust fiction that its impact has been so devastating.

Yet of all the crowding myths it is the flimsiest. From the outset the division of the country into so-called national republics and autonomous regions has been no more than an administrative arrangement, along linguistic lines, for its propaganda value. All important local posts have been filled and vacated and refilled arbitrarily by Moscow. In the blood purges of the late thirties, the Kremlin decapitated *all* government and party institutions in *all* the "independent" national areas. With the outbreak of war, the Soviet Republic of the Volga Germans was liquidated by decree; and at its end a batch of other "autonomous" regions were abolished.

Inside Russia no one takes the myth seriously. Wherever some custom or cultural preference of a minority

seems even remotely at variance with the prescribed ideology or shifting party line, it becomes "national deviation" and "counter-revolution" by definition. The glorious equality thus comes down to the privilege of glorifying Stalin in your own tongue.

On a provincial railroad station once I saw the word MEN inscribed on a toilet door in four languages: Russian, Byelorussian, Polish and Yiddish. "There," I said to a colleague, "is the whole sum and substance of the new national equality." Since then even the pretenses of racial parity have been largely dropped in favor of priority for "the Russian people, the most advanced of the nations of the Soviet Union." Like the animals in Orwell's fable, all Soviet races are equal but some are more equal than others.

The belief, widespread in the world and especially among wishful-thinking Jews, that anti-Semitism has been wiped out in the Soviet Union was at all times a plain lie. The sad truth is that the Communist regime had tried to cure this ancient sore — for its own sake, as a menace to its own power — and failed. The very fact that thousands of Communists had to be expelled in party purges year after year for anti-Semitic conduct should have been enough to expose the falsehood. A disease so prevalent in the hand-picked ruling party could hardly have been overcome in the population at large.

Politically, the great mass of Russian Jews were hard hit coming and going: by the revolution and by its opponents. As petty traders and as artisans employing a few apprentices, they fell into the outlawed category of "capitalists" — surely the most pathetically poor capitalists on record. As such they and their children were denied normal social rights and reviled without letup.

When Lenin's NEP made trading and small manufacture legal once more, Jews of necessity flocked to these private fields, and in some cases made quick fortunes. "Nepman" now became a term even more loaded with opprobrium than capitalist, carrying as it did the implication of profiteering. For millions of simple Russians, alas, "Nepman" became almost a synonym for Jew. The contempt heaped on the NEP capitalists in the propaganda clung to the Jews as a race. And the end of NEP, as Stalin assumed total power, turned yet another category of Jews into social lepers. In 1928, when I first reached Moscow, nearly fifty per cent of all Jews in the country — as pre-1917 capitalists or post-1921 Nepmen or both — were officially declassed (*lishentzi*, disfranchised, was the formal designation) and therefore without right to rations, living space, schooling or other privileges of Soviet citizenship.

In addition, Jews too often had jobs that exposed them to the direct fury of the masses. The ordinary Russian did not deal with commissars and top officials, who were overwhelmingly non-Jewish. His contact was with the petty functionary, the pen-pushing clerk behind some little window. And these, unhappily, were likely to be Jews if only because they were the one literate minority in a largely illiterate population. Thus the illusion that "the government" was Jewish was fostered, and discontents found a ready and familiar target.

In a time of universal shortages of the simplest necessities, and food in particular, the Soviet retail shop was the focus of popular vexations. And there again the Jew

took the brunt of it. With the old merchant classes obliterated, Jews with a trading background tended to become store managers and counter clerks. Theirs was the hateful chore of telling people that there "ain't any."

In fact, one could draw up a long inventory of hard luck that operated to stir up anti-Jewish feelings faster than the regime's propaganda could remove them. Every item on the list helped fortify the vague, nonsensical but deep suspicion that the despised government was somehow Jewish, that communism was an Hebraic abomination. As late as 1934, I can attest, the more simple-minded Russians still believed that Lenin and even Stalin were Jews.

Persecuted minority peoples in the Russian empire had naturally been drawn into revolutionary movements. Stalin himself came to Marxism by way of Georgian (Gruzin) nationalism. Thus it happened that Jews, Armenians, Georgians, etc. were conspicuous in the great upheavals of 1917 — in the leadership of the victorious Bolsheviks no less (and no more) than in the leadership of the defeated Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. With names like Trotsky, Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Radek, Kamenev as a seeming justification, and encouraged by the anti-Semitic propagandas of some Rightist factions, millions were inclined to blame the new regime on the Jews.

I recall a scene in an improvised courtroom in Minsk, where I was one of the two foreign reporters covering a "demonstration trial" against anti-Semitism. The accused were three moronic young men who had abused a crippled Jewish woman in their factory. In theory they were subject to the death penalty as counter-revolutionists. Before sentences were imposed, the defendants had their last word. One of the lads, looking around the crowded hall in bewilderment, stammered: "I don't know why I'm here; I'm in favor of this Jewish government."

The Kremlin was not responsible for the anti-Semitism inherited from the old regime. *But it was wholly responsible for the terror, sufferings and despair on which anti-Semitism battered after the revolution.* Anti-Jewish sentiment, muted but inescapable, rose and declined almost in direct proportion to the hardships, brutalities and insults imposed on the people.

In the hordes of police agents and bureaucrats who worked their will on the populace there was only a handful of Jews — but it sufficed to feed the smoldering fires of race hatred. When urban "activists" descended like vultures on the villages to "liquidate the kulaks," or to extract the peasant's last reserves of grain by force, there were inevitably a few Jews among them — enough to give the peasant indignations an anti-Semitic tinge.

Thus, year after year, the cancer grew. The Russian Jews, who had suffered more than any other group from the Soviet Communist policies, also collected a dividend of popular hostility on their piled-up sorrows. They were blamed for the sins and excesses of a dictatorship which, by and large, they hated as deeply as their non-Jewish neighbors.

Even after the early Communist idealism had ebbed away, leaving the muddy dregs of cynicism, the Kremlin had no alternative but to fight anti-Semitism, since it was so self-evidently an expression of hatred of the whole regime. But gradually the ruling group began to wonder

whether it might not be more expedient to meet the anti-Jewish mood half way. Stalin's struggle against the Opposition, personified in Trotsky, unquestionably played a role in this change of heart.

I was in Moscow at the time and was aware that the drive against Trotskyism carried distinct anti-Semitic overtones. I recall the occasion when the press — even then — identified Trotsky's son, Sedov, in parentheses, as "Bronstein," the original family name. The public did not know at the time that the arrest warrant for the architect of the Red Army had been made out against Bronstein, not Trotsky. And the practice apparently was general: non-Jewish Communists like Bukharin or Rykov were taken into custody under their adopted revolutionary names, while the Zinovievs and Kamenevs were officially reminded of their Jewish origin.

In the 1930s, the process of eliminating Jews from important posts, though slow and unacknowledged, was too real to be missed. The Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 provided the alibi of political necessity for speeding up the process. Increasingly Jews were eased out of government services, particularly at the diplomatic end. They were barred from schools training Foreign Office personnel and put on a quota basis in other educational fields. Only one Jew — Lazar Kaganovich, related to Stalin by marriage — survived in the Politburo.

The tragic extent to which anti-Semitism had grown in the Soviet years was disclosed by the German invasion. Of the ideological baggage brought into the occupied Russian areas by the Nazis, only its Jew-hatred met with what Solomon L. Schwartz has called "staggering success." In most places the approach of the conquerors was a signal for local attacks on Communists and Jews.

When the war ended — and here, I believe, we are close to the heart of the motivations of official anti-Semitism — the Kremlin apparently decided to accept and exploit the malicious force it had been unable to curb or control. Having failed to achieve unity with the people on the higher levels of loyalty to the regime or Communist ideology, it now sought identification with the masses on the lowest levels of their primitive prejudices. In a perverted fashion Stalin chose to come closer to his subjects by pandering to one of their worst moods.

Native anti-Semitism had been inflamed by Nazi propaganda; some 70 million Russians, it should be remembered, lived for longer or shorter periods under Hitlerism. It could be turned into a convenient lightning rod to draw at least part of the mass discontents away from the Soviet masters. Was not the best answer to the libel that the Soviet regime was "Jewish," openly to restore anti-Semitism as state policy? If Stalin could not bring back the best features of the Tsarist past, he could at least bring back one of the worst.

The decision fitted neatly into two other and inter-related policies: the revived Russian nationalism, and total isolation from the West. Here the dictatorship had some justification in terms of *Realpolitik* to balance total bankruptcy in terms of morals and intellectual honesty. For the Jews, to the extent that they remained Jews, could scarcely make first-rate Russian chauvinists and enemies of the West.

Try as they might, Russian Jews, Communist and non-Communist alike, must find it hard to work up con-

vincing enthusiasm for national heroes like Ivan the Terrible and Chmelnitzky; or for a historical past marked by pogroms and Pales. In the newly prescribed glorification of Russia on purely national and racial planes, they could not be trusted to bring their "loyalty" to the boiling point.

Moreover, absolute mental and spiritual divorce from the non-Soviet world is a difficult, even an impossible feat for most Jews. Thousands of them, to put the matter on the most elementary basis, have relatives abroad. Their culture and their history link them indissolubly to Jews in other lands and to a Western culture in which Jewish writers, composers, philosophers and religious leaders figure so importantly.

In Stalin's mind the Jews seem annoyingly associated with universal culture and, worse, with liberal tendencies. As material for his postwar pattern of patriotic isolation and Russification they must appear pretty unpliant. The inner-party enemies whom he most hated, whom he has exterminated, included nearly all the Jews among the Old Bolsheviks — and they were "Westerners" all, speaking European languages and at home with European ideas. Bolshevik propaganda techniques require that "the enemy" be personalized; the Jews must seem to Stalin and his gang the best available exemplars of resistance to utter isolation from the rest of mankind. They have been made to order by millennia of history as whipping-boys for all those Soviet citizens who might fail to achieve 100 per cent Sovietism.

Such is the grain of truth in the mountain of absurdity called Jewish cosmopolitanism. That Stalin considers his Jewish subjects "unreliable" is indicated by the forcible expulsion of tens of thousands of them from frontier areas. It was no accident that in the abortive attempt to found a "Jewish Soviet Republic" the Kremlin selected Birobidjan, a site in eastern Siberia as remote as possible from world centers of Jewish population. That fear of Jewish kinship with the non-Soviet world has now reached its climax.

In the days of his glory, when he was second only to Lenin, a delegation of Jews called on Leon Trotsky. "Go home to your Jews," he told them brusquely, "and tell them I am not a Jew and I care nothing for the Jews and their fate."

The renunciation was typical of Jewish Communists in the higher brackets of power. Many of them had been impelled into the revolutionary orbit by the wish (normally subconscious) to cast off the burden of their Jewish status in a Jew-hating world, to submerge themselves in an interracial community. After the revolution they denied their racial roots self-righteously, as a token of the new equality. Those told off to deal with specifically Jewish problems and propagandas — in the Jewish Section of the ruling party, for instance — felt themselves unfairly confined.

History has betrayed their hopes and exploded their delusions. It has demonstrated again that a persecuted minority commits suicide if it supports reactionary dehumanized ideas, no matter how beguilingly garnished with equalitarian slogans. The one hope for such minorities is a democratic-liberal world in which the dignity and importance of the individual is the central tenet, the foundation stone of life.

TRUMAN HAS MANILA IN A FRENZY

By GEORGE LANGDON

The Philippines don't know whether they're coming or going. The Truman Administration has poured more than two billion dollars into the archipelago. It is now getting ready to let the Manila government have another 250 million on top of that. In other words, Washington is fixing once again to plug the holes which economic irresponsibility has hacked into the Philippine financial boat. But that isn't the whole story. While committing still more of U. S. taxpayers' money to the Philippines, President Truman has also shown his readiness to cast the whole Philippine ship of state adrift when it fits the policy of appeasing Red China.

The President announced this when he assured the Peking Communist regime that we'll pull the Seventh Fleet out of the Formosa Straits whenever things quiet down in Korea. If, after that, the Chinese Communists go ahead and gobble up Nationalist-held Formosa, we will presumably look the other way.

Let's forget, for a moment, about the Chinese Government of Chiang Kai-shek. It has become fashionable in Washington to view Chiang's troubles with I-told-you-so glee. But if the Chinese Nationalists get pushed out of Formosa, the Philippines will have lost their last outside line of defense. That was one of the things General MacArthur tried to tell the American people in his famous message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the message Truman tried to suppress. MacArthur said that Formosa might become "an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender" for a Communist attack on the Philippines and Okinawa. This would enable the Chinese Reds to cut through the Japan-Okinawa-Philippines perimeter that represents America's line of defense in the Pacific.

If Truman is willing to throw Formosa to the Communist wolves, does he intend to pitch the Philippines right after it? Philippine ex-Defense Secretary Ruperto Kangleon has said: "The Philippines are definitely a target of the Communists. The fall of Formosa would facilitate infiltration into the Philippines by the Chinese Communists." Even now the Philippines have 400,000 Chinese residents. About 170,000 of them are believed to be in the country illegally. Recently scores of Communist agents have entered under the guise of refugees from the China mainland. Others have landed secretly on the poorly-guarded shores.

According to Philippines Deputy Chief of Staff Brigadier General Calixto Duque, 25,000 Chinese Communists are now in the archipelago. That is more than enough to sabotage U. S. bases on the islands in case of trouble. Small wonder Radio Moscow brags that the rebel movement is "drawing inspiration" from the Chinese Reds, is "growing stronger, and keeps advancing."

Of course, professional liberals here at home have been peddling the same line about the Communist Hukbalahap guerrillas that they used to sell about Mao Tse-tung's China Reds — that they're just a bunch of militant "agrarian reformers." But the country is no longer listening to that kind of talk. Always excepting, of course,

the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

The Philippine Army took over the job of fighting the Huks early this year. Until then the task had been in the hands of the Constabulary. It had done badly. The Red Huks had started off, after the war, with operations in Central Luzon. By now their warfare has spread to other islands, including Panay, Negros and Cebu. They have been raiding in the environs of Manila. Through looting and by deals with corrupt officials, the guerrillas have been able to build up large arsenals. Public morale wasn't very high to begin with. The Huk influence has boosted disregard for law and order still further.

Part of the Huk forces are what is known in much of South Asia as "dacoits"; that is, men who appear to be peaceful farmers during the day but turn into marauders during the night. Burma, Malaya and Indo-China suffer from the same type of "dacoitism." Such trained professional revolutionaries as the Philippines top Communist Luis Taruc provide the leadership for a motley group of disgruntled, illiterate peasant boys, who are in the guerrilla gangs for excitement and plunder. Communist indoctrination is applied in its crudest form. But it suffices to give the gunning youngsters a moral excuse for their outlaw existence.

Much current information on the workings of the Huks comes from two former members of the U. S. armed forces: Ronald Dorsey, the twenty-year-old Army private from Palmer, Massachusetts; and Benjamin Advincula, a Filipino employee of the U. S. Navy. The two men had joined the Huks in a mixture of adventurism and illusion regarding the movement's "agrarian reformist" character. They surrendered to the Philippine Army last June 3. Dorsey was turned over to the U. S. Army to be tried on charges of desertion. Advincula was the Manila government's star witness at the trial of fourteen Filipinos, said to be members of the Communist Party's secretariat, which began November 9. Advincula testified that the Huks were run by the Communists and aimed to overthrow the government by "force of arms."

Philippines Army Intelligence last October reported that it had arrested a "Mr. X," a high government official who was serving the Communists. The report stated that the mysterious official had minutes of meetings of the Cabinet, the Armed Forces General Staff and field communications system plans in his possession. This arrest was characteristic of the mixture of melodrama, emotionalism and moral immaturity involved in the guerrilla movement.

Public illusions about the character of the rebellion were retained until 1947, when President Elpidio Quirino tried to appease the Communists with an amnesty. It did not work, of course. Since then Quirino has assured the world at various times that the guerrillas were practically licked. This, too, proved a delusion. Instead, the Huks spread out, gained new recruits, became more daring in their raids, and promised their followers to repeat the success of the Chinese Communists.

If the Hukbalahaps are cut off from Chinese and Soviet support, the Philippine Government may be able to finish them off in the end. But there isn't a chance that it would have the power to defend the archipelago against Communist infiltration based on Formosa. President Truman's promise to pull the fleet out of the Formosa

Straits had Manila in a frenzy. The announcement completely contradicted the Administration's efforts to put more dollars into the archipelago.

Manila's mood for weeks resembled that of a schizophrenic rat in a laboratory labyrinth; Washington's policy of pushing contradictory military and economic notions simultaneously set off a series of mixed reflexes. Then, in November, came the report of the President's economic survey mission headed by former Under Secretary of the Treasury Daniel W. Bell. The report suggested that the U. S. finance a Philippine Five Year Plan with 250 million dollars. It proposed that the money be put into a sort of South Pacific New-Fair Deal. Aside from its superstatist notions (whereby one government is to supervise the workings of another government in a kangaroo-pouch-type arrangement), the report had a number of sensible points regarding better tax collection and less corruption and inefficiency.

But why put more money into the Philippine archipelago if, militarily, it is to be exposed to infiltration from a Red-occupied Formosa?

The answer is simple. This is Korea all over again. We pulled our troops out of Korea, and established a vacuum that the Communists tried to fill by force of arms. But at the same time, last year, Congress was pushed by the Administration into providing 150 million dollars in economic aid to the Korean Republic. It is the same pattern now used by the Truman Administration in most of South Asia. It is the pattern the State Department's Professor Philip C. Jessup devised during his hasty tour of Asia last spring. It is a pattern composed partly of appeasement, partly of New Dealish point-fourism, and partly of anti-MacArthur amateur militarism; it is a thing of shreds and patches, glued together with the polished generalities used to pad Secretary Acheson's apologetic speeches.

The Truman Administration, whose Chief Executive used the UN's fifth birthday to describe Andrei Vishinsky as a "nice fellow," just doesn't believe that fluttery appeasement, frantic do-goodism, and second-hand New Deal garments clothing South Pacific corruption, are insufficient in battling Moscow's Asian terrorists.

"IS IT I, LORD?"

"Is it I, Lord?"

Who can be honest

Save by nature or heaven's alms

Or gift

Or muse

In a filthy season

When the soul's integrity counts no more

Than the weight of a flea

Or a gnat

Or a newt?

He who does not fear his own nature

Understands not the publican

The mender of nets

Or the traitor, Judas —

"Is it I, Lord?"

EDWARD DAHLBERG

ARE WE TRYING TO ABOLISH CHRISTMAS?

By ROBERT M. YODER

IF YOU described our Christmas-time performance to a man of ordinary good taste from another planet, filling him in with enough of the disgraceful details so he'd get the feel of the thing, I think one oversight would puzzle him. Admitting we have done a pretty thorough job of debasement and cheapening, he would want to know what kind of a signal opens the rat race we have made of our finest holiday. Knowing that the President opens the baseball season by pitching out the first ball, he'd want to know who opens the Christmas season by pitching out the first dollar.

There is no such ceremony, of course, but he'd be justified in asking why not, for it is about the only flaw in an otherwise remarkably shabby performance. The big annual scramble to sell and buy gets off to a ragged start. Most stores don't start blasting *Adeste Fideles* through the p.a. system until the day after Thanksgiving. Others begin putting the Christmas heat on a little before Thanksgiving, which isn't much of a sales event, anyway. This gives a few stores a nasty disadvantage. And that's out of keeping with the shrewd, steely-eyed planning for which the season has come to be distinguished.

An official opening wouldn't take half the thought devoted, for example, to finding the Christmas Tieup. The Christmas Tieup is one of our charming modern additions to such customs as bringing in the Yule log and caroling. It's the attempt to get in on the Christmas spending by urging your product, however implausibly, as a Christmas gift. What gift could be more novel, and yet more useful, than one of our hundred-gallon concrete mixers or electric pruning hooks? We never sold them as Christmas gifts before, but we can try. Buy a Christmas gift for your house! (This one has a cute cartoon in which the front door is grinning.) Our pumps — we'll put them in a Christmas box — will keep the leakiest basement dry next spring, when Christmas is only a financial bruise.

How your wife's face will light up when you show her a gleaming, modernized bathroom, the Gift Unexpected. Surprise That Man in Your Life with one of our 40-foot extension ladders, the Gift Preposterous. Looking forward to a big Christmas dinner with your loved ones? Then play it smart — slip a couple of bottles of Bi-Kar-Bo in your own stocking. The anti-acid Santa himself uses — and by the pound, probably, if he watches many of these perspiring attempts to put a big Christmas ribbon around everything from hot-water bottles to garbage cans. . . . Running low on money, friend? Charge it, it's Christmas. Spend all you like, and forget it, until you receive our combined collection letter and New Year's card on January 2.

Our vandalism with respect to the pleasant custom of exchanging Christmas gifts is still incomplete, but we have made progress. We have made the word "gift" into an adjective with a special modern meaning — "second rate, suitable for definitely reluctant giving," as in the phrase "gift sherry." You'll hear this used in the liquor

store, where the nice lady with an "I fix them" shake of her head is telling the clerk what *she* does. She gives them all a bottle of sherry — the garbage man, the trashman, the milkman, the bread man, the cop on the corner, the whole bunch. "I know they expect money," she says, "but if they don't like it they can lump it." Could we have that set to a pleasant air, do you suppose, as a modern Christmas carol?

The gentleman behind her, now, he doesn't give sherry. "I have a lot of people I have to give something to," he'll tell you, "so I always order fifty, seventy-five small boxes of gift candy from this candy maker I know, and the hell with them." A begrudging Merry Christmas to you, friend, but I got it wholesale, in the one-pound size.

The lady's taking chances, with that sherry. She is bucking that jolly Christmas shakedown, the system of involuntary or coercive "remembering." That used to be a nice word, too, "remembering." Now we use it to signify Giving, Or Else. The bite usually is one dollar — a buck for the garbage man, a buck for the trashman, and so on down a long list of those who come regularly to your door. This is not a matter of generous choice. The Christmas gun — a pretty modern addition to the traditional bells and holly — is in your ribs. The garbage man may be the most shiftless churl on the city payroll, the trashman may spill more debris than he totes away, but they can show great efficiency in this Christmas kind of collection. One householder I know drew a curt rebuke because nobody was at home to accept service on the little envelope the garbage man brought around as a reminder. The garbage man complained in a note that he had been around three times for his collection, and to prove he meant no mere collection of garbage, he left most of the eggshells, potato peelings and banana skins in a trail across the back yard.

Sometimes this whole worrisome problem of whom to remember is taken off your hands. A friend living in an apartment hotel never has to bother his head about it; the management puts a mimeographed list in his mailbox. Somewhat to my friend's surprise, the two dozen or so hotel employees on the list included the auditor, who endears himself by seeing that the tenants get their bills promptly. It was a little like being asked to kiss a process server.

The janitor, now, he's a special problem, and so is the superintendent of the smaller office buildings. It calls for a careful estimate (while frosty stars twinkle in the December sky, and Santa beams from a hundred billboards) of exactly what it will take to keep these gentlemen from getting sore. What must we give the janitor this year, with calculating and involuntary generosity, to win his equally calculating gratitude, and for fear the bum will let us freeze in February? What visions of sugarplums dance in his surly head? The clearcut answer is money, and it'll take a fin minimum. Last year we gave him a six-dollar necktie and he came to the automatic conclusion that if it didn't come from a bargain basement we got it wholesale.

So it has to be money, and not even the banker in apartment 1-A can get that wholesale. His bank has, however, laid in a supply of new bills for Christmas giving. With special envelopes, too, which show the good green glint of the money, but not enough of the bill for anyone to tell that the dollar inside isn't a five or maybe a ten.

Another bad idea we have developed to a pretty high state is Christmas giving by business houses. There at the necktie counter is Mr. Johnson, shopping on behalf of International Incinerator. He wants two dozen ties for two dozen minor purchasing agents. Int'l Incin can't be with you this joyous morning, boys, but wants you to know the corporation is thinking of you, and your future orders. Johnson is stalled over a handpainted number with a zestful pattern of careening sailboats, trying to remember whether that jerk in South St. Paul is the one who is nuts about boats or can't stand them. The gent in South St. Paul isn't going to like it anyway; he expected something better. Here you have a scheming giver and a disappointed recipient with motives just as low. It oughtn't to happen at Christmas, as would be apparent to a retrograde ape.

Many a great innovator never gets his just reward. Somewhere a leftover coat of tar and feathers waits like the Little Toy Soldier for the thickwitted boor who first said "Let's get a little Christmas atmosphere around this office." Nothing succeeds like a bad idea, under a Gresham's Law that the shoddy ideas always drive the good ones out of circulation. So in thousands of business houses we strew pine branches on the filing cases and put streamers and wreaths on the cashier's cage. Don't be misled; the same old electrified barbed wire is up, in case you wanted an advance against salary.

There's a cute tree in Accounting, and the office manager, smiling painfully, sits beneath a sprig of mistletoe. This is all about as convincing as geraniums in a penitentiary window-box. To carry a bum idea to its fullest possible development, there is often an awkward little party, at which men and women with nothing in common except the same corporate employer exchange small and heavily comic gifts, in accordance with a drawing of names.

The girls usually like it — it's an hour off, anyway. The men stand around with wooden smiles. Somebody vivacious plays Santa Claus. Here's a present for Mr. Twinning from Miss Apperson! Miss Apperson is a girl Mr. Twinning knows only as somebody's secretary with sturdy Gothic legs, and he smiles his thanks to three wrong girls before hitting the right one. Open it, Mr. Twinning, let's see what it is. It's a — let's see, it's a puzzle, isn't it? I guess she thinks *you* are a puzzle, Mr. Twinning, get it? Oh, it's a key chain. . . . Anybody having any of this fruit cake? If Dickens had looked in on one or two of these soggy little scoundrels the hero of "A Christmas Carol" would be Scrooge, and he would be given lines far more forceful than bah, humbug and fiddlesticks. It wouldn't take much good taste to keep Christmas in the homes and the churches. Little as it would require, we haven't got it.

It is a little fraudulent of us to continue to use sleighing scenes and pictures of carolers in beaver hats as if they were characteristic of Christmas. What we ought to use are honest photographs of the Christmas shoppers, looking so cross the picture might be captioned "Surly Mob Mills Around Gates of Strikebound Plant." The shoppers will drop all pretense of manners by the final week — the thin veneer of veneer can't stand this.

Those whose true emotions shine through most clearly look like disgruntled looters. They couldn't be in worse

humor if they had been starved and teased three days before being let into the stores. Stung with warnings that the time is growing shorter and shorter, they plunge through aisles in a churlish daze, sore at everybody. Sore at the Parkers, for whose three children something must still be bought, sore at Aunt Emma for taking a size 42, sore at rival customers, sore at the store for stupidly running out of little red wagons.

"Wait for the next car, *please!* Honestly, what cattle!" That is the elevator operator's Christmas greeting. "Back inna bus, back inna rear!" is the season's snarl from the bus and trolley drivers. Enough ill will is generated at any single revolving door of any single department store for a small but savage war. This is our pre-Christmas showing of spite, peevishness, rapacity and several other unlovely qualities, and it is enough to send a fastidious citizen home badly depressed.

So far, in an instance of exceptional restraint, no one has used Holy Night as the theme song of a commercial. But there is music in the Christmas air, God knows. Twenty-seven times an hour, from loudspeakers in the street calling attention to Christmas Plumbing Specials, on the radio, on behalf of the Dry Cleaners With the Christmas Spirit, and in the stores, we hear White Christmas. Another 27 times we hear Jingle Bells.

And we have the confusing religious experience of hearing Little Town of Bethlehem blaring from the loudspeaker of somebody's filling station, where Christmasy signs urge you to make your car happy with a Yuletide greasing. I know a newspaper man who goes and gets drunk about a week before Christmas, singing "Hark the herald angels sing, Blatfogle's has got everything."

There was a day, in our innocence, when Christmas cards came from friends and carried no sales pitch. We have fixed that, too, in our zeal to devalue. Please accept this memo pad to remind a busy man of his appointments, reminding you, too, that whenever you need false teeth, Dr. Glazel, the production-line dentist, extends friendly credit. A Merry Christmas from a hotel where you stopped three years ago only long enough to discover it was a mistake. The new management is leaving no stone unturned to drum up business for the coming summer. Season's best, too, from old Charlie Fiddle, using the firm's cards. Charlie, whom you haven't seen for ten years or missed for fifteen, is greeting fifty or a hundred of his old college friends who might be in the market, come spring, for some landscape gardening. A merry Christmas from a couple of insurance men, a dealer in kitchen linoleum, and a roofer who wishes you joy and hopes your roof leaks. And a merry, merry Christmas from a small-loan company, which is thinking of you, as a hawk of a tired pigeon.

As I understand it, the star atop the Christmas tree symbolizes the Star of Bethlehem. As far as I know, nobody passes out stars which blink a sales message, such as "Keep Bright with Gleem, the Sink Cleaner Supreme." But we are apparently trying to abolish Christmas piecemeal, and I'd hate to bet that any offensive little touch will be overlooked long. To make the Christmas season what it is, combining many of the least charming features of a traffic jam, a fire sale, and the opening of Kansas, took bad taste lavishly expended. You've got to hand us this: we had what it took.

IMPORTED MUSIC

By RALPH DE SOLA

AMERICANS have always been suckers for imported music — good and bad. This season they will get plenty, mostly bad, and the cost will be higher than usual. Rare and beyond compare in the imported field, however, is "The Royal Philharmonic Orchestra of London, England — Sir Thomas Beecham, Bart., Conductor."

Music's distinguished baronet has at his own risk and expense brought his own orchestra to our shores for performances in 43 cities from Hartford to as far west as Madison, Wisconsin, down the river to New Orleans, and in the big seaboard centers, including New York, where I have greatly enjoyed two of his three concerts scheduled. Sir Thomas's advertising, quoted above in its entirety, his splendid record as a very great musician, and his attractive programs, have combined to reward his free-enterprise venture with sold-out houses throughout this country. His tour represents an individualistic and artistic triumph. It was conceived and is being executed without one farthing of assistance from his own socialist government or a penny of our ECA money. It is a shame to report that his offers to get new symphonic groups under way here were not better appreciated in the past when his services were at the disposal of several important American communities that stood to profit from his experience and enterprise.

Frankly, Beecham did better, musically speaking, when he guest-conducted our own Philharmonic in New York many years ago, for the tone of the U. S. orchestra is far more alive than that of Beecham's London group; and while many discriminating New Yorkers who heard the Royal Philharmonic came away from Carnegie Hall delighted, they somehow wished Beecham had been given a chance to preside over the exquisitely lush strings of the Boston Symphony, or to command the electric brilliance of the Philadelphia, or the wonderful sonorities of the New York, Chicago or San Francisco orchestra. Sir Thomas is far better than his present orchestra.

By way of complete contrast let us glance at the dark side of the commodity stamped "imported music." For this we are taxed heavily and to this we can listen by merely turning on the nearest radio. An almost endless series of ECA broadcasts of second- and third-rate European concert ensembles is available. Alas! dear radio listener, alas! dear music lover, no enthusiastic applause punctuates the ECA programs rebroadcast coast-to-coast and representing such varied attractions as Scandinavian string ensembles, Neapolitan nightingales, and groupings with names that sound like Pireaus Philharmonic.

What is wrong, you ask? Well — and this is strictly confidential — the programs, the performances and the performers sound no better than any similar collection of local talent drawn from Main Street, be it in White Plains, Wichita Falls, or Walla Walla. The reason is clear to any listener — ECA on the cultural level is no better than the music projects of early WPA. The free market place is still the best arbiter of taste that can be devised.



A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

The last war was fought by the Western democracies to rid the world of a tyrant. It was fought to save Poland from extinction. It was fought to keep Manchuria from being engulfed by a totalitarian power. It was fought to preserve the Open Door in the Far East. It was fought because of Cordell Hull's sense of obligation toward Chiang Kai-shek. It was fought to stop genocide. It was fought to save the world from Statism. It was fought to put an end to the economic policies of autarchy. It was fought to relieve the democracies of the burden of militarism.

Every one of these aims was a noble aim. But the raw, rude facts of 1950 are an ironic reminder that it takes more than zeal, more than military power, more than the recital of winged phrases, to win a war. It also takes brains applied to the proper understanding of man and his history.

For lack of brains, for lack of a proper understanding of man and his history, World War II has become a lost crusade. The world is still threatened by a tyrant. Poland has been extinguished. Manchuria has been engulfed by a totalitarian power. The Open Door in the Far East has been slammed shut. Chiang Kai-shek has been kicked around like a dog. Genocide is a policy, somewhat disguised to be sure, of the Soviet Union, which kills Jews for being "stateless cosmopolitans." The world is lurching steadily toward the final rigor mortis of extreme Statism. Economic autarchy reigns practically everywhere, despite the incantations of those who still hope to check it by "most favored nation" clauses negotiated in marginal fields that have little effect on the main issues of foreign trade. As for militarism, the costs of armament are rising every day.

How did the United States and Great Britain manage to throw away a great victory in such an incredibly short span of time? The story is told in two recent books, William Henry Chamberlin's "America's Second Crusade" (Regnery, \$3.75), and Hanson W. Baldwin's "Great Mistakes of the War" (Harper, \$1.50.) And the cream of the bitter jest is that neither Mr. Chamberlin nor Mr. Baldwin has written out of hindsight. They both knew what was to be expected from the policy of "unconditional surrender." They both knew that coalitions seldom outlast the disappearance of the common enemy. Mr. Baldwin ran up his warning signals about the fallacy of total war periodically in the *New York Times*. And Mr. Chamberlin, though he could command no regular daily pulpit, fought a brilliant guerrilla battle for the truth in publications as diverse as the socialist *New Leader*, the "isolationist" *Chicago Tribune*, the capitalist *Wall Street Journal* and the humanely traditionalist *Human Events*.

If Mr. Chamberlin and Mr. Baldwin had been the only sources of enlightenment during the days when official Washington presumed to be the keeper of every intellectual's conscience, there might have been some excuse for miffing the victory of 1945. After all, Mr. Chamberlin and Mr. Baldwin were merely journalists — and journalists, as we are told in season and out, are catch-as-catch-can fellows who fail to meet the stern requirements of scholarship-in-depth. Franklin D. Roosevelt, on the other hand, enjoyed a widespread reputation among the idolatrous for being a profound student of history. No doubt Mr. Roosevelt did know a lot about the party battles of the Jackson period and the life stories of Commodore Perry and John Paul Jones. But as for the fundamental dynamics of history, which are compounded of ideas and morals acting on force and vice versa, Mr. Roosevelt knew little or nothing. It so happens that in the early forties the great trilogy of Guglielmo Ferrero on war and peace was available to American readers in translation. Ferrero's searching and canny study of the Napoleonic cycle of wars and the subsequent peace of Vienna was a brilliant refutation of the whole theory of unconditional surrender and total war. Did Harry Hopkins ever expose himself to Ferrero's ideas? Did Roosevelt ever ask a brain-truster to digest them for him? If there is any record to such effect it is a record of a vaccination that didn't take.

Ferrero was, indeed, pondered seriously by Walter Lippmann in the late thirties and early forties. But Lippmann, for some unaccountable reason, forgot his own principles as World War II drew to a close. The author of "The Good Society," a book which conclusively proved that a stable peace is a function of limited government, private property economics and limited warfare fought to a conditional conclusion, turned his back on Ferrero just as history was about to endorse the soundness of the great Italian's ideas. With no publicist of importance taking up for Ferrero, it is scarcely to be wondered at that our peacemakers were cut off from a wisdom that might have saved them. The peacemakers of 1945 were more rootless than even the most superficial of journalists. Victims of modernist education, they knew no rules of human action. Nor did they bother to read the Leninist tracts that govern the policies of Soviet Russia and the Comintern. Our Hopkinses and Winants and Stettiniuses were not even aware that Stalin was a Marxist. When Stalin acted as such after Yalta it came as the rudest sort of jolt to official Washington. Dean Acheson can't believe it yet.

William Henry Chamberlin knew about communism, which is the parent of fascism, from long experience in Moscow as a *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent. But he was an irreverent man in the presence of pan-

jandrumry and guff. When he warned the United States to be wary of the hidden aims of its Muscovite ally he was looked upon as a saboteur of Grand Alliance spirit, a "hang-back boy," to use the lingo of the period. His chapter on "Wartime Illusions and Delusions," however, is a vigorous refutation of the theory that you must believe in the organization policies of hell when you are staking one devil to fight another.

Both Mr. Chamberlin and Mr. Baldwin knew from their reading of history that the doctrine of "unconditional surrender" leads to the creation of a power vacuum and a consequent serious disturbance of the balance of power. They also knew that the vacuums created in central Europe and East Asia by the complete atomization of German and Japanese society would invite swift expansion by the Soviet Union, which, since it is on a permanent war footing, must live by expansion or die. It was fashionable in 1945 to argue that we could not afford to allow Hitler or the Japanese warlords to set the conditions of surrender. But it was not a question of dealing with either Hitler or the Japanese warlords. As Mr. Chamberlin shows, there was a well-organized anti-Hitler underground in Germany ready to rise and deal with us the moment we gave the proper signal. We could have gotten rid of Hitler, Goebbels and Co. by a mere nod of the head. In the case of Japan, we did offer conditional surrender at the twenty-fifth hour — the "condition" being that the Japanese be allowed to keep their symbol of governmental legitimacy and continuity, the Emperor Hirohito.

Both Mr. Chamberlin and Mr. Baldwin think we should have eschewed the landing in southern France and the later stages of the Italian campaign in favor of a landing in force in the Balkans. They also think we should have made peace with a thoroughly defeated Japan before Soviet Russia had a chance to move in force into Manchuria. If we had done these two things we might have limited the Soviet Union to a purely defensive victory — which is certainly all it deserved after signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. But we were not thinking in terms of postwar realities in 1944 and 1945; we were thinking in terms of the moment — and of myth. And because we forgot that war is a political act as well as a military act, we lost the war politically. A witty man quoted by William Henry Chamberlin has said that Hitler won his war — in the person of Stalin. Only the most obdurate and lunkheaded of fools could doubt either the truth or the wit of this remark after digesting the full import of what Mr. Chamberlin and Mr. Baldwin have to say.

NOTE ON THE DECLINE OF SOAP-BOX ORATORY

The Square is still there
And the speakers are urgent
In shouting the claims
Of their causes divergent —
But somehow they don't sound
So wildly insurgent
When standing on cartons
Of liquid detergent.

WEARE HOLBROOK

JAPAN IN SURRENDER

Journey to The Missouri, by Toshikazu Kase. New Haven: Yale. \$4.00

Toshikazu Kase writes with mingled tenderness and skeptical head-shaking of his country, Japan, which, until World War II, had neither been invaded nor defeated. As a member of the Japanese Foreign Service, Kase was caught in the midst of the great drama into which his country plunged with the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

After the Japanese foreign office had made its futile fight to prevent the war, Toshikazu Kase's efforts were directed toward persuading his militarist-dominated government to sue for peace. Mr. Kase relates principally those events of which he has personal knowledge. While he endeavors to be dispassionate, his love for the West — especially the United States — and his deep and abiding patriotism, coupled with bitter hatred for the Japanese militarists (the "brainless warriors") plunge him into passionate, almost unguarded, emotion.

During the year following Japan's surrender on the battleship *Missouri*, I became well acquainted with Mr. Kase. I can assure the American reader that there can be no doubt of his sincerity, his character, and the acute mental anguish he suffered after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Kase was a member of the Emperor's surrender party, which boarded the *Missouri* on September 2nd, 1945. On the deck of the *Missouri* he felt as if he were "being subjected to the torture of the pillory. A million eyes seemed to beat on us. . . . Never had I realized that staring eyes could hurt so much." Then General MacArthur's radio address stunned Mr. Kase. He had expected harsh terms — all Japan was humiliated and prepared for punishment. Kase writes: "Here is the victor announcing the verdict to a prostrate enemy. He can impose a humiliating penalty if he so desires. And yet he pleads for freedom, tolerance, and justice. I was thrilled beyond words, spellbound, and thunderstruck."

Most Americans know the Japanese principally through the unspeakable cruelty wreaked by the militarists on our prisoners of war. These Americans will be compelled to reassess their views of the Japanese people after reading Mr. Kase's own condemnation of Japan's military caste. Mr. Kase makes it clear that the Japanese common people, whom the militarists regarded merely as fit for cannon fodder, wanted no war. He relates, step by step, how the civil branch of the Japanese Government, encouraged and led by the Emperor, first opposed the war and then secretly plotted as early as 1942 to bring about a peace.

In Japan the military leaders are independent of civil authority. As Kase puts it: "The Supreme Command was almighty; God and Caesar in one. The fact that the fighting services were absolutely free from political control was largely responsible for the abuse of power by the military."

In this statement there is a guarded warning for the United States if it continues its recent practice of being careless about the constitutional provision for checks and balances.

Even Kase, who was in a position to know, finds it difficult to list the various and separate attempts of the civil branch of Japan's Government to bring about peace. He is justly impatient with Russia, which the Japanese

tried repeatedly to use as a mediator, beginning as early as 1944.

Mr. Kase expresses no resentment, however, over President Truman's reported approval of Russia's inaction when Stalin first disclosed at Potsdam the Japanese request that Russia act as mediator in peace conversations between Japan and the United States.

What Mr. Kase could not have known — and possibly does not yet know — is that, beginning in the middle of February 1945, the United States Government, through secret intelligence sources, knew of Japan's attempt to institute peace conversations, using Russia as mediator.

By April, 1945, terrible military reverses had enabled the Emperor to appoint octogenarian Admiral Kantaro Suzuki as Prime Minister. Suzuki was a pacifist. In the 1936 uprising of the young officers, he had been attacked by assassins and survived as by miracle.

His appointment as Prime Minister, so Suzuki himself told me in 1946, was intended by the Japanese to be a signal that the Emperor was endeavoring to surrender. Some day it would be revealing if ex-President Herbert Hoover would write the story of how he so interpreted this Suzuki appointment and then failed in his attempt of May 24, 1945, to persuade President Truman to exploit the favorable opportunity for an early peace.

Mr. Kase, like the rest of the Japanese with whom I have talked, discloses no particular bitterness toward us for dropping the atomic bomb. He feels a deep sense of guilt for the militarists who struck at Pearl Harbor — and in humiliation he accepts the atomic bomb as just punishment for that barbarity. He holds — along with Col. Henry Stimson — that a remark of Prime Minister Suzuki to the effect that "the Japanese Government would ignore the Potsdam Proclamation" was the reason the United States dropped the bomb on Hiroshima. To quote Mr. Kase: "Had Suzuki been more steadfast or his advisers less stupid, we might have been spared the atomic attack."

Mr. Kase also feels that the Suzuki rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation brought Russia into the war. A few pages later, however, he evidently reconsiders: "We did not know," he says, "that on June 1, 1945, the American authorities adopted recommendations to the effect that the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible." And that Russia, "from about February (1945) on," had been sending "powerful forces with offensive equipment into Siberia at the rate of some thirty carloads a day."

The position of the Emperor in the minds of the Japanese is not fully spelled out in this book, yet the reader clearly senses his emergence as a great leader in his own right. Not only his dramatic forcing of Japan's surrender upon his militarists, but also his clear contribution toward the success of the occupation, leaves no doubt as to our wisdom in retaining him.

Yet until the very end Mr. Kase was gravely apprehensive over the fate of the Emperor, because "men like Owen Lattimore were known to be advocating the internment in China of the Emperor and of all males eligible for the throne."

In Mr. Kase's postscript one finds unmistakable astuteness: "Armaments are a relative affair. There is no end to an armament race." As one of the contending parties

forges ahead, the military strategists of the other side deem "it necessary to force the issue by resorting to war before it should become too late."

Is Mr. Kase warning the Western world?

BONNER FELLERS

MOONSHINE HOLLYWOOD

Hollywood, The Dream Factory, by Hortense Powdermaker. Boston: Little, Brown. \$3.50

The people of Hollywood, like most people, love to talk about themselves. Like most people, also, they love to talk about their neighbors; and their loquacity is seldom matched by reciprocal charity. So Dr. Hortense Powdermaker, an experienced anthropological field worker in Melanesia and Mississippi, was sure of a hearty welcome and much lively conversation when she arrived in the motion picture capital with her ears and eyes open and her notebooks handy. She spent a year there, seeing what she could see for herself and interviewing executive producers, ordinary producers, writers, directors, stars, character actors, starlets, publicity men, and perhaps even agents. She began with the reasonable hypothesis that there must be an influential relationship between the "social system underlying the production of movies" and the character of the movies produced. Her purpose was to explain this relationship. "Hollywood, the Dream Factory" contains her findings, including a number of individual case histories, and presents her explanations.

Dr. Powdermaker is an excellent reporter. A good many of her facts must be widely known, and it may be said safely that all her facts are familiar to every intelligent person who has been associated for any length of time with what Hollywood calls "the industry." But Dr. Powdermaker has done a neat job of tying these facts together in a tidy bundle. For this she deserves praise.

She points to Hollywood's emphasis on income brackets, and the social consequences of this emphasis when it comes to the preparation of guest lists. She assures us that it is important in Hollywood, perhaps even more so than elsewhere, to know and consort with the right people. Confronted by Hollywood's important "symbols" of wealth and sex, and seeking to discover their relationship to reality, she concludes that motion picture makers in all departments are paid more than their counterparts in the outside world; but she does not believe that there is "more or less sexual activity in Hollywood than anywhere else." The making of movies, she informs us, "is both a big business and a popular art." Since movies are "a mass medium" they must make a profit if they are to exist in our society. So there is, in movie-making as it is practiced, a basic conflict between art and business; and the conflict "is not confined to different groups of men, but may be found within the same individual." (Hence those ulcers.)

Every group engaged in picture-making, she finds, is sure that its contribution is the most important, and there is a ceaseless jockeying for position and power. No one feels that his job is secure, so the industry functions in an atmosphere of constant fear. It functions also in a state of perpetual crisis and improvisation. Producers regard every picture as a gamble; Hollywood has the air

of a gamblers' den. (One wonders how familiar Dr. Powdermaker is with the quaint customs of other areas of the entertainment world.) Great sums of money are wasted on the purchase of story material; greater sums are wasted in preparing it for the screen. Fine talents are thrown away or perverted. Writers are the slaves of the producers, for they are compelled to project the fantasies of these "foremen" and "bosses," most of whom "know nothing or very little about writing, acting, directing, composing, or painting"; most of whom came to their positions of power by the luck of getting an early start in a booming, popular business. Producers sweat over physical details, but ignore meanings. Pictures are made under conditions that the ordinary American workman would find "debasement," for even the highest-salaried men and women receive their pay by virtue of contracts that place them at the mercy of their studios. (Dr. Powdermaker writes as if all important actors, directors, and writers worked under long-term contracts. This, of course, is not true.) In the highly collaborative enterprise of picture-making "a striking and complete lack of mutual respect as well as trust" is the rule. Everyone dislikes and despises everyone else, but a totalitarian authority rules from on high.

Yes, Dr. Powdermaker is a good factual reporter; although she has been misled into exaggeration when she writes that in Hollywood "actors are looked down upon as a kind of subhuman species. No one respects them." It is only when she offers her interpretations and seeks to draw anthropological parallels between Hollywood and primitive South Sea societies that she compels us to take her less seriously than she takes herself. When, for example, she finds in the industry's censorship Code (Hayes-Johnston Office) a system of magical taboos comparable to those of the Melanesians, and insists on "the many-sided failure of the Code," she is ignorantly wide of the mark. The Code, with all its apparent absurdities, was created for a very practical, not a magical purpose. It was designed to keep Hollywood's films from being cut to shreds by local censors, and it has successfully done just that. The taboos of the Code are not those of Hollywood, but those of Topeka, Philadelphia, Boston and Mobile. Nor can the use of stars and tested story patterns be equated with magical formulas. Stars outlive their potency, to be sure, but new stars replace them with new attractive power at the box-office. And a "cycle" of similar pictures is cut short as soon as one or two pictures of the cycle fail to be profitable. This is not the way of primitive peoples, who cling to unchanging magical formulas in the face of innumerable failures.

Indeed, Dr. Powdermaker's over-all theory that Hollywood is slowly emerging "from a dim prehistoric past of illusions, fears, and magical thinking" is anthropological moonshine. Hollywood has depended and does depend, not on magic, but on trial and error. (There's no business like show business.) It could be infinitely more efficient. It should not waste talent as it does. It should make far better pictures. But it could not be less magical. And, Dr. Powdermaker to the contrary, the conflict between art and big business in Hollywood is "inherent" and "necessary." It is also, of course, deplorable.

Dr. Powdermaker's conversational year yielded her many facts; but she did not quite understand some of them.

BEN RAY REDMAN

LIFE WITH JUNIOR

Twentieth Century Unlimited, edited by Bruce Bliven.
Philadelphia: Lippincott. \$3.50

Few symposium books are quarrelsome. The basic notion of works of this sort is to show that while experts may have opinions as various as their specialties there is a consensus of difference, so to speak; they are oriented toward the same goal, although they have chosen separate paths leading to it. If all of them seem to be toiling at a great distance from the Promised Land, the reader can pick the man who seems to him a likely winner. There's something for nearly everybody in a symposium book if only the contributors don't insist on blazing the same trail over and over again. On the other hand it won't do to have them squabbling with each other, for the purpose of these collective volumes is to give readers the pleasure of arriving at a judgment, and not of refereeing a combat.

The Promised Land of this symposium, which Bruce Bliven has put together out of pieces from the *New Republic*, is the answer to a question: whither America, or, is there any serious reason for despairing of the future? The responses vary considerably in quality. Suppose we make a sampling of the first five of them. Elmer Davis has a remarkably good essay on "What Hope for World Government?" (there is none at present). Leon Svirsky, a popular science expert, discusses "The Atom in Peace and War" (you won't worry so much about it if you know how it works). Edward U. Condon has a tricky piece on "Science and Civilization" (the method of science — if you don't mind the way he juggles words like *technology* and *valid* in place of *science* and *truth*, respectively — can solve most of the problems of society). Marguerite Clark, another popular science expert, assembles a catalogue of clips on new cures to show "The Advance of Medicine." George R. Cowgill demonstrates, in "Food and the Future," that now we know what to eat. There are eleven more, including one genuine oddity, Robert R. Nathan's piece on "American Business Today and Tomorrow" (he concludes that if businessmen take advice from labor they will survive, despite their stupidity; a point which makes one wonder why Mr. Bliven did not give this topic to Philip Murray, who holds forth wearily, and without a trace of originality, on "The Future of Trade Unionism"). The best thing in the book is a thoughtful review of "Mid-Century Manners and Morals" by Clyde Kluckhohn, an anthropologist.

The big question, however, remains unanswered: Whither America? If we are going to have another war no knowledge of the atom bomb will immunize anybody against the effects of it and the best cures will not bring the dead to life; if our economy goes to pot, labor unions will not be able to dicker with capitalists, or give them advice, but will have to coax workers not to strike (as in England) or police them outright, as in Russia; and if the federal patronage and subsidy machine now mis-called the Democratic Party continues to develop into a national Tammany Hall — on the principle of a bit of boodle for everybody with a ballot — we may wake up to find ourselves trying to buy groceries with "tax anticipation warrants" or some other form of scrip.

Lacking a clear answer to the question, Whither

America?, the reader will be tempted to ask a question on his own: Why this book? The reasons are spelled out in Mr. Bliven's introduction. He is a passionate hater of nostalgia. When many people jumped to the conclusion that the first half of this century was over at the stroke of midnight last New Year's Eve, says Mr. Bliven, they were wrong. "Presumably on the theory that forty-nine cents is half a dollar," he remarks severely, they made this simple error. Certain newspapers and magazines did worse. They ran stories about Life With Father and pictures of horsecars, bicycle parades, grotesque automobiles and other paraphernalia of the McKinley era. At that time, to be sure, mankind was "firmly intrenched in the theory that this is the best of all possible worlds." But the important time is now, if not tomorrow. In the past forty-nine years we have seen an alteration of the moral climate from a mood of overwhelming optimism to one which comes pretty close to despair. We are frightened to death. We are afraid of atomic, biological and chemical warfare (Mr. Bliven has a new wrinkle on this subject: a small cylinder of di-iso-propyl-fluorophosphate released on a windless day would kill everybody on Manhattan in two or three hours). We are also afraid of propaganda — "the fiery furnace of indoctrination" — in Mr. Bliven's excited phrasing. We are afraid there will be too many people and not enough for them to eat.

What the magazines and newspapers should have done, according to Mr. Bliven, was to eschew all that quaint poppycock about Life With Father. What they should have dwelt on is Life With Junior. Junior's world is equipped with airplanes, radio and television sets, sulfa drugs, antibiotics, psychoanalysis and atomic energy. Junior will have more of these good things in the future. However, his present worriments appear to increase also; for Junior, whom Mr. Bliven conceives in his own image, cannot learn from the past. He can only learn from the future and it is not here yet. That is why Mr. Bliven has called upon his sixteen specialists. Experts are the prophets of our era and what they say to him, generally speaking, is that the offensive use Junior has made of the novelties at the foot of the scientific Christmas tree is nothing compared to the dangers that may accompany the still newer gadgets that are ripening on its branches.

With such a fear in mind, Mr. Bliven embarks on a summarizing contribution. The reason why we fight wars over the gifts of science is because we live too much by our history, which is pre-scientific or non-scientific. There is only one way to cure that human propensity to remember the past. We must review our history by the light of science alone and apply the result to the correction of our present gloom. Take the fundamental problem of the economics of the future:

Ever since Marx and Engels published the Communist Manifesto in 1848 there had been a steady growth of the idea that a society was possible which would be founded on cooperation, not competition; a society in which the industrial revolution — which had produced a population barely above the starvation level, a population in which, at the beginning, children of six or seven worked twelve hours a day and seven days a week — would bring abundance to everybody.

The thought is familiar or even banal, but for a man so terrified of propaganda, Mr. Bliven displays remark-

able innocence in pushing his own line of that stuff. *Cooperation* and *competition* are sticky words. It is certainly arguable that a market economy, which is based on the voluntary exchange of goods and services, is the only one that can be truly described as cooperative.

However, what we have here is a supposed statement of fact: Mr. Bliven says the industrial revolution lowered the standard of living to the starvation point and abused children. Is that true, or rather, to refer to Mr. Bliven's standard of value, is it scientific? It's what the "Hammond" books say (the three volumes on English town, village and country workers by J. L. and Barbara Hammond which appeared about 35 years ago). But the Hammonds had an axe to grind. They were associated with the Fabian socialist movement. Other Socialists continue to repeat their statements *ad nauseam*. Yet there have been subsequent studies, less descriptive and less readable to be sure, which apply a more thoroughgoing statistical analysis to the same problem. Mr. Bliven ought to know that the only way sociology can be made to look like a science is through the use of statistics. These more scientific investigations reveal that the first factory workers left the farm in order to earn some cash money, like the hillbillies, crackers and Okies of our own country.

The swarming of those wage-hungry people into the newly industrialized towns, still functioning under forms of municipal government inherited from the Middle Ages, led to the development of a peculiar squalor. Peculiar not in degree but in proximity; intellectuals and other members of the ruling class live in towns, and this thing happened under their noses. Consider, to grasp the point rightly, what we mean by a *slum*. It is almost impossible to imagine a rural slum. The thatched huts or shacks of the peasantry are dispersed over the countryside and each of them is surrounded by grass, trees, flowers, birds and fresh air. From a distance the poor peasant seems merely to be roughing it, and in a rather picturesque way, too. One has to sit down at his table and sleep in his bed to discover how hungry, verminous, cold and ailing he and his children can be, even in the bosom of Mother Nature. But *he* knew; he lived there, and he acted accordingly by hot-footing it to the factory when he got the chance. As for the early capitalistic use of child labor, it supplied, at least, a way of keeping those waifs alive. Let Mr. Bliven examine the mortality rates of eighteenth-century foundling hospitals and orphanages before leaping to a conclusion.

This is the crucial case in Mr. Bliven's excursion into economic history. He manages to be just as wonderfully mistaken in his references to recent political history, even when dealing with a subject so close to his interests as the difference between Socialists and Communists. The moral of his piece is that what we face today are the twin evils of Depression and War. As to the former:

The scientific approach to this problem rules out adherence to any fixed set of beliefs. . . . It prescribes instead a mixed economy in which problems are solved as they arise, by whatever means seems most appropriate in each individual case, the only unifying principle being collective responsibility for those aspects of individual welfare which are clearly beyond the individual's personal control.

But that is surely the formula for muddle rather than science. Savages solve problems as they arise; scientists

are supposed to solve them in advance. As to the latter, "the morbid over-aggressiveness which characterizes so many people today is partly curable and almost wholly preventable, given sufficiently complete control of the environment from birth."

Thus Mr. Bliven's rotary argument makes a full circle and meets itself coming as well as going. The new knowledge of psychiatry will adjust individuals to society better than they can do it for themselves by controlling them "from birth," for man is master of his own environment and you cannot control it without controlling him. If this plan works, and it can only be carried out by an agency with the unlimited powers of a totalitarian state, the individual who has been processed in that way will be incapable of complaining about anything at all. He's been scientifically fitted to society, hasn't he? And does he dare to gripe? Shoot the bastard!

ASHER BRYNES

PROBLEMS OF WATER

Water, Land and People, by Bernard Frank and Anthony Netboy. New York: Knopf. \$4.00

So far as I know this is the first book to have been written which deals with the problems of water in terms that will be understandable to everybody. It is also an eminently readable book for which there has long been a need. It is a very fair and well-informed story of all aspects of the water problem, and the authors have written it without taking sides or slipping into the doctrinaire and professionally bureaucratic and petty point of view which renders so much of our government information over-specialized, distorted and sometimes of little value.

The problems of flood control, of irrigation and industrial water, of city water supplies, of pollution, of fishing, both industrial and sporting, have become increasingly serious with a steadily gaining momentum. Most city dwellers, and especially those in New York, have become alarmed in recent years because the problems have struck home and it is no longer possible to ignore them.

As the authors point out, countless factors have led up to the situation in which we now find ourselves. From the very beginning of the nation, the exploitation and waste of all our natural resources has set a record unequalled by that of any people at any time in history. This was a large, rich, well-watered and underpopulated country until very recent times. But population has grown rapidly; ground cover in the form of grasses and forests has been plowed up, cut and burned over; and industry has brought about immense concentrations of people living in great cities and making, together with the industry which brought them together, unimagined new demands upon local and regional supplies of water. In the Southwest the demand for water for industrial city and agricultural purposes has caught up with and passed the supply. Barring some formula by which sea water can be purified for drinking and industrial use, the prospects for the Southwest of growth in population, in industry and agriculture seem to be checked. But the difficulties are not limited to the semi-arid regions alone. In Ohio, a state with a good and well-balanced rainfall, the water table at which ground water is available in reasonable quantities has been dropping steadily to a

point where in some cities it is difficult to provide water for one more industry and, in some cases, for even one more family.

Such shortages are brought about in two ways. One: by the fact that in such a state as Ohio (which was originally almost entirely a forest state) the supply of water finding its way underground has been steadily diminishing until quite recently through the stripping of ground cover and through soil erosion. And two: by the greatly increased demand for underground water for industry and for a rising population.

Conversely, the same run-off water which should have been going underground has caused vast problems of flooding and siltation which cost the nation close to a billion dollars or more a year in the building of levees and dams and the dredging of silted stream channels and harbors.

How to correct all this? The authors, writing fairly and temperately, find a proper course between the programs of the Army Engineers, whose only solution is to dredge more and more and build higher and higher downstream dams and levees, and the cranks who would eliminate all of these measures. The Messrs. Frank and Netboy believe, rightly I think, that the problems can best be solved through the proper development of watersheds and through the wise use of headwater dams to impound floods at their source. The really fundamental answer, however, is better agricultural, grazing land and forestry management; only occasionally is the use of levees and big dams a basic necessity.

Of course, there are many kinds of watershed developments — all the way from the pattern of the Tennessee Valley Authority to the Muskingum Flood Control District and Conservancy, the first largely an affair of centralized government, the second operating in the form of a public corporation with both state and federal governments excluded from authority, save where the Army Engineers have control of the dams under existing laws which the Hoover Commission thinks should be changed. The authors are apparently in agreement with the recommendations of the Hoover Commission, as are many other authorities who have watched for years some of the more preposterous operations of the Army Corps.

What the authors make perfectly clear is that we are faced by the absolute necessity of taking quick and sensible action with regard to the water, forests and soil which are our most important natural resources. Fortunately in the field of soil erosion, more progress has been made in the past five or six years than could reasonably have been hoped for in a generation. We are still far behind in the management of our forests and our water supplies. The three resources are, as the authors point out, tied together and inseparable, each one affecting the other and not, as some of our over-specialized bureaucrats would have us believe, separate and isolated problems.

I would recommend this book to every good citizen and think it worthy of being used as a textbook in all high schools and colleges. It is not only readable, it is interesting and stimulating. Once you have read it you will have a sound and comprehensive understanding of the problems with which it deals and with their almost frightening importance to the future of this country.

LOUIS BROMFIELD

DIANETIC FICTION-SELECTOR

The Story: A Critical Anthology, edited by Mark Schorer.
New York: Prentice-Hall. \$3.35

Anyone interested in contemporary fiction knows where Mr. Schorer stands: under the banner of St. Flaubert, on the side of the writer for whom creation is primarily a conscious act, and against the darkly-possessed genius who lets free association and automatic writing have their way until the publisher is dazedly confronted with a "morasssterpiece."

Surveying American fiction in 1947, Mr. Schorer wrote: "For every six or seven men or women now writing distinguished poetry, one can name perhaps one man or woman now writing distinguished fiction. Is it absurd to suggest that our poetry has had the advantage of a large and excellent accompaniment in criticism, and that the peculiar excellence of the criticism exists in its concern with formal considerations, with a rigorous analysis of poetic technique?" It is just such a New Criticism for fiction that Mr. Schorer has been working since 1947 to set up.

Even those who may have wondered whether "distinguished fiction," so promoted, would necessarily mean *live* fiction (say, more novels like Henry Green's or Rayner Heppenstall's, or the second novel of James Agee) have appreciated Mr. Schorer's good intentions. They have applauded Mr. Schorer's standard-raising "Technique as Discovery" essay of 1948, and have watched for his reviews. For Mr. Schorer seemed to realize that "technique" is a plastic, an intrinsic, a *quick* thing, inseparable from its subject, and having nothing to do with formulae or jargon. Younger writers may even have felt that America had now been made safe for a possible generation of mid-century masters: Mr. Schorer would assuredly be among those to recognize them early.

However, if the present anthology represents Mr. Schorer's 1950 views, he had better not be counted on to recognize anything — saving, perhaps, another critic. For he seems finally to have concluded that writing a story is not only a conscious act, but a chill and securely formularized one as well.

The Schorer anthology design is tidy and inoffensive: twenty-four stories arranged to illustrate the cumulative complexity which the art of fiction can achieve. The selections are fresher than usual; most of them are good; and the schoolmarmish little questionnaires at the ends of the stories can be ignored. It is the interpolated commentaries that betray.

It is in these commentaries that Mr. Schorer approaches the creative act as though it were a *fait* which had been *accompli* from the start. Reading his remarks, one gets the impression that writing a story amounts to something like this: the writer switches on his Electro-Dianetic Fiction-Selector, turns a knob to Anecdote, or Character Conflict, or Symbolism, or Meaning Through Style, and promptly, without any static at all, a prim, cool little voice comes in, reading a recipe which the writer has only to follow. In some of Mr. Schorer's own words (page 113), it sounds like this:

As it characteristically amalgamates the narrative and the dramatic methods, so fiction characteristically amalgamates subject and objective delineations of character.

Now there is no untruth here; and perhaps "creative" writing teachers will find it reassuring. But from Mr. Schorer I expected more. After all, he writes stories himself. Surely he knows that genuine creation of any kind is a very non-Aristotelian affair, an act of bringing something into consciousness; moreover, an act involving committal and risk, having almost nothing to do with these snug, *a posteriori* generalizations. And whatever Mr. Schorer's purpose in his collection — "to assist the reader in appreciation," says the blurb — some insight into this aspect of creation would have been more enlightening.

ROBERT PHELPS

PRIVATE VENGEANCE

Reprisal, by Arthur Gordon. New York: Simon and Schuster. \$3.00


Based frankly on an actual incident — a wanton lynching of four Negroes which occurred a few years ago — "Reprisal" is an exciting, angry novel. Having lost his young wife at the hands of a gang of local thugs, having learned that three of her murderers have been identified but have escaped retribution, Nathan Hamilton, in this story, decides to act for himself, and returns to his home town, Hainesville, in the role of an avenger. His coming, his acts of vengeance, have catastrophic consequences — not only for Nathan himself, of course, but also for the town, which has been suffering since the lynching from a deep sense of guilt and which now sees old wounds reopened.

Except for its revenge motif, which is definitely unusual, "Reprisal" has much in common with other recent novels which have dealt with racial conflict in the South. That is, the social issues are discussed frequently, the pros and cons argued, and the author has been scrupulous in introducing a number of white characters who do not share the besotted prejudices which he attributes to the community at large. What chiefly distinguishes the book, in fact, is not its material or implied commentary — both are all too familiar — but the pace, drive and tautness of Mr. Gordon's writing, his skill in weaving and then resolving a very complex pattern, and in keeping the reader limp with suspense. Although it is unquestionably the product of honest indignation, "Reprisal" emerges as a kind of super-thriller. I suspect it will hold an audience who would ordinarily be allergic to a theme so grim.

To say this, of course, is not in itself a criticism, and certainly "Reprisal," in many ways, is a masterly job — one that both stings and galvanizes. For all its sincerity, however, it somehow lacks depth, and this is particularly true of the people involved, whose surfaces one very rarely penetrates. Nathan, for example — a kind of archetype of the educated young Negro — is little more than a cypher, an instrument of vengeance, which prevents one from participating as fully as one should in his agony and the problems which confront him. One feels, too often, that Mr. Gordon is manipulating his characters for the purposes of the plot, and using them as mouth-pieces for tentatively stated theories which he is not quite ready to espouse openly. A William Faulkner, a Robert Penn Warren, would have searched deeper and more fruitfully beneath the surface of violence, but meanwhile Mr. Gordon has done very well, and given us a book that is charged with excitement.

EDITH H. WALTON


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